


H. Carr, C. S. B.

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EDITED BY

WILLIAM KNIGHT, LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

K A N T

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K A N T

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
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P R E F A C E.

A FEW words stand here by way of explanation and acknowledgment.

The biography (in which the quotation of authorities or reference to them would have necessitated a doubling of the allotted space) is founded on Schubert's life of Kant, and on the early memoirs, which have been largely corrected and added to in accordance with more recent information. Special mention on this head is due to Professor Benno Erdmann's essays on Knutzen and the 'Kritik;' to Dr Emil Arnoldt's sketch of Kant's early life; and to several articles in different numbers of the 'Altpreussische Monatsschrift.' For the communication of the last I am indebted to the kindness of Dr Rudolf Reicke of Königsberg, whose devotion to Kant is known to all brethren of the craft, and whose promised edition of the philosopher's correspondence will enable the last thirty years of his life to be written with more fulness than heretofore.

The account of Kant's philosophy is founded directly on his own works. Chapter viii. gives glimpses of his scientific theories; chapter ix. notes the more salient points in his metaphysical views up to 1766; chapter


xi. analyses the first quarter of the 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft;' chapter xii. sums up the results of the rest of that work; chapter xiii. deals with the first part of the 'Kritik der Urtheilskraft,' the second part of which is connected in chapter xiv. with the two chief ethical treatises. The 'Prolegomena' and the 'Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft' are passed by; the 'Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft' is briefly alluded to in the life; and the later essays, like the lectures, are only mentioned.

There have within the last five years been published in England many works on Kant. The present little book has been partly shaped by the desire not to tread more than was inevitable on ground they had already occupied with greater plenitude. Those who wish to study Kant more profoundly will find a penetrating exposition of his central doctrine in Dr Hutchison Stirling; an eloquent and suggestive account of the first 'Kritik' in Professor Caird; a well-reasoned *résumé* of the theoretical and moral philosophy in Professor Adamson; and an able and elaborate review of current English opinion on Kant in Professor Watson. And these are only the works of larger dimensions on this topic. Those who may wish to read Kant in translations may be safely referred (in addition to older versions by Semple, Heywood, and Meiklejohn) to Professor Mahaffy's translation of the 'Prolegomena,' &c.; to Professor Abbott's rendering of the Moral treatises; and to Professor Max Müller's centenary translation of the first edition of the 'Kritik.'

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K A N T.

CHAPTER I.

KÖNIGSBERG.

IN the records of philosophy it is a rare thing to find much said of the local habitations of philosophers. The world in which they are supposed to be most at home is an abstract world—the invisible kingdom of ideas, freed from the limitations of particular place and particular time. They work their achievements by the impersonal agency of books. In the crowd which pursues the several avocations of a complex civilisation, their individuality leaves no trace. No single place is associated with the names of Aristotle or of Descartes, of Locke or Leibnitz. It is only in very special circumstances that the city of a philosopher has interest for his biographer.

There are, however, exceptions. In the ancient world the life and work of Socrates would be barely intelligible without some picture of Athenian society

in the fifth century B.C. And the city of Königsberg forms an almost equally significant background in the life of Kant. It was there, on the 22d April 1724, that he was born ; there in its schools and university that he was educated ; there that he was for nearly fifty years a public teacher ; and there, on the 12th February 1804, that he died, in his eightieth year. For about nine years only of this period was his lot cast outside Königsberg ; and even in those years he never crossed the frontiers of East Prussia, the province of which Königsberg is the capital. Kant is therefore in a special sense the philosopher of Königsberg : and that city may to the imaginative enthusiast have some claim to be called the City of the Pure Reason. His name and fame still cling to the place which, while he was alive, looked up half in admiration, half in curiosity, to Professor Kant as its hero and ornament.

Even at the present day Königsberg has somewhat of an out-of-the-world situation. It stands about 360 miles to the north-east of Berlin, and about 100 miles from the Russian border, in a province where the German element is flanked by the Lithuanian nationality on the one hand and by the Slavonic on the other. The river Pregel, on which it stands, falls into the shallow waters of the Frisches Haff a few miles below ; and communication with the Baltic is found at Pillau, where the Haff joins with that sea, about thirty miles from Königsberg. The town, intersected by the branches of the Pregel and by the Schlossteich, gradually rises from the river to the north and north-west suburbs, from which a view of the Haff can be obtained. It is a fortified town, with a population of more than 120,000, with

a garrison of about 7000, and a university attended by about 700 students.

But in the middle of last century, Königsberg, though a smaller place, was probably a more important factor in the intellectual life of the district north-east of the Vistula. The Russian Colossus had not yet thrown its fatal shadow over the Teutonic borderlands. Poland had not yet been partitioned between its powerful neighbours, and Courland still owed a certain allegiance to the Polish throne. In fact, there still seemed to survive a sort of spiritual image of the union which, under the Grand-masters of the Teutonic Order at Marienburg, had embraced the lands between the Oder and the Gulf of Finland. Königsberg in this period gravitated towards the Baltic provinces—as they are now styled—of Russia, more than towards Brandenburg. Riga, Mitau, Libau—the chief towns of Courland—again and again appear in the lives of the scholars of East Prussia. It is to Courland and Livonia that Hamann and Herder—not to mention others of Kant's contemporaries—betake themselves when their *Lehrjahre* are over. Hartknoch, the bookseller of Riga, who published the '*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*,' was a worthy instrument in promoting the enlightenment of the whole country. And on the other hand, the province of East Prussia—the old duchy of Prussia, of which Königsberg was the chief town, and from which the electors of Brandenburg had borrowed the title of their royalty—was then cut off from the other lands of the Prussian crown by an intervening tract of alien ground. Up to the year 1772, when the first partition of Poland was carried out, the district south of Danzig and Elbing—

what was subsequently formed into the province of West Prussia—was still included among the territories belonging to the anarchic kingdom of Poland. For two-thirds of what is now the railway route from Berlin to Königsberg the traveller would have been on Polish soil. Friedrich Wilhelm I. had done his best to cherish and develop the economy of East Prussia: he had settled its deserted lands with exiles from other parts of the empire. About 20,000 Protestants, for example, who had been obliged for religion's sake to quit Salzburg, were introduced by his forethought to fill up in part the enormous gaps made in the population of East Prussia by the plague of 1709 and 1710, when nearly 250,000 are said to have fallen victims to its violence.

East Prussia was governed by a ministry in Königsberg, under the superintendence of the Council of State at Berlin. At the beginning of every new reign, the sovereign visited the town to receive the homage of his subjects in the court of the grand old castle. But for a long period during the eighteenth century East Prussia lost the favour of its king, and was denied the grace of his presence. During the struggles of the Seven Years' War, the province was for about five years—from January 1758 till the autumn of 1762—in the possession of the Russians. Königsberg was administered by a Russian governor, and the great hall which the Muscovites added to the *Schloss* seemed to indicate that in their opinion the connection between the Prussian province and Brandenburg was severed for ever. Frederick the Great never forgave the East Prussians for what he seems to have considered a defection; and though the Russians quitted the province in 1763, after

the peace of Hubertusburg, he never set foot in it for the remaining twenty-one years of his life. In the year 1786, when the homagings to the new king, Friedrich Wilhelm II., took place, we shall see Kant as rector of the university for the year taking part in the proceedings.

In 1544 Albert Duke of Prussia (Hinter-Preussen), who also introduced the Reformation into these parts, founded at Königsberg a university, hence known as the *Albertina*. About the year 1780 it numbered thirty-eight professors. The university buildings were then situated in the vicinity of the cathedral, in the Kneiphof, an island surrounded by two arms of the Pregel. The professors, however, mainly taught in their own rooms or houses in different parts of the city: thus, as we shall see, Kant's lecture-room was first in his lodgings and later in his house. Königsberg, which in 1781 had a population of 54,000, exclusive of garrison and foreigners, was esteemed a large town; and "large towns," says the historian of the University of Königsberg, "have the advantage that the professors, by their services at the churches or the courts, or in medical practice or otherwise, have some opportunity of making up for their defective stipends, and are not compelled for the sake of bread to burden the learned world with useless and superfluous writings." An advantage of a somewhat dubious character! At least one professor in the end of the eighteenth century could say that to hold a professorship in Königsberg was as good as taking a vow of poverty.

There were two ways of looking at Königsberg as a home. By the literary man, turning with eager yearn-

ing towards Leipsic, which, for the earlier two-thirds of the eighteenth century, was the intellectual and especially the literary centre of Germany, Königsberg was not unnaturally described as a Scholar's Siberia (*ein gelehrtes Sibirien*); and with some pardonable exaggeration, it might be asserted that books, like comets, allowed years to elapse between one appearance in Leipsic and a second when they managed to reach East Prussia. Kant himself could feel this isolation from the world of letters; yet, on the other hand, he has given expression to the optimistic view of the situation. "A large town," he says, "the centre of a kingdom, in which are situated the ministries of the local government, which has a university (for the culture of the sciences), and which, moreover, possesses a site suitable for maritime trade,—which by means of rivers favours intercommunication with the interior of the country not less than with the remote lands on the frontier, lands of different languages and customs,—such a town, like Königsberg on the river Pregel, may be taken as a suitable spot for extending not merely a knowledge of men, but even a knowledge of the world, so far as it is possible to acquire the latter without travelling."

The Königsberg of last century is redolent of a free democratic air. The town and the university, the merchant and the scholar, the teacher and the statesman, meet on the same platform, and interchange their ideas as a common currency. There is less of the separation of ranks, less of the isolation of professions, than one is prepared to expect. Man meets man on the universal field of intelligent human interests. In the *salons* of the highest Königsberg society, the sons of the people,

like Kant, Hamann, and Kraus, meet and mingle freely with the rich and the high-born of the land. The result is seen in the noble independence of Scheffner,—in the lofty republicanism of Kant. There have been few cities where the mayor has been a successful cultivator of literature; where an excise officer has been a half-prophetic sage, the friend of Jacobi and Lavater; where its commercial magnates have been intimate associates of its philosophic teachers. Removed by its distance from the malignant atmosphere of the Court, Königs-berg, unlike most of the universities of Germany, fostered among its citizens a sense that they formed a united republic, including as rival but friendly forces the interests of commerce, learning, and civic administration.

CHAPTER II.

KANT AT SCHOOL AND COLLEGE.

KANT, who has repeatedly acknowledged the powerful stimulus by which the Scotchman, David Hume, shook him from his dogmatic slumber in philosophy, was also, according to family tradition and his own belief, himself of Scotch descent. His father, Johann Georg Kant, who was born at Memel in 1683, but afterwards settled at Königsberg, spoke of his ancestors as having come from Scotland. Kant himself, towards the close of his life, when his fame had spread abroad, one day received from the Bishop of Linköping, in Sweden, a letter informing him that his father was a Swede, who had served as a subaltern officer in the Swedish army in the beginning of the century, and had afterwards emigrated to Germany. In his draft for a reply to this letter Kant states his own belief as follows: "That my grandfather, who resided as a citizen in the Prusso-Lithuanian town of Tilsit, was of Scottish descent; that he was one of many emigrants, who for some reason or other left their country in great crowds at the end of the last and the beginning of the present century, and of whom a considerable part stopped by the way in Sweden, whilst

others spread themselves in Prussia, particularly about Memel and Tilsit (as is proved by the family names, such as Douglas, Simpson, Hamilton, &c., still found in Prussia)—of this I was perfectly aware.”

A direct and detailed confirmation of the belief which the philosopher thus expressed in his seventy-third year, cannot be given, but there can be no real doubts as to his Scotch origin. It is said even that he, like his father, at first spelled his name with a C (Cant), and only changed it to prevent his townspeople calling him Tsant. But this can scarcely be right. As a matter of fact, his name is entered on the books of his school (the *Collegium Fridericianum*) spelled as Kant, Cante, Candt, not to mention other variations.¹ There is indeed no direct trace of his ancestors in Scotland; but that, considering their probable position in life, is not to be wondered at. The only Scottish Cant known to fame is the Rev. Andrew Cant of Aberdeen, an energetic and zealous adversary of the Episcopalian innovations, and one of the northern leaders of the Covenanting party in the middle of the seventeenth century.

But though precise indications are wanting, numerous facts serve to confirm and explain the connection. One of Kant's younger contemporaries, a Professor Kraus, had, as he tells us, for grandmother, the widow of a Scotch emigrant named Sterling. In the seventeenth century Poland seems to have offered to Scotch emigration the same opportunity as is now sought further afield in America. There was at that period a considerable

¹ What is more; even his grandfather is entered (1678) as Hans Kand or Kant in the vestry-book at Memel. The philosopher himself matriculated at the university as Emanuel Kandt.

Scotch colony at Danzig. In 1624 (August 30), Patrick Gordon, a sort of Scotch consul or agent there, brings the disorderly state of the immigrants under the notice of James I. ; and several Scotch merchants of the place at the same date complain of the "exorbitant numbers of young boys and maids, unable for any service, transported here yearly, but especially this summer." The Danzigers threatened to expel their disorderly colonists; and the old historian of the town denounces Old-Scotland (*Alt-Schottland*, still the name of a southern suburb of Danzig) as a true "scathe or scæud" to the place (as a *Schad-land*). Another Patrick Gordon, who subsequently became a Russian general, landed at Danzig about thirty years later to seek his fortune, and found his compatriots abounding not merely there, but at Braunsberg, Posen, and in Poland generally. It is thus that a Scotch traveller of the period, William Lithgow, speaks of Poland: "For auspiciousness I may rather term it to be a mother and nurse for the youth and younglings of Scotland than a proper dame for her own birth, in clothing, feeding, and enriching them with the fatness of her best things, besides thirty thousand Scots families that live incorporate in her bowels." Another writer puts it less favourably when he tells how "Scotland, by reason of her populousness, being constrained to disburden herself (like the painful bees); did every year send forth swarms, whereof great numbers did haunt Pole with the most extreme kind of drudgery (if not dying under the burden), scraping a few crumbs together." Scotch merchants also settled largely in Sweden in the same age. And if we turn from commerce to mercenary warfare, we find more than seventy

Scotch names, from the grade of colonel upwards, figuring in the army-lists of Gustavus Adolphus.

Kant's father, like his grandfather, was by trade a strap-maker (a belt and thong cutter, distinct from the saddler's business), and worked for himself in a small way in his house in or near the Saddler-Street in the Fore-Suburb. He married in 1715 Anna Regina Reuter, daughter of another strap-maker in the town; and from this union sprang nine children, of whom, however, only five survived the years of infancy. Of these, Immanuel, born in 1724, was the second. He had three sisters, one older than himself, who died unmarried, and two younger. The latter married humbly in Königsberg: one of them, who was left a widow shortly after her marriage, became in the closing months of his life the nurse and attendant of her elder brother. Immanuel had also a younger brother, eleven years his junior. We hear of this brother (Johann Heinrich) attending the lectures of Immanuel at the university, and of the two brothers being sometimes seen exchanging a word after lecture. After his university career was ended, the younger brother spent his next years as tutor in various Courland families, and died in 1800 as village pastor at Rahden.

Immanuel Kant was born on the 22d April (which in the East-Prussian calendar figures as the day of Emanuel), at five o'clock on a Saturday morning, and baptised next day. There is but little to be told of his parents. "Never, not even once, have I had to hear my parents say an unbecoming word, or do an unworthy act," was the witness of the son in after years. "No misunderstanding ever disturbed the harmony of the household."

He remembered how, when his father had to mention trade disputes between the guilds of the saddlers and the strap-makers, his words breathed nothing but patience and fairness. Honesty, truth, and domestic peace characterised this home. Of his mother in particular Kant always spoke in terms of reverent tenderness. She seems to have been fairly well educated; and it was her delight to take her son, her *Manelchen* (little 'Manuel), into the country, and teach him the names and properties of plants, and to explain what she understood of the mysteries of the skies and stars. Above all, she was a deeply religious woman. There were fixed hours for prayer in her household. Like many others, rich and poor, in Germany during this period, she had been caught up in the current of a religious revival, which, like all such movements, has had much evil as well as much good said of it. Its good side was, that it sought to be a vital religion, and not a mere system of dogmas: it tried to carry out in the conduct of life what the current orthodoxy was content to recognise in word and form. Its evil side was to attach an exaggerated importance to certain prescribed attitudes and feelings towards God, and thus to produce a morbid, over-sensitive, and even fanatical habit of mind. As the protest of religious emotion against ecclesiastical indifferentism, it had deservedly won adherents throughout the land; and perhaps the circumstance that Friedrich Wilhelm I. was decidedly in sympathy with its rigorous morality and earnest faith, might not be without effect in increasing the numbers of its adherents.

This new movement, known in history by the name or nickname of Pietism, had made considerable progress

at Königsberg. This success was chiefly due to two men, both of them educational reformers. The earlier, J. H. Lysius, was the first director of a new school which had been set up at Königsberg under Pietistic influence. Endowed by special privilege with the title of a royal school, the Friedrich's College (*Collegium Fridericianum*) soon became a power in the city. But the religious tone which, as might have been expected, characterised it, was not its only novel feature. It is said to have been the first in the town to give instruction in history, geography, and mathematics. Lysius, after an active and reforming career, died in 1731, and about a year afterwards was succeeded as director of the school by Franz Albert Schultz. Schultz must have been no ordinary man. This was the man of whom Kant in his last years said: "Almost the only thing I regret is not to have done something, left some memorial, to show my gratitude to Schultz." At Halle, the headquarters of Pietism, Schultz had been carried away by the current of evangelical reform. But at the same place he also came under the influence of Wolf. The philosophy of Christian Wolf, dim and uninteresting as it has now become to all but professed adepts in the history of philosophy, was then in the zenith of its fame. It led, with the requisite academical decorum, the liberal thought of the time; clothed the thoughts of Leibnitz in the terms familiar to the hereditary guardians of the schools of philosophy; and drew the youth of Germany to Halle and Marburg to learn wisdom. Amongst Wolf's disciples was Schultz: in fact, there was a rumour current that the great man had said, "If any one has understood me, it is Schultz in Königsberg."

When Schultz in his thirty-ninth year became pastor of a church in Königsberg, he came in the double capacity of evangelical and philosophical reformer, combining the logical and scholarly training of a disciple of Wolf with the zeal and fervour of a religious apostle. Alike in the church and in the town, in the school and the university, he was active and influential. Through his efforts Königsberg between 1730 and 1740 was largely won over to the banner of the Pietistic Church; and the *Collegium Fridericianum* flourished under his patronage. The old king looked upon him and his cause with favour. A royal order of 1736, specially exempting Königsberg students from the rule by which every Prussian student of theology was required to take two years at Halle, showed how completely true religion was assumed to be in the ascendant in the theological faculty of the Albertina.

The parents of Kant were among the attendants on the religious ministry of Schultz. In material no less than spiritual services he was their friend, and would sometimes kindly send the poor saddler's household a store of wood for their winter's fire. Schultz began to take an interest in the eldest boy. Immanuel had been sent for his first schooling to the Hospital School of his own quarter of the town. At about eight and a half years of age, in Michaelmas 1732, he was entered on the books of the *Collegium Fridericianum*, where he remained till Michaelmas 1740, when he left for the university. Of these eight years of school life there is little to tell. Discipline seems to have been strictly maintained,—more so than some of the boys liked. One of them, a comrade of Kant in those days, the after-

wards celebrated philologist David Ruhnken, wrote long after to remind him of the times they had spent thirty years before under the harsh but salutary restraints of their puritanical masters. Kant seems to have worked well, but not in the direction of philosophy. Whether or not he was influenced by the fact that Heydenreich, who taught him Latin, was a man of more ability than the other masters, at any rate he made himself familiar with the literature of Rome, and to the end of his life knew by heart long passages from the Latin poets, particularly Horace, Persius, and Lucretius. Of Schultz, who was director, and of Christian Schiffert, who was the working head-master of the school, we hear nothing in relation to Kant. One of his schoolmates, Ruhnken, has been already named; Cunde, who died in early life as an overworked schoolmaster, was another. The three boys, equally enthusiastic for scholarship, dreamed of future fame as classical philologists, and tried to fix on the Latinised forms in which their names were to appear in the title-pages of their books.

While Kant was a schoolboy of thirteen he lost his mother. In 1737 she was cut off suddenly by a rheumatic fever caught when attending a sick friend. Her husband survived her only nine years. It could not be a very comfortable home.¹ The daughters had to go out into the world to service: Kant had, as best he could, to pick up enough to support himself at school and university. His father's death, supervening on a

¹ The form in which the churchyard books enter the funerals of Kant's parents tells the tale of poverty. The words "*Still; Arm*" (Silent; Poor), added in each case, show that there was no service at the grave, and that no burial dues were exacted.

palsy-stroke eighteen months before, was thus recorded by Kant in the family Bible: "On the 24th March 1746 my dearest father was called away by a blessed death. May God, who has not vouchsafed him great pleasure in this life, grant him on that account the joy eternal!"

But to return. In 1740, at the age of sixteen years and a half, Kant entered the University of Königsberg, —the same year in which his great contemporary and sovereign, Friedrich II., entered as King of Prussia upon his life-long struggle against the house of Austria, against superstition, intolerance, ignorance, and pettefogging. Kant may have been a spectator of the torch-light procession of students in July to compliment Friedrich on his homage-taking. It is impossible to say what precise aim Kant had in view when he entered the university. Though the regulations required every student to enrol himself either for law, medicine, or theology, he put his name down for no one of the three whatever. Stories were in circulation to the effect that student Kant had attempted to preach in country churches; but Kant himself apparently disowned the impeachment, and the evidence of one of his contemporaries tends to render the legend apocryphal. Kant, says Heilsberg (who with Wlömer was one of his most intimate friends at the university), was never a professed student of theology. The three companions, as he explains, were prompted by laudable curiosity to attend one session the public lectures of Professor Schultz (the same Schultz already mentioned), and showed themselves so proficient in examination, that the professor called them up to question them as to their aims in life.

Kant, to our wonder, expressed his intention of becoming a physician. Whatever trust we may or may not place on the details of this narrative, it seems to show that Kant had not begun to feel the need or the power of definitely fixing on a vocation.

At any rate, his college studies between 1740 and 1746 ranged over the whole faculty of arts and sciences,—or, as the Germans call it, philosophy. In mathematics and physics he learned much from two men—Teske and Knutzen, especially from the latter. Martin Knutzen, *professor extraordinarius* of logic and metaphysic, was a man whom local obstacles alone prevented from acquiring a wider reputation. Only eleven years older than his pupil Kant, he had gained his professorship at the age of twenty-one. By excessive devotion to the work of his post (he lectured four hours and sometimes more every day on philosophy and mathematics) he wore himself out, and died in 1751, aged thirty-seven. Knutzen, like Schultz, was a follower of Wolf in philosophy and of Spener the Pietist in religion; but, unlike Schultz, he was a man of the study and the lecture-room,—no churchman or ecclesiastical politician. His main interest lay in philosophy; and his chief literary work, the ‘*Systema Causarum*,’ published in 1735, treated of a question then much in dispute between the older school of philosophers, who continued the dogmas of the Schoolmen, and the younger school, who derived their ideas from Descartes and from Leibnitz. What philosophical ideas Knutzen communicated to Kant we cannot tell; but we know that in general they were the current, somewhat mixed and moderate, theories of metaphysical character which pre-

vailed throughout Germany. But we do know a service which he rendered that was of more influence in opening and forming Kant's mind than any formal instruction in abstract philosophy. He lent to the young student the works of Newton, and when he saw these were appreciated, allowed him to have the run of his extensive library. Two things were thereby brought about. One was, that Kant acquired that appetite for books which so characterised him. The other was the introduction to the methods of natural knowledge, of experimental philosophy. From Newton he learned the use of the sling which was to slay, or at least to stun, the Goliath of unreasoned and uncritical metaphysics.

During the six years in which he ranked as student, Kant's pecuniary means must have been but small. His father was too poor to give him help. An uncle on the mother's side named Richter, a well-to-do shoemaker, sometimes, perhaps often, supplied the needs of his nephew. But for the most part Kant had to help himself. He was, as has been said, on very friendly terms with two Lithuanians—Wlömer and Heilsberg—to whom he seems to have acted as unpaid tutor. Wlömer for some period shared his room with Kant as a sort of payment; and after Wlömer's departure another friend seems to have rendered him a similar service. Others of these occasional pupils seem to have given according to their abilities. One, *e.g.*, it is recorded, besides a small subsidy now and then, would pay for the coffee and the white bread (evidently a luxury, which formed the simple refreshment at the hour of lesson. A certain Trummer, afterwards physician in Königsberg (most probably J. Gerhard Trummer, who died in 1793), also

paid for his lessons, and in later life continued (not altogether to Kant's satisfaction) to address him in the familiar "Du." Occasionally when an old garment stood sorely in need of repair, a friend, who meantime had to keep his room, would lend him part of his own wardrobe for the occasion. Heilsberg even adds—but it must be owned one hesitates to accept every tittle of the old man's tales of his boisterous and impecunious youth—that he and his friends sometimes earned a little money by their successful skill at billiards or at *l'hombre*. To such straits were then reduced three youths, who afterwards became pillars in the academical or the political world (Heilsberg became Kriegs-rath in Königsberg, and Wlömer, Finanzrath at Berlin). But at twenty-one, when hope still rules the imagination, and life beats in vigorous pulses, such privations only serve to call out the energies and temper the character.

In 1746 Kant's father died; and the son, having failed in an application for an assistant's place in what is at present the cathedral school of Königsberg, had to look further outside for a temporary haven. His apprenticeship to learning was almost completed; and after an interval of nine years, which is partly to be reckoned to the preparatory stage, partly to the practical work of teaching, he entered upon what was the business of his life.

CHAPTER III.

PROBITAS LAUDATUR ET ALGET.

LIKE many another student in a land where few endowments foster scholarship, Kant found his most obvious resource was to take a tutorship in a well-to-do family. His first post was in the household of Pastor Andersch of the Reformed Church in Judschen. The village of Judschen lies about sixty miles east of Königsberg, not far from the town of Gumbinnen. Here, according to one account, he stayed three years. Here, according to the imagination of a French biographer, he sometimes filled the pulpit of the absent clergyman. But of how or what he taught, and who his pupils were, and how he liked his duties, we know nothing, and fancy is at liberty to fill up the details with materials derivable from the common story of a private tutor's life. Kant himself, speaking of these years, declared that there could hardly be a tutor with better theory and worse practice than himself. His second tutorship was at the manor-house of Arensdorf, the residence of the squire of the place, a Von Hülsen. Arensdorf is some miles west of the town of Mohrungen (the birthplace of Herder), in the hilly and lake-studded region to the south of Elbing.

Of this connection with the Hülsen family, which, it is said, lasted a year and a half, we also know very little. One of his Hülsen pupils was afterwards boarded with Kant, when he came of age to go to college; and it may not be without interest to add that the Hülsens were among the earliest of the Prussian landholders to earn honourable commendation by liberating their peasant dependants. Thirdly, Kant, it is said, was tutor in the family of Graf Keyserling at Rautenburg, a manor-house near Tilsit. But this statement cannot be literally accepted. Graf Keyserling had no children: and it seems probable that Kant's pupils were the two sons of the Graf's second wife, Gräfin von Truchsess Waldburg, by her first husband. It was to the kinsmen of this lady that the Rautenburg estates originally belonged, and from them they had been bought by her first husband, who died in 1761. If Kant, therefore, was in 1752 the tutor of her two sons, it must have been while she was still the wife of Graf Johann Gebhard. The lady, the subsequent Gräfin von Keyserling, when her second husband retired from the diplomatic service of Poland after 1772, settled with him at Königsberg. Her house, luxuriously and æsthetically furnished, became the resort of the best society in the town, frequented not merely by the wealthy and noble, but by the intellectual aristocracy of the province—men like Kant, Hippel, Hamann. The Graf died in 1787, and his wife followed him to the grave four years later. Both of them were of distinguished talents and culture. The Gräfin in particular seems to have combined a delicate social tact which knew how to respect worth and intellect, with considerable taste and skill both in art and literature.

But whatever be the exact fact about these years of country life and work, to which Kant in later age looked back as a pleasing memory, sufficient evidence that he had not neglected his own studies is given by his published works. His first book, though 1746 stood on the title-page, came out in 1749. The expense of printing had been chiefly borne by his uncle Richter. These 'Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces,' treated of a question of mechanical theory, agitated between Leibnitz and the followers of Descartes—the question as to the law or formula of movement. Two short papers on questions of cosmic speculation appeared in a Königsberg periodical in 1754. But his first important essay—'A General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens'—was printed in 1755. It contained a suggestive hypothesis on the origin and constitution of the universe, and indicated a new solution of the problems of natural theology. But it had an unfortunate destiny. Frederick the Great, to whom it was dedicated, never set eyes upon it. The publisher through whom it was to appear failed, and the copies of the book never reached the Leipsic Fair. Though printed, it was hardly in any true sense published.

It was equally on a subject drawn from physical science that he wrote the dissertation 'De igne,' which led the way to his admission to the degree of Doctor in Philosophy (*Anglicè*, Master of Arts) on the 12th June 1755. At Michaelmas in the same year he "habilitated" or qualified himself as *privat-docent* by his 'New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge' ('Principiorum primorum cognitionis meta-

physicæ nova dilucidatio'). And with the winter session (*semester*) of 1755 he began his career of licensed but unsalaried lecturer at Königsberg, a career in which he had to linger for fifteen years. Inevitable circumstances, and not any wish to keep Kant out in the cold, led to this result. In 1756 he applied for the extraordinary professorship of philosophy, which had remained vacant since his teacher Knutzen's death: but unfortunately the Berlin Government, in the all but certain prospect of a combined Austro-Russo-Polish attack, had resolved to economise by paring down the educational budget to the lowest limits. Two years later, in 1758, when a vacancy occurred in the ordinary professorship of logic and metaphysics, Kant was a candidate for the post. The Russian governor (it was during the Russian occupation) appointed the nominee of the faculty, another *privat-docent*, named Buck, senior in standing to Kant. In 1764, after peace had been restored, the Government board at Königsberg received a missive from the Ministry of Frederick, asking whether a certain *magister* Kant, already known for some scholarly work in the world of letters, would, so far as concerned his acquaintance with German and Latin poetry, be a suitable person to hold the professorship of poetry, which had been unfilled since 1762. Kant, who probably did not need to be reminded of the Horatian maxim to see "what the shoulders refuse to carry," did not put himself forward for the post; and the first result of the gracious disposition of the Government towards him was his appointment in February 1766 to the sub-librarianship in the Schloss Library, with a yearly stipend of sixty-two thalers (about £10). Thus at the age of forty-two he

received his first official post, and with such an amount of income. Almost at the same date he undertook the superintendence of a rich merchant's private collection of natural history and ethnography, but soon resigned, as not long afterwards he gave up the librarianship, finding the duties of showman and cicerone little else than an ungrateful waste of time.

These years which he spent as *privat-docent* from 1755 to 1770 must have been uphill work to Kant. Without private means on which to fall back, he was obliged to look fortune in the face and trust to nothing but himself. Early in life he made it his principle to owe nothing to any man; to be able, as he said, never to tremble when a knock was heard at his door, lest it might be the call of a dun. His solitary coat grew so worn, that some richer friends thought it necessary to offer him in a discreet manner money to purchase a new garment. Kant, in his deep sense of independence, declined the gift. He had set aside a reserve sum of twenty Friedrichs-d'or,—only to be touched in case he should be laid up by illness. During this period, and even later, he lived in various lodgings, obliged, like other studious souls, to quit the neighbourhoods where intolerable noises preyed upon his nerves. Five several houses are mentioned by one of his biographers as his successive abodes before he finally in 1783 settled in the house in the Prinzessin Strasse, which he occupied till death. One of these was in the Magister-gasse, near the river, and from it he was driven by the noisy boatmen. For some years after 1766 he lodged with the bookseller Kanter, where he suffered much from a screaming cock. The Königsberg directory for 1770

informs us that the *magister legens* and *subbibliothecarius* Herr Immanuel Kandt lived with the *Buchführer* J. Kanter in *Löbenicht ohnreit der krummen Grube*.

Kant's lectures at first dealt with the subjects of mathematics and physics, the topics with which his own studies had evidently been in the main engaged. For the first ten years he carried on simultaneously courses on logic and the other departments of philosophy. But about the year 1765 he began to abandon the mathematical and confine himself to the strictly philosophical branches of knowledge. In some of the earlier years, along with the programme of his lectures, he had published a short essay on some physical question. The announcement of his courses for the year 1765-66 embraces logic, metaphysics, ethics, and physical geography. The lectures on physical geography, which he had begun to give about 1757, always continued one of his most popular courses, and were attended by many outsiders, especially military men, belonging to the Russian garrison. Another not less frequented course was that on anthropology—a sort of gossiping and elementary psychology. Both of these courses were published: those on Physical Geography, by Dr Rink, from Kant's manuscript, in 1802; and those on Anthropology, by Kant himself, in 1798. It was the last work he prepared for the press; and such was the demand for it, that the first edition of two thousand copies having been disposed of in less than two years, a second edition of equal amount was issued in 1800. Military pyrotechnics and the art of fortification were also subjects on which he had classes composed of army men.

One of his biographers has told us of Kant's appear-

ance at his first lecture in 1755. It was given in a ground-floor room in the house of old Professor Kypke, with whom Kant then lodged. When the hour struck, a crowd of students had occupied the entrance hall and steps, as well as filled the room; and Kant, put out by the sight of his audience, seemed to lose his head, and uttered some almost inaudible remarks, correcting himself again and again. At the next hour of lecture he showed himself more at ease. But with his delicate organisation he was always easily disturbed in lecture. Every one probably has heard of his habit of fixing on a particular pupil as the ideal butt of his remarks, and even on a particular button on that pupil's coat; and of the dire collapse which ensued one morning in the lecture, when, instead of the button, the coat presented only the rudiments of its attachment. He objected, too, to the student who took down his utterances *verbatim*, much preferring to see an attentive face trying to grasp the lecture on the spot.

His method in these courses of lectures was to employ a text-book as the basis of his own remarks. Thus in logic and metaphysics he followed at first the Manuals of Baumeister; in later years he used Meier's Logic and Baumgarten's Metaphysic. "Wolf's Logic," he would say, "is the best we have. Baumgarten meritoriously concentrated Wolf, and Meier once more commented on Baumgarten." This method extended to the lectures on mathematics and physics. Kant always refrained from teaching his own system as such, and insisted upon the distinction between his duties as teacher of the young, and his other duties as an author and thinker, writing for the learned world. In his lectures he aided his

memory by marginal notes, often pasted on to his own copy of the text-book, and by loose papers on which were jotted the heads of his exposition.

His pupils in those years were often enthusiastic admirers of their teacher. Herder, the poetic and theological philosopher, attended Kant's lectures between 1762 and 1764, and was once so delighted that he threw the ideas suggested by the lecture into verse, and handed the poem one morning to Kant, who read it aloud to the class. About thirty years later, when youthful enthusiasm had given place to coolness and antagonism, Herder penned a glowing picture of his old teacher. "His open, thoughtful brow was the seat of unfailing cheerfulness and joy; the profoundest language fell from his lips; jest, wit, humour stood at his command; and his instructive address was like a most entertaining conversation. With the same originality as he tested Leibnitz, Wolf, Baumgarten, Crusius, Hume, and traced the natural laws of Newton, Kepler, and the physicists, he made allusion to the books which then appeared,—the 'Emile' and the 'Heloise,'—as well as to every new discovery in physics of which he became aware, estimating their value, and always coming back to the disinterested study of nature, and to the moral dignity of man. The history of man, of nations, of nature, physical science, mathematics, and experience, were the sources which gave life and interest to his lectures and conversation. No knowledge was indifferent to him; no cabal, no sect, no advantage, no ambition, had ever the least attraction for him as against the extension and elucidation of truth. By his encouragement and a compulsion welcome to his hearers, he taught them to think for themselves."

The secret of Kant's attractiveness as a lecturer was evidently the reality of his knowledge—the way in which, with all its extent, it was concentrated and unified. He was a wide, if not a very thorough, reader in the fields of literature, and particularly in the concrete sciences—those which treat of human life in all its phases, and of the phenomena of the physical world. The productions of every part of the earth, the manners and customs of distant and barbarous tribes, every outline of the more notable constructions of man, were familiar to him. The English stranger who heard him describe Westminster Bridge could scarcely believe that the speaker had not been on the spot. He lived himself into what he read till it became as it were a part of his own experience. When the great earthquake at Lisbon occurred in the end of 1755, Kant was ready and willing to enlighten his townspeople on the conditions, known or supposed, of phenomena which had excited such intense interest throughout the country. When Rousseau's 'Emile' appeared in 1762, Kant was so entranced by his perusal of the work, that he, for that day alone out of thousands, omitted his usual afternoon walk in order to read it to the end. Another proof of his widespread interest in all things human and divine was the attention he gave to the study of the mysticism of Swedenborg. But the best of all evidences of his broad human sympathies, of profundity combined with grace and tact, were his 'Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime,' published at Königsberg in 1764.

Kant was no mere metaphysician, no mere man of science: he was both, but he was a great deal more besides. In the period of which we are now speaking

he had not merely a good deal of lecturing to do both before and after noon, but also undertook the supervision of some young men committed to his care in his lodging. In the vacations he saw a somewhat different society. Occasionally at Capustigall, a seat of the Keyserlings, about ten miles south-west of Königsberg, he passed a few weeks in the earlier years, giving lessons to the younger members of the Gräfin's family. With these there alternated other visits in the holidays. One of these houses was the hospitable mansion of Baron von Schrötter at Wohnsdorf (between Allenburg and Friedland); and to the end of his life Kant retained a charmed memory of a summer morning which he had spent, with pipe and cup of coffee, conversing with his host and General von Lossow, in an arbour on the high banks of the river Alle. Von Lossow's country-house, near Insterburg, was another, and the most remote point to which his holiday trips carried him. To Pillau, too, and its sandy downs, spreading pleasantly between the Haff and the Baltic, he made occasional tours. But the favourite retreat of Kant in those years of middle life was at Moditten, about eight miles west of Königsberg. At the house of the chief ranger (Oberförster) Wobser and his wife, Kant, like other Königsbergers, used sometimes to spend a pleasant week in the woodland neighbourhood. There he wrote his 'Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime,' the host himself, it is said, standing for the typical German described in the chapter on the characters of nationalities.

Kant had already made acquaintance with several of the prominent inhabitants. One of these was the English merchant, Green, who had settled in Königsberg.

An anecdote records how Kant one day in a public garden had been vehemently maintaining the rights of the American colonists as against the attempts of the British Government to enforce taxation upon them, and how Green, then a stranger to Kant, had sprung forward in indignation and demanded satisfaction from the maligner of his nation. Kant, adds the story, only replied by quietly explaining the grounds for his position, and ultimately so succeeded in convincing Green, that the latter shook hands with him, and the two were ever after the closest friends. Unless the incident refer, as has usually been supposed, to the American war, it puts the commencement of Kant's friendship with Green in 1765—the date of the passing of the Stamp Act and the opposition against it raised in Virginia. We thus clear the story of any mythical imputation—for Kant was certainly a frequent visitor of Green's in 1768, as we know through Hamann. Every Saturday evening he spent at Green's house till the latter's death, and after that he went to evening parties no more. With Green he had invested his money, receiving six per cent interest originally, and subsequently five when the investment was changed. Motherby, Green's partner, was another close friend, with whom he dined regularly every Sunday (but this, of course, belongs to a later period); and Hay, a Scotch merchant, may be added to the number of these commercial intimacies.

In another class comes John George Hamann, who now returned to his native place in 1759, six years younger than Kant. The apparent contrast between the two men was great. Hamann, the "Magus in the North," discontented with all abstract reasoning, yearn-

ing after some faith and unity which he naturally could never formulate, uttering in a *quasi* Scriptural language the dicta of a satirical wisdom; and Kant, the patient continuator of the work of rational enlightenment, appealing only to the understanding, and never indulging in the blind denunciations which flow from irritable conceit. The relations between the two remind one of those between Hume and Rousseau,—the same benevolent tranquillity on one side, the same passionate intensity on the other. And yet there must have been points of connection. They even seem in 1759 to have entertained the idea of a joint work—a natural philosophy for children (*Kinder-physik*). It was partly due to the advocacy of Kant that Hamann got a post in the custom-house at Königsberg, which he held till 1787, the year before his death.

A few words will suffice on the literary labours of Kant during these fifteen years. Beyond an occasional essay accompanying the public announcement of his lectures, and an article now and then in Königsberg papers, published by his friend Kanter, nothing of any importance appeared by his hand during the greater part of the period of the Seven Years' War. With the year 1762 begins a period of greater intellectual production, so far at least as concerns external results. 'The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures' in that year is followed in 1763 by the 'Attempt to Introduce into Philosophy the Conception of Negative Quantities' and the 'Only Possible Argument for Demonstrating God's Existence;' and in 1764 by the 'Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime,' and the 'Inquiry into the Evidence (Perspicuity) of the Prin-

ciples of Natural Theology and Morals.' The plan of lectures, which Kant published in 1765, shows that his mind was at this period passing through a crisis. Hitherto he had been, on the whole, occupied in problems of a scientific rather than a purely philosophic kind, and had been vaguely resting in the traditional metaphysics. His study of Newtonian physics and kindred topics had gradually thrown doubts on these presuppositions. It was reserved for this period (1760-65), by bringing him into acquaintance with the moral philosophy of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, to throw at least temporary discredit on the theories of the rationalist school. The prize offered by the Berlin Academy of the Sciences in 1763 for the best essay on the question of the ground of our belief in the first principles of morals and theology, served as an occasion for him to draw out formally some of his views on the contrast between the method of mathematics and that of metaphysics. His essay failed to gain the prize, which was awarded to Moses Mendelssohn. Lastly, in 1766, appeared his 'Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics,' — a somewhat uncomplimentary parallelism between the ideas of Swedenborg and the theories of the Leibnitian metaphysics. This, after the 'Observations,' is one of the best written and most brilliant of his writings. It marks the extreme point in his dissatisfaction with the existing methods of philosophy, and is the last work of any extent addressed to the larger public which came from his hand up to the appearance of the 'Criticism of Pure Reason' in 1781, fifteen years later. The data to the questions of spiritualism must, as he saw, be sought for "in another

world than that in which our sensations lie." In other words, scientific data there were none. The unanswerable problems suggested by the conception of immaterial souls in relation with each other and with material bodies, suggested the need of a metaphysical system which should be "a science of the boundaries of the human reason." Kant in 1766 had in short anticipated in a rough way the results which he was afterwards, in the 'Criticism of Pure Reason,' to establish on their true premisses by an analysis of the conditions of knowledge.

CHAPTER IV.

PROFESSOR KANT IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE.

IN 1770, at the age of forty-six, Kant reached the office which was the summit of his ambition. Already in 1769 negotiations had been begun by the university of Erlangen, with the view of securing Kant for the professorship of logic and metaphysics; and a similar offer came about the same time from Jena. But as it happened, it was now possible to retain Kant at Königsberg,—a course which to his mind far surpassed possible advantages elsewhere. By the death of the professor of mathematics a vacancy arose; and an arrangement was effected by which Buck succeeded to the mathematical chair, and resigned to Kant the very professorship of logic and metaphysics for which he had been twelve years before an unsuccessful applicant. On the 20th August 1770, accordingly, Kant read himself into his chair by a Latin dissertation “On the Form and Principles of the Sense-World and the World Intellectual,”—an essay which, in a scholastic and unequal form, laid down, almost in its very title, the lines which, in the subsequent ‘Criticism of the Reason,’ determine how

far knowledge by the mere intellect is a possibility. The post of respondent in the discussion was taken by his young Jewish friend, Dr Marcus Herz, subsequently a well-known physician of Berlin.

From 1770 to 1804 Kant continued to be professor at Königsberg. He was not, indeed, without temptations or inducements from other quarters. A more lucrative post at Mitau, in Courland, was declined by him. Zedlitz, the minister for schools and churches under Frederick, had been a great admirer of Kant's, whose lectures on physical geography he studied in manuscript notes, carried to Berlin by Kraus, one of Kant's younger friends. Zedlitz was now anxious to secure Kant for Halle, then the principal university of Prussia; and besides offering a double amount of income, appealed to the professor's sense of duty to confer the inestimable advantages of his teaching upon the more numerous body of students. Kant, however, could not bear the thought of quitting the old familiar faces, and made his stipend of 400 thalers (about £60) suffice, when added to the other emoluments, for a frugal degree of comfort. In 1780 he became a member of the *Senatus Academicus*, involving the small additional sum of twenty-seven thalers. In 1786, the date of the new king's accession, the professors received a general increase of stipend, which in Kant's case raised his income to 440 thalers. And in addition, Kant in 1789 received notice in very complimentary terms from the Prussian premier (Wöllner) that he would henceforth receive a further yearly supplement of 220 thalers, thus making his income in the last decade of his life reach the sum of 660 thalers, or £100 sterling — doubtless

purchasing much more than the same sum at the present day.

Kant took his turn as Rector or Vice-chancellor of the University. On the first occasion, in 1786, it was his part to present the respects of the Albertina to the new sovereign, on the occasion of his receiving the homage of his East Prussian subjects. In 1788 he again held the rectorship—both times only for the summer half-year. As dean of the philosophical faculty he had several times to test the candidates for admission to the university, and gained in this function the reputation for laying more weight on the scholarly solidity of foundation than on the mass and extent of the acquired facts. As a disciplinarian he was inclined to the view that liberty does less harm than excessive restraint and hothouse forcing.

Kant as a professor continued to lecture very much as he had done as a *privat-docent*, except that he somewhat restricted the number of his hours. Henceforth he habitually lectured for two hours daily during six days in each week, adding on Saturday a third hour for catechetical purposes. On Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday his hours were from 7 to 9 in the morning, on Wednesday from 8 to 10, and on Saturday from 7 to 10. Year after year for twenty-five years he continued with unexampled regularity to discourse for one hour daily either on logic or metaphysic; for the other on some branch of applied philosophy, or on such a subject as physical geography or anthropology. One of his hearers assures us that during the nine years over which he attended Kant's prelections, the teacher never missed a single hour. Another testified to the fact, that

during five years Kant only failed to lecture once, and that this single absence was due to indisposition.

Some idea of his style of lecture may be gathered from the following eyewitnesses. Jachmann, one of his biographers, thus speaks of his lectures on metaphysic :—

“ Discounting, as we may, the difficulty of the subject for the beginner, Kant may be said to have been always clear and attractive. He evinced a special skill in the exhibition and definition of metaphysical ideas. He conducted, one may say, an experiment before his audience, as if he himself were beginning to meditate on the subject. By degrees new conceptions were introduced to specify the initial idea ; step by step explanations which had been tentatively offered were corrected ; and finally the finishing touch was given to the conception, which was thus completely elucidated from every point of view. An attentive listener was in this way not merely made acquainted with the object, but received a lesson in methodical thinking. But the hearer who, unaware that this was the procedure of his teacher, took the first explanation for the correct and exhaustive statement, and neglected to follow the further steps, carried home only half-truths. Sometimes in these metaphysical speculations Kant, carried away by the current of thought, pursued single ideas too far, and lost sight of the main object, whereupon he would suddenly break off with the phrase, ‘ In short, gentlemen ’ (‘ *In summa, meine Herren* ’), and return without delay to the point of his argument.”

This account by a genial admirer may receive its proper pendant in a somewhat cold-blooded description drawn from a later date. In 1795, in Kant’s seventy-first year, Graf von Purgstall, then in his twenty-second year, came to Königsberg to see the “ patriarch ” of the Critical philosophy, which he had already studied under

Reinhold at Jena. He thus gives his impressions of Kant's lecture to a student friend:—

“His delivery has quite the tone of ordinary conversation, and can scarcely be called elegant. Imagine to yourself a little old man, bent forward as he sits, in a brown coat with yellow buttons, with wig and hair-bag to boot; imagine further that this little man sometimes takes his hands out from the close-buttoned coat where they lie crossed, and makes a slight movement before his face as a man does when wishing some one else quite to understand him. Draw this picture to yourself, and you see him to a hair. Though all this can scarcely be termed elegant, though his words do not ring clear, still everything which his delivery, if I may say so, wants in form, is richly compensated by the excellence of the matter. . . . Kant lectures on an old logic, by Meier, if I mistake not. He always brings the book with him into lecture. It looks so old and stained, he must, I think, have brought it to the class-room for forty years. On every page he has notes written in minute characters. Many of the printed pages are pasted over with paper, and many lines struck out; so that, as you can see, almost nothing of Meier's Logic remains. Not one of his hearers brings the book to lecture: they merely write to his dictation. He does not, however, appear to notice this, and follows his author with much fidelity from chapter to chapter, and then corrects him, or rather says quite the reverse, but all in the greatest simplicity, and without the least appearance of conceit over his discoveries.”

The extraordinary uniformity of Kant's life renders it possible to draw a picture of one day which may serve as a type of thousands. Every morning about five minutes before five o'clock his servant Lampe entered the bedroom and called Kant with the words, “It is time” (“*Es ist Zeit*”). Uniformly, and without exception (on the testi-

mony of the servant himself), the call was obeyed, and at five o'clock Kant was in his sitting-room or study. His sole refreshment was one cup of tea (sometimes unconsciously increased to two) and a single pipe of tobacco. Up to seven o'clock he continued to prepare for his lectures. At seven o'clock he descended to his lecture-room, whence he returned at nine. Thereafter he devoted himself during the rest of the morning to his literary labours. At a quarter before one o'clock he rose and called out to the cook, "It is three-quarters!"—whereupon she brought the liquor which he was to drink after the first course had been served. At dinner, for the last twenty years of his life,—during which he occupied a house of his own,—he always had guests—never, if possible, less than two, and seldom, if ever, more than five. (The limit of six was due to the fact that his plate, &c., was provided for a party of that number.) These guests were invited on the morning of the day on which they were to dine; for Kant either knew the rudeness of mere general invitations, or did not wish his friends to feel themselves bound by a lengthened and formal engagement. But one thing Kant expected from his guests, and that was punctuality. As soon as the number was complete, Lampe entered and announced that the soup was on the table. The guests proceeded to the dining-room, talking of no subject more profound than the weather. Kant took his napkin, and with the words, "Now, gentlemen" ("*Nun, meine Herren*"), set the example of helping himself from the dish set in the midst of the table. The dinner usually consisted of three courses—in which fish and vegetables generally formed a part—and ended with wine and dessert.

The dinner and its concomitants lasted from one to four, and sometimes even to five o'clock. Politics was a frequent subject of conversation, but anything of the nature of metaphysics was rigorously excluded. Kant was always an eager reader of the newspapers, and welcomed the post which brought them to Königsberg. The fortunes of the French Revolution were among his main interests in later days, as the American War of Independence had been in his middle age. He sympathised with the efforts of a nation to shape the forms of its social life. When the news came of the establishment of the French Republic, Kant, turning to his friends, said, with tears in his eyes—"I now can say like Simeon: Lord, let Thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen Thy salvation."

According to Kant, the conversation at dinner goes through three stages—narration, discussion, and jest. When the third stage ended, at four, Kant went out for his constitutional walk. In later years, at least after 1785, this was a solitary promenade. He had never been strong—never ill, and yet never thoroughly well. His chest was flat, almost hollow, with a slight deformity in the right shoulder, which made his head stoop a little on that side. All his life through he had managed to keep himself in health by persistent adherence to certain maxims of diet and regimen. One of these was, that the germs of disease might often be avoided if the breathing were systematically carried on by the nose; and for that reason Kant always in his later years walked alone with mouth closed. He was also careful to avoid perspiration. His usual stroll was along the banks of the Pregel towards the Friedrich's Fort; but this so-called

Philosophen - damm has in modern Königsberg given place to the railway station and other alterations. Other walks were to the north-west of the town, where his friend Hippel, the chief magistrate (Oberbürgermeister), had done much to embellish the environs by new paths and gardens.

On returning from his walk he set to work,—perhaps first of all arranging any little matters of business, reading any novelties in the way of books, or possibly the newspapers, for which his appetite was always keen. As the darkness began to fall, he would take his seat at the stove, and with his eye fixed on the tower of Löbenicht church would ponder on the problems which exercised his mind. One evening, however, as he looked, a change had occurred—the church tower was no longer visible. His neighbour's poplars had grown so fast that at last, without his being aware, they had hid the turret behind them. Kant, deprived of the material support which had steadied his speculations, was completely thrown out. Fortunately his neighbour was generous—the tops of the poplars were cut, and Kant could reflect at his ease again. About 9.45 Kant ceased working, and by ten o'clock was safely tucked in his eider-down cover. Till the last years of his life his bedroom was never heated even in winter, though his sitting-room is said to have been kept at a temperature of 75° Fahrenheit—a statement which one has some difficulty in accepting.

In these years of his professoriate another set of friends gathered round Kant. Hamann, it is true, still continued in some degree of intimacy with him; but the tie between the two men, never very strong, had been decidedly weakened as years showed the radical divergency of their

ways of thinking. Th. G. von Hippel (1741-1796), the *bürgermeister* of Königsberg, the author of some works which throw considerable light on the social history of Königsberg in last century, was one of these friends of maturer life. In one of these books, the 'Lebensläufe in Aufsteigender Linie' (1779), Hippel had introduced so many ideas of Kantian character, that in 1797, after Hippel's death, Kant had actually to publish a formal disclaimer of the authorship of this as well as of another work of Hippel's ('Ueber die Ehe'), both published anonymously. He added, to explain the similarity of opinions, that Hippel had dipped largely into the note-books of students during the years 1770 to 1780, and had frequently conversed with him on philosophic topics. One instance of the relations subsisting between the two men may raise a smile. Kant, whose house stood not far from the castle, was disturbed in his studies at one period by the noisy devotional exercises of the prisoners in the adjoining jail. In a letter to Hippel, accordingly, he suggested the advantage of closing the windows during these hymn-singings, and added that the warders of the prison might probably be directed to accept less sonorous and neighbour-annoying chants as evidence of the penitent spirit of their captives. What was the result of Kant's application we know not.

J. G. Scheffner (1736-1820) was another of Kant's friends. The best known period of Scheffner's life, however, comes later. His patriotic and liberal conduct in the dark days of Prussia, his connections with Stein, and his frank yet courteous friendship with Queen Luise and her husband when they took refuge in Königsberg, belong to the history of his country.

A nearer friend of Kant was Christian Jakob Kraus (1753-1807), once his pupil, afterwards professor of moral philosophy, and favourably known for his lectures on political economy. Kraus, like Kant, had been an inmate and an instructor in the household of the Keyserlings. In the philosopher's declining years there were few of his friends so devoted and self-forgetful as Kraus, who would sometimes refuse an invitation to the country and spend his holidays at home, rather than leave Kant to a solitary table. In his walks, too, he was a frequent and welcome companion to Kant, who had a high opinion (apparently well justified) of his junior's talents. This tender friendship subsisted unbroken to the end of Kant's life.

Of the other knights of Professor Kant's table it may suffice to give the names. There was Sommer (1754-1826), a clergyman in Königsberg: in early years he had joined in those happy country parties which met at the cottage of forester Wobser in Moditten, and in later years he became a weekly guest. There were the brothers Jachmann—the younger a medical man, the elder a sort of director of education in Danzig and Königsberg; Wasianski, pastor of the Tragheim church in Königsberg, the friend of Kant's declining years; and Borowski (1740-1831), the son of a sexton in the town, who finally became archbishop (an isolated instance of the title) in the Evangelical Church. The last three have especially come down to posterity for their interesting memoirs of the philosopher. The names of Jensch, town councillor and criminal magistrate; Vigilantius, another civic dignitary, who attended Kant's lectures whilst occupying his official post; Hagen,

an authority in natural science; the two brothers Motherby—the elder a merchant, the younger a physician—the sons of Kant's old friend of youthful days: such are some of the names recorded to us by Reusch, the last of the band. Rink, another of the writers of biographical notices, and editor of some of the lectures by Kant, may be added to the list.

Kant lived a bachelor all his life. Some of the touches in his 'Observations on the Sublime and Beautiful' might suggest the idea that in early years he had not been insensible to the attractions of love. But the rigours of poverty had denied him the indulgence of these dreams; and as years went on and brought competence, though not wealth, he probably felt that the proper season for wedlock was over and gone. Probably his own circumstances had impressed upon his mind the contrast, to which he has more than once given expression, between the date which nature suggests for the union of the sexes, and the time fixed for marriage by the conventions and necessities of social life. Still even in his later years, according to more or less well-founded gossip, he was the hero of two inchoate and fragmentary love-affairs. A prepossessing young widow of gentle ways had touched the philosopher's heart so sensibly, that he had begun to balance his accounts to see if he could afford the luxury of a wife. But ere his calculations were completed, and his plans fixed, the prospective bride had left Königsberg, and found a prompter claimant for her hand somewhere in the Prussian Oberland (to the south). On another occasion, if we believe these idle tales, the same story repeated itself—only this time the heroine was the fascinating

companion of a Westphalian lady on a visit to Königsberg. Here, too, Amanda departs for her home before the scrupulous forethought of Kant permits him to make his election. More authentic is the story of a simple-hearted pastor of the town, whose compassion for Kant's solitary state led him to print a dialogue exhorting to matrimony as a duty and a blessing. The septuagenarian smiled gravely at his foolish friend's importunity, paid the costs of printing the 'Raphael and Tobias' dialogue, and retailed the jest at table. But he disliked to hear allusion or remark made concerning his celibacy.

Probably the temperament of Kant was more disposed to the freedom of friendship in general society than to the comparative bondage of the conjugal life. The long years of probation had certainly stamped him with several peculiar habitudes, and had made him specially impatient of any interference with his liberty. Once, it is told, he had accepted the invitation of a noble friend to take a seat in his carriage, and had in the sequel been driven, much to his own disgust, far beyond the time and distance originally intended. From that time he made a vow never to enter a carriage unless he should himself be supreme to fix the hour and the road. A like impatience of control made him his own physician. By a variety of hygienic precepts, which he had evolved from his own reflections, he endeavoured to steer clear of the doctor. The care of health, and his own rules to that end, were subjects on which he was always ready to converse. He devoted to medical questions considerable attention. His papers show that in the closing years of his life he had brought to him the weekly list of births and deaths in Königsberg. He was in the

habit of discussing the merit of innovations in medicine—such, for example, as the Brunonian theory (John Brown's '*Elementa Medicinæ*' first appeared in 1780) and the vaccination doctrines of Jenner, which were promulgated only in the last years of the century. Up to the time of his last illness, the only medicine which Kant accepted at the hands of the profession was the aperient pills prescribed by his old college friend, Dr Trummer.

If Kant distrusted or eschewed the medical faculty, he was little less inclined to give a wide berth to the lawyers and the clergy. Of the Church he had a noble idea; but he did not find it realised in the Churches of his day. Sacerdotalism, even in its mildest forms, was as abhorrent to him on the one hand as a superstitious and sensuous supernaturalism was on the other. It is a point in their hero's life which causes the deepest pain to some of his biographers, that during his manhood he never entered a church door. On the special day, when the professors, with the rector at their head, made their procession to the cathedral, Kant did once take his position in front; but at the church door he turned another way, and retired to his rooms. To the free soul of Kant the sectarianism which had an eye for nothing higher than professional interests in its performance of the sacred duties of keeping body and spirit sound could only be abhorrent in the extreme. Like his king and contemporary, he was above all things impatient of the pettifoggery on which the legal profession so largely depends, of the intolerance by which priests often claim to guide and govern the consciences of men, and of the conventional methods by which medi-

cal tradition seeks to palliate disease. Every man his own doctor, every man his own lawyer, every man his own priest,—that was the ideal of Kant.

A man with these lofty visions of independence is not likely to find many women to sympathise with him, or even to understand him. What, to them, would life be without its conventionalities—without the doctor and the clergyman? Kant, besides, was in a mild way something of a beau. In his younger days the *privat-docent*, little man though he was (just over five feet), had always tried to dress like a gentleman. With his frock-coat of brown or bright sand-colour, his frilled front or *jabot*, his three-cornered hat, silk stockings, a cane (in earlier days, when fashion so prescribed, a sword had swung at his unwarlike side), he made a well-becoming appearance in the streets: a wig and hair-bag completed his costume. One of his barber's accounts still survives (the back of the paper having been used for notes) to show how moderate were the charges for coiffure in Königsberg. Kant had also dressing arrangements of his own: the mechanical contrivance by which his stockings were suspended has been described in detail by Wasianski. He was apt also to discourse on the philosophy of dress, no less than of conversation. He would touch upon the comparative effect of white and black stockings in giving an appearance of stoutness to the ankle; and would remark that we may take a lesson in the proper harmony of colours for our apparel from the common auricula.

All this was the natural result of long years of bachelorhood. Since 1762 Kant had been attended by a faithful servant named Martin Lampe, a native of Würzburg.

Like Corporal Trim, Lampe was an old soldier, and probably added an additional touch to the pipe-clay and misogynist tendencies of the establishment. Kant grew deeply attached to his servant. When some of his friends said jestingly one day, that they feared Kant would leave them in the next world and seek more congenial society among the departed philosophers, he replied: "None of your philosophers; I shall be quite happy if I have the society of Lampe." But Lampe, who one day surprised Kant by presenting himself in a yellow coat instead of his livery of white with red trimmings, and by informing his master of his intention to be that day married, grew less satisfactory as years went on. He drank occasionally, and had fits of obstinacy and quarrelsomeness, which his old master was less and less able to bear with. At last, two years before Kant's death, he had to be dismissed; but the name of his ancient domestic would not leave Kant so easily as his bodily presence had been disposed of, and the veteran sage found it needful to write on his note-book, "The name Lampe must be completely forgotten." He did not, however, forget Lampe's interests, and took means to soften, by a small pension, the hardships of old age.

From his celibate vantage-ground Kant made his observations on womankind and the relations between the sexes. His remarks are not unkindly or on the whole unfair; but they suffer from the effect of distance and of antithesis. He had a keen eye for the foibles of the sex, and a strong sense of the illusions and conventionalities which throw a "beautiful sham"—a spiritual fig-leaf—over the nakedness of the natural attractions. His

remarks are all from the exclusively masculine standpoint. Unlike Plato, he directs his view almost solely to the diversity between the sexes, instead of to the identity of human nature, to the double-sexed being of which they are complementary halves. Hence we are not surprised to hear him impress on his lady friends the supreme importance of cookery as a feminine accomplishment. He cherished the current prejudices of the masculine world against blue-stockings. "Human nature sums up the grand science of a woman, and in human nature especially the man" (*Der Inhalt der grossen Wissenschaft der Frauen ist vielmehr der Mensch, und unter den Menschen der Mann*). "A lady, who has her head full of Greek like Madame Dacier, or who engages in serious mechanical controversies like the Marquise de Châtelet, may as well have a beard to the bargain: it would possibly give better expression to the character of profundity at which she aims."

The age of Kant was an age of match-making, and not an age of æsthetic or passionate love-making. It looked upon marriage as an arrangement for the happiness of human beings,—a mode of making one's way through the world easier and pleasanter. The foremost intellects of the time were engaged in a continual warfare against fanaticism and superstition, against the fantastic extravagances of passion and instinctive belief. Reason was their watchword; Reason was their deity. Unreasoning faith, undisciplined imagination, were the enemies they most abhorred. Enlightenment of the mind, illumination, freedom from the prejudices of feeling and tradition, were greater aims in their eyes than any mere enthusiasm for learning for its own sake. Here was a

grand and noble idea, but because of its limitations it easily assumed a prosaic and utilitarian aspect. If Kant's age was the age of criticism, it was not the age of historical insight, or of sympathy with the past. The thinkers of whom we speak were too acutely sensible of their duty *écraser l'infâme* to see any beauty in the structures of old belief and traditional authority which they hoped to destroy. To get rid of the incubus of governmental, legal, sacerdotal oppression, was a task that hardened the sensibility to the beauties of art and the delicacies of sentiment.

And yet there was another series of currents of opinion even in Kant's time. Already in the middle of the century the investigations of Winckelmann had revealed Greece as the true school of European culture. His contemporaries, Hamann and Herder, had reiterated the doctrine that human history was not an abstract philosophical process, but a poem instinct with feeling and faith. They had called attention to the mysterious double nature of language as an incarnation of reason in sense and materiality. A sympathetic historical appreciation of the past and the uncultured was rising up here and there, to modify and beautify the too anxious devotion to the claims of utility and reasonableness as the one thing needful. But of all this new light Kant saw little, and what little he saw he deemed a Will-o'-the-wisp. In the complex and irregular beauties of the middle ages, he, like the average of his contemporaries, saw only disorder and fantastic folly. Gothic architecture seemed caricature,—the fruit of a perverted taste and of a barbarous age. Monasticism and chivalry were unnatural and fanatical aberrations. The grand old pile

of Marienburg, the ancient seat of the Teutonic knights, the edifice which Kant's scholar, Theodor von Schön, restored to some of its old magnificence (and which, as he said, had never failed to impress every visitor save two, and of them one was suspected of being a parricide),—of this pile Kant, like his contemporaries, had probably barely heard. The name of Shakespeare does not occur in Kant's works; and when he speaks of Homer, he suggests Pope's translation more directly than the original. Probably he knew little Greek. "The old songs from Homer to Ossian, and from Orpheus to the Prophets," he says on one occasion, "owe the brilliancy of their style to the want of proper means to express the ideas."

This limitation of Kant's mind on the æsthetic and emotional side is especially seen in the domain of literature and art. He had seen no picture-galleries. He speaks of print-collectors merely to quote an illustration of an amiable weakness. The only print which adorned the walls of his room was a portrait of Rousseau, and that was probably a present. In the works of art which the accomplished Countess Keyserling had gathered in her mansion, he was never observed to take any special interest. In music his favourite strains were the stirring notes of a military band: he warned his pupils against the enervating effects of plaintive and languishing airs. In poetry his taste had probably been formed on the model of the classic bards of ancient Rome. Of both Milton and Pope he speaks with respect, although for different reasons; yet Milton, like Homer, seemed to him to transgress the limits of well-regulated imagination, and to border on the fantastic. Haller he had •

early learned to admire ; Bürger and Wieland are also mentioned among the poets he had read. But probably he found the sallies of the comic and satirical muses more to his mind. Amongst these Liskov, and at a later period Lichtenberg—especially the comments by the latter on Hogarth's pictures—afforded him relaxation and amusement. The better known poets and novelists who cluster round the reign of Queen Anne,—such as Swift, Fielding, Addison, Butler, Richardson, Sterne, Young, and Pope,—seem to have been tolerably familiar to him. But, on the whole, it may be said that what Kant sought in literature was the relief of contrast, recreation in the hours when he quitted the stern studies of ethics and metaphysics. The world of art as such—except, that is, in so far as it ministers to the pleasure or ease of the natural and untaught sensibility—was to Kant almost a *terra incognita*.

This externality to the influence of art is to be ascribed partly to Kant's early upbringing, and partly to the provincial atmosphere in which his lot was cast. Königsberg lay too far outside the general current of human progress and interests. It had not yet entered into the full light of the culture which at this epoch radiated from Paris and Central Germany. But if art had not become a habitual sphere in which his mind could float as in an azure sky, the influences of nature which, either from their grandeur or their witness to intelligent adaptation, fall pleasantly on the common mind, were to Kant peculiarly impressive. "The starry sky above me, and the moral law in me,"—these, he says, "are two things which fill the soul with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence." For the little

glimpses which the ordinary phenomena of nature permit into the operations of an intelligence, he had a perception no less keen than was his sense of the sublimer aspects of the universe. He told his friends one day how, as he passed a certain building in his daily walk, he had noticed several young swallows lying dead upon the ground. On looking up, he discovered, as he fancied, that the old birds were actually throwing their young ones out of the nests. It was a season remarkable for the scarcity of insects, and the birds were apparently sacrificing some of their progeny to save the rest. "At this," added Kant, "my intellect was hushed: the only thing to do here was to fall down and worship." Once, he said, he had held a swallow in his hand, and gazed into its eyes; "and as I gazed, it was as if I had seen into heaven." All through life he had never lost sight of the lesson of mind in nature which he had learned at his mother's knee. And in the last of the three criticisms, the 'Criticism of the Judgment,' he gave his systematic account of the faith in reason which strengthens and guides the inquirer in the search after natural order.

CHAPTER V.

THE AGE OF CRITICISM.

WITH his entrance upon professorial life there is a contemporaneous change in the character of Kant's literary activity. For the twenty years between his earliest work in 1747 and his comparison of Leibnitz to Swedenborg in 1766, the writings of Kant had indicated an advancing and tentative intelligence, grappling in apparently casual order with some of the fundamental problems of human thought. The true nature of our conceptions of movement; the primitive origin and constitution, as well as the final aim, of the cosmic system; the ideas which it is possible to attach to the current beliefs in a spiritual, invisible, and immortal world; the place of God in the plan of natural existences; and the relation of thought (as especially shown in the case of negatives) to reality,—such had been some of the more significant topics on which he had from time to time attempted to gain systematic and consistent conclusions. The ideas thus suggested had procured for their author throughout Germany a reputation for originality and profundity; and kindred spirits, engaged in similar researches, were prompted to enter into correspondence with him.

Of these contemporaries the first to hail Kant as a fellow-labourer for the cause of truth was Lambert. Johann Heinrich Lambert, who was only four years younger than Kant, had at an early period distinguished himself by his mathematical acumen. In 1764 he settled at Berlin, and in the following year became a salaried member in the Academy which Frederick had been gathering in his capital. His introductory address, "*Sur la liaison des connaissances qui sont l'objet de chacune des quatre Classes de l'Académie*," struck the keynote of his philosophical efforts. His aim was to unfold the one true method of the sciences,—the method which combines experience on the one hand with the demonstrative certainty of the calculus on the other. The words of Kant, that "in every branch of natural science there is only so much strict and proper science as there is of mathematics," are exactly conceived in the spirit of Lambert. His 'Cosmological Letters on the Arrangement of the Cosmos' (1761) traverse in part the same ground as Kant's work on the 'Natural History of the Heavens,' which made its unregarded appearance in 1755. His 'Neues Organon,' published in 1764, was an attempt to bring the abstract laws of thought to bear upon the conditions of experimental knowledge.

It was this man who in 1765 wrote to Kant, and suggested that the communication of their respective ideas, and combined action with divided labour, might bring them with greater rapidity to the results in which they were alike interested. In his reply Kant states that "after many and many a tack he has at last reached a firm conviction as to the method which ought to be employed if escape is ever to be made from the illusory

and pretended knowledge known as metaphysics." "All his efforts culminate," he says, "in a search for the proper method of metaphysics." Meanwhile he proposes to begin with two minor works of a more real use, 'Metaphysical Elements of Natural Philosophy,' and 'Metaphysical Elements of Practical Philosophy.' In 1770 (about a month after his dissertation) he again tells Lambert: "It is now nearly a year since, as I flatter myself, I reached a conception, which I feel sure I shall never change, though I may extend it: a conception which enables us to test all sorts of metaphysical questions by perfectly certain and easy criteria, and to obtain a decision as to how far they are soluble or not." "It seems," he adds, "that metaphysics should be preceded by a special, though merely negative, science, in which the first principles of sense have their authority and their limits fixed, to prevent them introducing confusion into judgments about objects of pure reason, as has hitherto almost always been the case."

It would thus appear that in the year 1765 Kant had in his eye a work on the 'Proper Method of Metaphysic.' It is preserved for us only in the somewhat negative chapters of the 'Dreams of a Visionary.' To account for the non-appearance of the work, or for its prolonged delays and final issue in a different shape in 1781, some critics have referred to the publication of the 'Nouveaux Essais' of Leibnitz. That work, which its author intended as a confutation of the views of Locke, had been kept back, originally in consequence of the English philosopher's death, and did not ultimately see the light till 1765. It is no doubt probable that the problems suggested by Leibnitz had much to do in

determining the direction of his thoughts. But if we depend upon the evidence to be drawn from references in his own writings, Locke's Essay had almost as much to do as that of Leibnitz in giving form and tone to his speculations.

According to a remark of Kant himself in a letter to Mendelssohn, the 'Kritik,' though "the product of reflection of a space of at least twelve years, was written in the course of between four to five months." Of the course of preparation for the 'Kritik' thus indicated to have begun in 1769, Kant's letters to Marcus Herz of Berlin give a faithful record in occasional glimpses. On 7th June 1771 he writes, that in consequence of the difficulties raised by Mendelssohn and Lambert *apropos* of the doctrines of his dissertation, he is engaged upon a work on the 'Boundaries of Sense and Reason,' the materials for which he has gone through during the past winter, sifting, weighing, and adjusting, so that he has only lately arrived at a definite plan. He adds, however, that the state of his health only allows him to employ for this purpose moments of good humour, and obliges him to devote the rest of the time to comfort and slight recreations. In February 21, 1772, it appears that the prospect of a speedy realisation of these plans had increased. "He is now," he says, "in a position to propound a criticism of the pure reason, including the nature of theoretical as well as of practical knowledge, so far as the latter is intellectual;" and of this he "proposes first to complete the earlier part, dealing with the sources of metaphysic, its method and limits, within the space of three months.' But those who looked for the book in the lists of the Leipsic Easter Fair of 1772

would be disappointed. Towards the end of 1773 he offers excuses for his failure to put in an appearance, on the ground that a new science, which is to give a new turn to philosophy, and which, while it makes philosophy do better service to religion and morals, will also make it strict enough to satisfy the sternest mathematician, cannot be the work of a short time. Again, on the 24th November 1776, describing his essay as "a criticism, a discipline, a canon, and an architectonic of pure reason," which will tell with certainty whether we are on the soil of true reasoning or false subtilty, he adds: "With this work I do not expect to be ready before Easter, but look forward to spending on it a portion of next summer, so far as the constant interruptions from bad health will let me work." On the 20th August 1777 he again speaks of the criticism of the pure reason as a stone in the way of all other enterprises; that winter, however, he hopes to have got over all difficulties, and to present his views in a clear and distinct form. And so on during the years 1778 to 1780 he continues partly to excuse to his correspondents the continued non-appearance of the promised work, partly to name a near day for its publication.

At last, in the beginning of 1781, the manuscript was sent to the printer at Halle. By the end of March Kant had received in proof some thirty sheets,—more than half the work; and in the beginning of June there appeared at the Easter Fair of Leipsic the '*Critik der reinen Vernunft, von Immanuel Kant, Professor in Königsberg.*' The volume, published by Hartknoch of Riga, consisted of 856 pp. 8vo, costing in ordinary paper 2 thalers 16 silbergroschen, and in better paper

(*Schreibpapier*), 4 thalers. Kant asked no fee for his work; but Hartknoch gave him 4 thalers a sheet, which would make in all less than 200 thalers, or about £30, for the first edition of the work. The later editions were paid for separately. The book was dedicated to Zedlitz, the celebrated Minister of Frederick and patron of liberal culture in Prussia. And in the words of Schopenhauer: "It is certainly not the least of the merits of Frederick the Great, that under his rule Kant could develop and publish the 'Criticism of Pure Reason.' A salaried professor would scarcely have dared to do anything of the sort under another Government." Of Zedlitz himself and his relations with Kant something has already been said. Their first public relations began in a way rather characteristic of the despotic methods current with the liberal reformers of the period. In 1775 the Government of East Prussia received a mandate from Berlin, in which Zedlitz, referring to certain statistics which had been furnished as to the condition of the Königsberg University, commented in severe terms on the general backwardness and obsolete methods of the professors. "Excepting a few teachers, notably Professors Kant and Reusch, they use textbooks long since shelved by more able modern works." Certain lecturers are informed that if they are determined to adhere to the system of Crusius (the more orthodox antagonist of Wolf), they should betake themselves to other subjects than philosophy. Professor Braun in particular is directed to make his courses less prolix. Great must have been the stirring among the dry bones by this dictatorial edict of the Prussian minister of education.

At the first publication of the 'Kritik' in 1781, the full significance of the work was unfelt. To minds steeped in the prejudices of the current metaphysics, as well as to minds imbued with the current prejudices against metaphysics, it was a sealed book. To the latter it seemed like killing a dead dog, and the former believed it to be only another of the idealistic theories, of which specimens were already too common. Except a few friends of the author and a casual reader here and there, the book found no demand, and the publisher began to feel anxious. Kant's long abstinence from literary labour had not been favourable to the maintenance of a style which even at his best had wanted simplicity and directness. And now he was no longer in the same living contact with his pupils as in the days of his *privat-docentship*. He writes to Herz in 1778, "I have almost no private acquaintance with my hearers."

It was about half a year after the appearance of the book that the first review of it was published. The 'Gelehrte Anzeigen' of Göttingen for the 19th January 1782 contained a nine-page notice of the 'Kritik.' It began with the statement: "This work . . . is a system of the higher or transcendental idealism,—an idealism which embraces both mind and matter, transforms the world and ourselves into ideas, and represents the objective world as derived from appearances which the understanding combines in the interdependent whole of experience. . . . The cause of these ideas is to us unknown and unknowable." It compared the first chapters, in which Kant argues for the phenomenal character of space and time, with the idealistic theory of Berkeley.

The review, originally written by Professor Garve of Breslau (a well-known essayist on ethical topics), and subsequently curtailed and modified by J. G. Feder, an eclectic philosopher of the day, was probably as good as could have been expected. It classified the new phenomenon under the customary labels of the philosophical reviewer, showed how similar things had been said before, and called attention to the old metaphysics which lurked under the new and awkward terminology. The attacks on metaphysical and natural theology, which formed the main theme of the second and larger half of the "elementary" theory, seemed to be wasted labour for those who, while not directly rejecting the scholastic methods, still declined to take them *au sérieux*.

It was difficult for ordinary minds to imagine that here at length had come a man who was in earnest about philosophy. His was a mind of which the main attribute was thoroughness and consistency. The conscious or unconscious sophistry by which the majority of men, then as always, can accept a doctrine and yet implicitly deny it, was to Kant an impossibility. To him half-truths were an abomination. "Whatever on rational grounds is found good for theory is also good for practice." The business of philosophy, in the true sense of the word, is to answer three questions—(1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope for? Towards answering these questions, the highest questions which can interest human beings, Kant directs his whole efforts in those great Critical essays.

Kant, therefore, severely as he often speaks of meta-

physics, is a lover of metaphysics after all. Not, indeed, of the dogmatic metaphysics of the schools—"the matron, cast off and desolate"—but a younger metaphysics which is the dream of his own fond hopes,—a mistress of whom he says, his fate is to be enamoured, though he cannot boast of any favours he has ever received from her. A metaphysical system, he says in one place, has never yet been written; and then, in another, he tells us his conviction that on metaphysics depends the true and permanent welfare of the human race. This antithesis in Kant's own mind is constantly reflected in his exposition, where he seems at once the enemy and the devotee of metaphysics. In his eagerness to save metaphysics, however, he seemed to have laid disproportionate emphasis on the means. ✓

It would naturally be said: "Thus, then, all reality is maintained to be reality in our consciousness. Here is a new system of idealism, according to which all things have an existence only in the mind of the thinker." This idealistic interpretation of his work annoyed Kant considerably. He saw his supplementary thesis stated in a one-sided manner, and presented as the chief dogma of the book. The extent to which this feeling went is evidenced by the numerous passages of notes, written on scraps of paper and backs of letters, still preserved in the University Library of Königsberg. A large number of them bear the heading, "Wider den Idealism" ("Against idealism"). Again and again he had to wrestle with the enemy which he had thus unwittingly evoked against himself. The final precipitate from the effervescence thus produced was the chapter entitled "Confutation of Idealism," in the second edition of the 'Kritik.'

Previously, however, the "Prolegomena to every future metaphysical system which lays claim to a scientific character," had appeared in the beginning of 1783. Originally intended as an extract, or perhaps abstract, of the original work, the 'Prolegomena' had gradually grown to have a substantive purpose of their own. They accentuate the question as more distinctly a critical one. Is philosophy, as the science of what is beyond mere experience, possible? Is all knowledge an intelligent aggregation of sensations? And if there be a knowledge which anticipates and even regulates experience, how is this knowledge to be accounted for, and on what conditions or within what limits has it independent validity? The 'Prolegomena,' whilst forming an introduction to the more prolix work, tend at the same time to give an imperfect, and occasionally a misleading, conception of its fundamental aims.

But from the publication of the 'Prolegomena' early in 1783 to that of the 'Criticism of the Power of Judgment' ('Kritik der Urtheilskraft') in 1790, Kant was incessantly issuing instalment after instalment, intended to complete in detail what had been already laid down in its larger outlines. Feeling the shades of the night already creeping over him, — that night in which no man can work, — he was eager to leave nothing unaccomplished of the edifice which in his mind's eye had been gradually assuming grander proportions and clearer lineaments. Between the first 'Kritik' and the last, the 'Foundation for the Metaphysic of Ethic' in 1785, the 'Metaphysical Rudiments of Natural Philosophy' in 1786, the second edition of the 'Criticism of Pure Reason' in 1787, and the

'Criticism of Practical Reason' in 1788, along with the 'Prolegomena' in 1783, form the principal works of the intervening period. But these important works do not exhaust the list of Kant's writings during the period named. The Berlin 'Monatsschrift' between 1784 and 1786 contained seven papers by him on questions of general philosophy, and a smaller number appeared in other periodicals. Considering that Kant at the beginning of this ten years' period was fifty-seven years of age, one cannot but admire the energy which the old man showed in the elaboration of his system.

For from the publication of the 'Kritik' dates the existence of a Kantian system of philosophy. At first, indeed, he claimed to do no more than to prepare the ground for a system of philosophy which is hereafter to come. But ere long the critical attitude and analysis began to take the rank of a critical system in the mind of the author himself. Criticism became the Critical or Transcendental Philosophy. And with its assumption of the rank of a system, the Kantian theory gathered adherents and opponents. Kant welcomed even a mild attention to his book. A review in the 'Gelehrte Zeitungen' of Gotha (August 1782) pleased him, though it was hardly more than a collection of extracts from the beginning of the 'Kritik.' "I am obliged to the learned public," he says towards the close of the 'Prolegomena,' in a passage where the consciousness of genius mingles with the offended vanity of the author—"I am obliged even for the silence with which it has honoured my 'Kritik' throughout a considerable time" (*videlicet*, more than a year): "for this silence at any rate evinces a suspension of judgment, and a suspicion that after all, in a

work which abandons every accustomed path and strikes into a new one which at first feels strange, there may be something calculated to give new life and fertility to an important, but now dead, branch of human knowledge, —evinces, in short, an anxiety not to break off and to destroy the yet tender shoot by a premature judgment." When reviewers did appear, they were not less casual and unsatisfactory than they generally are. Few perhaps were so inept as a critic of 1784, who remarked: "It were to be wished that the author had written in French or Latin; perhaps he would have succeeded in being more intelligible in style, and by becoming known to foreigners, would bring honour to Germany." Another critic (Meiners), irritated by the scholastic terminology and dialectical subtilty of Kant's work, compared him to the indolent and corrupt Greeks in the time of the old sophists and later dialecticians.

On the other hand, there appeared in 1784 'Explanations of Professor Kant's Criticism of Pure Reason,' from the hand of Johann Schultz, at that time chaplain to the Court in Königsberg, and subsequently professor of mathematics. The elucidations ('Erläuterungen') had had the benefit of Kant's assistance and approval; but after all, they were only an aid for dull or indolent readers, and added nothing of independent value. The newly established 'Allgemeine Literaturzeitung' of Jena, with Schütz and Hufeland at its head, helped to spread abroad the new doctrines. An article in the beginning of 1786 pronounced the publication of the 'Kritik' the advent of a new epoch of philosophy, the beginning of a revolution. And in the 'Deutscher Mercur' of August 1786 there appeared the first of a series of papers, in

which Reinhold constituted himself the expositor of the new system in its moral and religious aspects.

The publication of the 'Foundation of the Metaphysic of Ethics,' in the spring of 1785, had been looked forward to with much interest, as it was known that Kant had been engaged since the year 1782 in the preparation of such a work. To the general public, and indeed to many of his special disciples, the ethical portions were by far the most attractive in the system. The 'Criticism of the Pure Reason' had been cold, almost sceptical in tone: it was positive only in its logical system or its theory of knowledge; in its application to metaphysics it was negative, and even destructive. The moral treatises were in a more enthusiastic and inspiring mood. If man as a phenomenon was but part of the blind chain of cause and effect, as an intelligible being he was member of a world of freedom, of self-determination, possessed of an absolute faculty of initiation. The august ideas of duty and the moral law were presented with a power and conviction which came like fresh bracing air among the close and relaxing latitudes of an age accustomed in morals to hear nothing but a commonplace eudæmonism. And the hopes which crave for God and eternal life found themselves in a kindred atmosphere, when they heard of the presuppositions required for the realisation of the idea embodied in the law of duty. We need not be surprised, therefore, to hear that the first edition of the 'Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten' was exhausted in a few months, and that a reprint (or almost such) was issued in 1786. It is, in fact, with the appearance of this work that public attention was first called to the new philosophy, and from that students

turned back to the hitherto neglected 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft.'

The other work of Kant's belonging to this period is the 'Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft.' Written apparently in the summer of 1785, it was published in 1786. It throws incidental light on some points of Kant's general philosophy, but is not very closely connected with the systematic development of his thought. More direct bearing in that line may be found in the shorter essays of the years between 1784 and 1786, which have reference to the theistic philosophy of Mendelssohn.

In 1787 appeared the second edition of the 'Criticism of Pure Reason.' By April 1786 the stock of the first edition had, his publisher informed him, been exhausted. Probably the duties imposed upon Kant by his rectorship in that year delayed the appearance of a new edition. By April 1787 the manuscript was, however, ready. In the Königsberg University Library there is preserved Kant's own copy of the first edition of the 'Kritik,' containing numerous marginal notes by his own hand, partly corrections and partly additions, which, however, are only to a small extent identical with the alterations actually found in the second edition. These explanatory remarks, recently published by Professor Benno Erdmann, show the secrets of Kant's workshop, and indicate the patient energy which led him, with absolute devotion to the completion of the edifice of his philosophy, to grudge even time for correspondence and for the lighter pleasures of society. With the issue of the second edition, however, Kant's interest in the text of the 'Kritik' was at an end. Only in the fifth edition

(1799) did he allow the insertion of certain corrections which a friendly eye had suggested.

His attention hereafter was directed almost exclusively to crowning the work of criticism in morals and aesthetics. He felt that there was still work to be done which he alone could do. "I am now well up in years," he writes to Professor Schütz of Jena in September 1785, "and no longer possess the same facility as formerly of suddenly diverting my thoughts to works of different kind. I must keep my thoughts together without interruption, if I am not to lose the thread which connects the whole system." And in 1787, whilst declining to write an article for the same editor, he adds, "The time fails me, because I must without delay proceed to the foundation of the criticism of taste." The '*Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*,' published in 1788, ended his labours so far as the ethical question is concerned. And with the '*Criticism of the Judgment-Power*' ('*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*') in 1790, carrying out in an extended form the intentions of a criticism of taste, which had occupied him at least since the close of 1787, the Critical philosophy may be said to have been complete.

At the time of the publication of this last '*Kritik*,' Kant had reached the age of sixty-six. Other evidences corroborate his own impression, that his versatility was diminishing—that he was growing less and less able to enter into the views and criticisms of others. Occupied in exemplifying in various departments the principles defined by the first '*Kritik*,' he seldom read the lucubrations either of adherents or of adversaries. "About two years ago," he writes to Reinhold in January 1791,

“my health, without visible cause and real illness, suffered a sudden revolution, which speedily threw my appetite out of its ordinary daily enjoyment; and in this way, though my bodily forces and feelings sustained no injury, the capacity for brain-work and even for reading my lectures suffered a great alteration. It is only for between two and three hours in the forenoon that I can persistently devote myself to head-work: then, however well I may have slept at night, sleepiness is sure to come on, and I am compelled to work only at intervals. Thus work makes poor progress, and I must wait for a happy mood and make the best of it.” Yet in 1790 he was still able to offer a vigorous retort to the attempt of Eberhard to show that Kantism was only the repetition of an old doctrine, instead of being, as its admirers claimed, the inauguration of a new philosophic era. And when the Berlin Academy, perhaps with insidious allusion to Kantism, proposed a prize (in 1791) for the best essay on the question of the real advances made by metaphysics in Germany since the days of Leibnitz and Wolf, the veteran sat down to criticise the problem, and to answer it from the point of view which his own development had reached. The fragments of his essay, pieced together by his editor, Rink, have a peculiar interest as the last and most distinct utterance by Kant of his own conception of what he claimed to have done for philosophy. They form a valuable aid to the study of his more detailed work.

“Religion,” says Kant repeatedly, “is the recognition of our duties as Divine commands. Morality is the foundation, — religion only adds the new and commanding point of view.” With such presuppositions,

Kant, when he was nearly seventy years of age, undertook to test the moral content in the dogmas of religion,—to expound how far unassisted reason can determine the relations between God and man. In all public religious observance there is, according to him, an element of accommodation to the weakness of the multitude,—there is a tincture of superstition. Even the sacred books, in which the statutes fundamental to any creed are contained, are marred by weaknesses and imperfections. It ought to be the object of the philosopher to submit these complex systems and bodies of doctrine to an examination, which shall show the true gold of moral truth free from the dross accumulated by the human passions which have burned in the fire of reason. Every established religion—and Christianity among the number—must for the scholar and the thinker undergo such a criticism. The result is, that Kant finds in the Christian Bible a pictorial, but on that account probably misleading, exposition of the religion of morality and reason,—he finds the ideas of reason personified in ideal forms, and the universal laws of human nature and development presented as individual incidents in the history of individual men. He finds a belief commonly held by the religious world, that a direct and sensuous interference takes place between God and the world; a belief in the efficacy of special ceremonies, in the *quasi* magical power of rites and forms; and a failure to recognise that there are no other duties specifically distinct from the duty of man to man, and entitled to rank in a higher category as duties towards God.

These doctrines, which are implicit in the Kantian writings previous to this date, were first publicly and

separately announced in an essay on the "Radical Evil in Human Nature," which appeared in 1792 in the 'Monatsschrift' of Berlin. Its publication, however, was not without obstacles. In 1786 a new king came to the throne with "sensualities, unctuous religiosities, ostentations, imbecilities." Two years after, Zedlitz, the patron of philosophy and liberalism, was forced to retire, and was replaced by J. C. Wöllner, an ex-preacher, not without ability or dispositions towards learning, but prejudiced in the interests of orthodoxy. The first energies of the new administration were directed towards stemming the rising tide of criticism in matters of faith. Deposition from office was the penalty for any religious teacher who gave expression in his post to unorthodox or sceptical opinions. There followed this an edict establishing a censorship of the press. Matters became more serious when, in 1791, a commission of three members—Hermes, Woltersdorff, and Hilmer—was instituted to test the doctrines and opinions of every nominee to an educational or ecclesiastical appointment, as well as to supervise churches and schools throughout the country. From the very first Kant and his philosophy were objects of suspicion to the new censorship; but with the development of the French Revolution the reactionary party in Prussia gathered strength, and increased their precautionary measures. Friends of liberty and admirers of the French nation were treated as enemies of Prussia and traitors to her king. In 1792, an edict forbade, under penalties, any depreciatory references to the administration of the country. In the same year appeared Humboldt's essay defining the limits of state action.

Kant's article on the "Radical Evil in Human Nature," submitted by its author's request to the Berlin censorship, was passed by Hilmer with the remark that "None but profound scholars read Kant." The second article, "On the Fight of the Good Principle against the Bad for the Dominion over Man," similarly destined for the Berlin '*Monatsschrift*,' met a different fate. The imprimatur was refused. Kant resorted to another method for securing publication. He submitted his essay and two others, in continuation of the theme, to the theological faculty of his own university, which granted the requisite permission, and in 1793 the work, composed of the four papers, appeared at Königsberg as '*Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*' ('*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*'). In the preface to the work he explains the grounds of his procedure. "A treatise," he argues, "which is of the nature of a purely scientific inquiry, and has no direct bearing upon edification in religious life, falls naturally under the censorship, not of a body appointed to guard the welfare of the unlearned multitude, but of a body specially intrusted—such as a university faculty—with the maintenance of scientific culture."

Such reasoning did not find acceptance with the censors at Berlin. Angry at this attempt to escape their authority, and not conciliated by the appearance of a second edition of the work in 1794, they solicited the intervention of the Government. On the 1st October 1794 a Cabinet order reached "the worthy and high-learned our professor, also dear liege, Kant."

"Our gracious greeting first. Worthy and high-learned, dear liegeman, our highest Person has already since con-

siderable time observed with much dissatisfaction how ye misuse your philosophy to disfigure and depreciate many head and foundation doctrines of the Holy Scripture and Christianity : which thing ye have especially done in your book, ‘ Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason,’ and likewise in other shorter treatises. We had expected better things of you ; for ye must see yourself how little your action herein answers to your duty as teacher of youth, and to our paternal interests in the land, whereof ye are well aware. We desire at the earliest your most conscientious conformity, and expect of you, if ye would avoid our highest disfavour, that ye henceforth be found guilty of no such acts, but rather, as your duty bids, apply your influence and talents so that our paternal intention may be more and more attained : contrariwise, with continued obstinacy, ye have infallibly to expect unpleasant measures.”

The document, signed by Wöllner, was presented to Kant on October 12th. Kant said nothing about it at the time ; and it was not till the publication of his essays on the “ Quarrel between the Faculties ” (“ Streit der Facultäten ”) in 1798—four years afterwards—that he made this “ Retract or —— ” order known. His reply to the charges was—1st, that as a teacher of youth (*i.e.*, in his academic lectures) he had never meddled either with the Bible or with Christianity ; 2d, that the incriminated book was not work destined or suitable for general reading ; 3d, that it treated of natural religion, and only by way of illustration of revealed dogma ; 4th, that he had always called attention to the high morality contained in the Bible.

“ Finally,” he said, “ as I have always recommended others in confessing their faith to be always and above all things conscientious and upright, and never to state more about it, or impress upon others as articles of faith, more than they

are themselves certain of, so I have always conceived this judge in myself as standing by my side during the composition of my writings, so as to keep myself free not merely from every soul-destroying error, but even from every carelessness in expression which might cause offence. And thus even now in my seventy-first year, when the thought will often arise that I may very likely have to give account of all this in a short time before a world-judge who knows the heart, I can undismayed hand in the present answer as one made in full conscientiousness. As to the second point—to be guilty of no such (alleged) disfiguring and depreciating of Christianity—in future, I think it my surest course, so as to prevent even the slightest suspicion on the matter, to make my most solemn declaration, *as your Royal Majesty's most faithful subject*, that henceforth, both in lectures and in writings, I will completely refrain from all public deliverances on the topic of religion, natural as well as revealed."

"The words in italics," adds Kant in a note, "I chose purposely, so that I did not resign the freedom of my judgment in this religious question for ever, but only during the life of his Majesty." It is clear at least that in Kant's opinion there was in this reservation no quibbling,—nothing which was morally unjustifiable. And yet the language leaves behind in the reader a feeling of dissatisfaction and disapproval. There is sophistry in the argument, and unnecessary surrender in the attitude. The old man, so courageous in his books, was a coward before his king. Let age and infirmity plead for him; and let his teaching wipe away the evil of his example.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CRITICAL SCHOOL.

WHILE the sage of Königsberg had been thus rebuked and silenced for the time by a reactionary Government, his name was spread far and wide by those who had found new life in his writings, or had been inspired with zealous discipleship by his lectures. For the last seven years—since 1786 or thereabouts—his philosophy had made itself felt in that emphatic way in which a system sometimes takes possession of the world lying outside of the schools of the philosophers. In the words of Schiller, a new light was kindled for mankind. “In a hundred years,” said the enthusiastic Reinhold, “Kant will have the reputation of Jesus Christ.” Baggesen, the Danish poet, gave Kant the extravagant title of a “Second Messiah.” In 1788 Kiesewetter, then a young man, went from Berlin to Königsberg to see face to face the new prophet that had appeared, and to learn the secret of Kant on the spot. Every alternate day during his visits in the closing months of 1788 and 1791 he enjoyed the privilege of spending the hour between eleven and noon with Kant, hearing and asking questions, and sometimes even carrying off a written state-

ment in Kant's own hand on the topics which they discussed. In 1789 Kieseletter had begun to lecture at Berlin on the Criticism of the Practical Reason, with the express approval of his Excellency Wöllner, but with a hint from other quarters to be careful in his allusions to matters of faith. Kieseletter himself had a *naïve* confidence in the impossibility of conflict between Kantian philosophy and Christian faith. "I am convinced," he says, in a letter to Kant (March 3, 1790), "that the principle of your moral system can be distinctly shown to be compatible with Christianity: perhaps even, that if Christ had heard and understood you, He would have said—Exactly, that was the very thing I meant by 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,' &c."

In 1792 a similar mission brought Professor Reuss of the University of Würzburg to Königsberg to satisfy his mind on some doubtful points in Kant's works. And this is only a sample of the stirring among the younger German professors to learn the new philosophy at its living source. By the year 1792 the Critical philosophy had adherents in the teaching staff of most German universities. Catholic even more than Protestant universities were among the scenes of its first triumphs; for in Protestant universities, said Kraus, every professor of philosophy imagines himself an original philosopher. At Mayence, Heidelberg, Ingolstadt, Erfurt, and Bamberg; at Halle, Jena, Göttingen, Marburg, and Giessen, one or another professor lectured on the system of Kant.

Even in England Kantism attempted to set foot. In the beginning of 1794, Fr. A. Nitsch, a Lithuanian, ex-

teacher in the *Collegium Fridericianum*, a pupil and enthusiastic admirer of Kant, anxious also to advance his own position, came to London, and in March issued "proposals for a course of lectures on the perceptive and reasoning faculties of the mind, according to the principles of Professor Kant." He began by three gratuitous lectures introductory to the subject—the first of which, lasting for an hour and a half, was delivered before an aristocratic audience, including some ladies. His efforts produced so favourable an impression, that a subsequent course of thirty-six lectures at a fee of three guineas was attended by a considerable class, and had to be repeated in the autumn of the same year. The substance of the lectures was ultimately published in 1796, under the title of 'A General and Introductory view of Professor Kant's principles concerning Man, the World, and the Deity, submitted to the consideration of the learned.' In 1798 A. F. M. Willich, from Ermeland (the district near Elbing), published a book on the 'Elements of the Critical Philosophy.' But the Philistine public and its reviewers gave but a sneering welcome to the enthusiasts of the new philosophy. Its bristling nomenclature disgusted them; its teachings seemed doubtfully reconcilable with orthodoxy. They used to its advocate the same language as the Saracen commander in the fable adopted when asked what was to be done with the books of the great library at Alexandria. If these new philosophic theories accord with the lessons of our Koran, what need of the mystery and doubt under which they wrap the plain Bible truth? And if they disagree, why not leave them to the obscurities of an unknown tongue? Not less grudg-

ing, probably, was the reception accorded to a translation, under the title of 'Kant's Essays and Treatises' (in two volumes, 1798), of several of the minor works. It was the performance of a young Englishman named John Richardson, who had studied at Halle under Beck (a translation of whose Principles of the Critical Philosophy he published at London in 1798).

In France an attempt was made to introduce the knowledge of Kant by Charles de Villers (1765-1815), at first in some journalistic articles, in his 'Lettres Westphaliennes' (1797), and latterly in his 'Philosophie de Kant, ou principes fondamentaux de la philosophie transcendente' (Metz, 1801). The attempt was apparently a failure. Thinkers like Lalande, trained in the mechanical sciences, and explaining everything by ideas derived from them, accused Kant of wishing by his ideas of God, liberty, and immortality, to throw the world back to the epochs when these mystical chimeras obtained belief. The literary world in France, as in England, treated the new speculations with *persiflage* or indifference. Not till Cousin brought the support of his eloquence could France begin to see that the philosophy of Germany might be as well worth attention as its literature.

In the Netherlands Kant found adherents as early as 1792, who expounded his views. In Italy it was the work of Villers above mentioned, together with a French translation of a Dutch work, containing an exposition of the gist of the 'Criticism of Pure Reason,' which in the first twenty years of the present century gave the earliest indirect knowledge of Kantism. In Austria, if we except the Jew Bendavid, who published some treatises of Kantian philosophy, the system made little impression

on the schools. But it was from Austria that Kant had a strange experience of the effect of his ethical doctrine when sown on a rank and weedy soil. In 1792 he received a letter, written in complete neglect of the customary laws of spelling and punctuation. It was the work of a certain Fräulein Maria von Herbert, from Klagenfurth, in Carinthia, and began as follows: "Great Kant, to thee I call as a believer to his God for help, for consolation, or for doom to death." The lady had loved and lost,—both perhaps not wisely: she loved again, and the disclosure of her earlier *liaison* (a disclosure made by her enthusiastic self to the second lover) had once more brought the loss of the intimacy and devotion of her friend. Such is the story she tells in veiled language; and she thus concludes: "Put yourself in my place, and give me consolation or condemnation; 'Metaphysic of Ethics' have I read, together with the categorical imperative; helps me nought: my reason leaves me when I need it most: an answer, I implore thee, or thou canst not thyself act on thy authoritative imperative." How Kant replied is unknown; but his reply was evidently couched in generalities. In a second letter of January 1793 she requests him so to "turn his answer that it may touch upon the individual, and not merely the universal," which she has already at her friend's side happily understood and felt in Kant's works. "If," she says, "when this unbearable emptiness is got rid of, my state of health permits, I purpose in a few years to take an excursion to Königsberg. However, I must first ask permission before presenting myself to you. And you must tell me your history, for I should like to know what style of life your philosophy has led

you to, and whether it would not be worth your while to take a wife, or devote yourself to some one with your whole heart, and leave an image of yourself behind." To this letter Kant made no reply, and in 1794 had the pleasure of a third letter from the lady, full of Kantian phrases, and repeating the statement about the proposed visit to Königsberg. In 1804, about six months after Kant's death, she put an end to her own life, carrying out the idea of suicide which she had indulged and resisted for more than ten years. Her brother made a similar end about seven years later. The whole story is marked by the overdrawn sensibility, passionate abandonment, and morbid sensuality depicted in so many romances of the period.

The fate of the Herberts leads naturally to speak of their acquaintance, J. B. Erhard, known in later life as a Berlin physician, whose memoirs were published by Varnhagen von Ense. Erhard, who had begun the study of Kantism in 1786, paid a visit to Kant in 1791, was very agreeably received, and continued ever afterwards a fervent friend of Kant and adherent of the Kantian philosophy. Here is the way in which he speaks in his autobiography:—

"All the enjoyment I received in my life fades into nothing when compared with the quivering emotion I felt in my whole soul at several passages of Kant's '*Criticism of the Practical Reason*.' Tears of highest joy burst forth again and again on that book; and even the memory of these happy days of my life always moistens my eyes, and gives fresh courage, when troubles of later days and sad thoughts shut out all cheerful outlook in this life. If my life becomes an event in the history of men, and not merely a means for preserving the human species: if I stand fast in the fight with the depressing thought which the history of the time, like a hostile

demon, breathes into my soul,—the thought that the belief in the progress of mankind amid the weltering chaos of human affairs is only a nursery tale, told to keep the child from joining the crowded procession on the path of coarse enjoyment, and only an empty consolation for missing the jubilation of his comrades ;—if I resist this soul-depressing idea, it is thy work, my teacher, my spiritual father.”

Amongst the other arrivals in Königsberg in those years was the young J. G. Fichte. He arrived in the beginning of July 1791, and introduced himself to the knowledge of Kant by a manuscript essay,—the ‘Essay in Criticism of all Revelation,’—which proposed to carry out without reserve what Kant had as yet only done implicitly, and for those who could read between the lines. The aged Kant naturally did not respond to the enthusiastic visions which the youth of twenty-nine had formed from the studies he had made in the philosopher’s works. He glanced at passages in the new essay, and assisted Fichte to a post, but declined to discuss the issues involved in his own deliverances. For several years the two thinkers continued an intermittent correspondence. But when the outspoken criticisms of Fichte upon theological problems drew down upon himself the suspicions of German Governments, and ultimately led to his withdrawal from Jena, Kant, grown cautious and cold with increasing age, sent to the “Intelligenzblatt” of the ‘Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung,’ No. 109 (1799), a formal disclaimer of any identity in views between himself and the bold critic :—

“I hold Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre* to be a wholly untenable system. . . . The presumption of crediting me with the intention of giving a mere propædæutic to transcendental philosophy, and not the very system of such a philosophy,

is to me incomprehensible. Such an idea could never have occurred to me, for I myself had declared in the 'Criticism of the Pure Reason' that the completed whole of pure philosophy was the best guarantee of the truth of the 'Criticism.' . . . An Italian proverb says : 'God preserve us from our friends ; we can defend ourselves against our enemies.' There are so-called friends, good-hearted, well-meaning people, but awkward and stupid in the choice of means to promote our views, — others, however, who are sometimes deceptive, crafty, bent on our ruin, and yet all the time using the language of goodwill. Before such people and the snares they lay we cannot be too much on our guard. Yet for all that, the Critical philosophy, by its irresistible tendency to satisfy the reason in theory as well as in moral practice, must feel that it has to fear no change of opinions, no amendments, or a different body of doctrine ; but that the system of criticism rests on a perfectly sound basis, for ever fortified, and for all future ages is indispensable for the highest aims of humanity."

Of the great men of his country's literature on whom Kant exercised an influence, Schiller should be first named ; and beside Schiller, his friend Wilhelm von Humboldt. Goethe, too, took note of the greater Kantian works, as he did of other interesting phenomena of his time. With the 'Kritik der Urtheilskraft' he was particularly pleased ; but the 'Categorical Imperative' and the 'Radical Evil in Human Nature,' were as thorns in his side. Jean Paul Richter found a kindred spirit in Kant's moral writings : the Criticism of the Reason was his abhorrence. But if these authors found subject for admiration in Kant, to others his influence was highly objectionable. Herder nicknamed the whole movement a St Vitus's dance, and priestly fanatics gave their dogs the name Kant.

CHAPTER VII.

KANT'S LAST YEARS.

IN 1794 Kant had reached his seventieth year. The work of criticism had, so far as he was concerned, reached its culminating point. Further development of his ideas was reserved for other hands; and the old man, eager, as he said, *sarcinas colligere*,—to pack up for the long last journey,—retired in the summer of 1795 from all his private lectures, and restricted himself to the daily public hour on logic and metaphysics. His leisure moments were henceforth occupied in preparing for the press his lectures on moral and political philosophy, as well as on anthropology, and to the elaboration of what was to be the grand consummation of his system—the application of his abstract principles to construct a philosophy of nature. All the while he continued to take the liveliest interest in politics,—particularly in the progress of the French Revolution,—meditating on the rights of subjects and of sovereigns. His essay, ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’ (‘To the Everlasting Peace’), published in 1795, was suggested by the transient appearance of consummation in the Revolutionary movement. The essay, of which a second edition was called for next

year, was shortly afterwards translated both into French and English. In 1797 appeared his lectures on moral and political philosophy, under the title of 'Metaphysical Rudiments of Jurisprudence,' and his lectures on moral philosophy, under the title of 'Metaphysical Rudiments of Ethics.' In 1798 a collection of three essays under the common title of the 'Quarrel of the Faculties' ('Streit der Facultäten'), gave expression to Kant's view that the so-called superior faculties—theology, law, and medicine—had to acknowledge philosophy as their queen. The lectures on Anthropology appeared in 1798. The rest of Kant's lectures were arranged and prepared for the press by the care of his younger friends and pupils. If we add that Kant occasionally wrote shorter papers for the magazines, we can see that the four years between 1794 and 1798 were not an idle time for the septuagenarian sage. With Michaelmas 1797 he ceased altogether to lecture, after forty-two years' service as university teacher. In the preceding June the students had celebrated the last public appearance of their revered professor by a *fête* and procession in his honour.

The 'Quarrel of the Faculties' connects itself with the 'Religion within the boundaries of mere Reason.' The death of Friedrich-Wilhelm II. in 1797, and the consequent abrogation of the censorship of the press, permitted Kant once more to utter the free word on the pretensions of dogma and convention, which he had, only in more metaphysical phrase, been preaching all his life. The three great professional agencies—law, medicine, and theology,—the great pillars of conservatism, are reminded that they are only servants set under authority. "Admitting," he remarks, "the proud

claim of the theological faculty to call philosophy her maid, we still ask whether the maid carries the torch before her lady-mistress, or carries her train behind."

The closing years of Kant's life have been described for us in a simple and touching memoir by Wasianski. Wasianski, who had attended his lectures in 1773, holding the poor student's post of amanuensis, entered the Church in 1780, and did not again meet Kant till the year 1790. In that year he saw his old master at a wedding, and thenceforth was a weekly guest at his small dinner-parties. To this circumstance we owe an introduction to the minor details of Kant's private economy, the growing weaknesses of his old age, and the immediate antecedents of his death. Sometimes we could wish that the gossip had been less microscopic,—that the minutiae of domestic life had been more faintly touched, and the spectacle of a great mind losing itself in the imbecility of second childhood had been withdrawn from the vulgar gaze. Yet for those who remember amid the decline of the flesh the noble spirit which inhabited it, it is a sacred privilege to watch the failing life and visit the sick-chamber of Immanuel Kant.

It was, as has been said, in the close of 1797 that Kant, feeling the heavy hand of age upon him, relinquished active professorial service. His memory began to fail him, and he had to write on cards and scraps of old letter-paper notes to refer to in conversation. He still continued, as he did till much later, his habit of rising at five o'clock in the morning; but he began to go earlier and earlier to bed. With the year 1799 a change for the worse came over his health. For some

years previously, since 1796, he had complained of a perpetual feeling of oppression in the head. Kant himself, always bent on tracing the dependence of a variety of phenomena on a common cause, attributed this feeling to an excess of electricity in the air, and saw evidence of the same influence in an alleged pestilence which killed the cats in some parts of Germany. No arguments could dispel this conviction. Nor was this the only fixed idea under which he laboured. He kept his bedroom darkened for fear of bugs; because, as it happened, he found this visitant installed in his chamber on his return from his holidays, and learned that the windows of the room had been left open.

But with 1799 he lapsed into greater feebleness of body. He told his friends one day, "Sirs, I am old and weak; you must treat me like a child. . . . I am not afraid of death. If I felt this night that I should die, I would lift up my hands, fall down and say, God be praised." Instead of his usual walk, he restricted himself to a short stroll in the *Königsgarten*, in the immediate vicinity of his house. Once he slipped and fell as he walked along the way thither. Two ladies who happened to see him hurried up and set the frail old man on his feet again, who, with his accustomed courtesy, presented to one of them the rose he held in his hand. At another time, falling asleep in his chair, he nearly set himself on fire.

As he began to make mistakes in the payment of money, Wasianski from this time undertook the management of his affairs—calling for some time every day, and making arrangements for his comfort. Ultimately, in the end of 1801, Wasianski had to take

possession of Kant's keys, and do almost everything for him. But he found it hard to get on with Kant's old servant Lampe, who was growing unfit to discharge his duties, and was occasionally aggravating and unmanageable. In consequence Lampe was dismissed in the beginning of 1802 with a small pension, and his place taken by a Johann Kaufmann. At first Kant was grievously tried by the change; but he gradually accommodated himself to the new man, who seems to have answered pretty well.

As spring advanced, Kant was persuaded to go out into the open air—a thing which, to the detriment of his health, he had not done for more than two years. When taken to his own garden, he declared he felt himself as nonplussed as if he were on a desert island; but he soon came to like the garden, where he would now and then drink a cup of coffee—a beverage to which he had latterly become addicted. But after all, the weariness of old age increased. He could not bear to wait an instant for anything; and if the cup of coffee did not punctually arrive, would say half peevishly, half humorously—"I may die in the meantime, and in the other world I will drink no coffee." He took no interest in the approach of spring; the old, old story of returning sunshine and flowers affected him not—"Das ist ja alle Jahre so, und gerade eben so!" Yet he could still look longingly forward to the coming of a grasshopper which used to sing in front of his window.

Late in the summer, one warm day, they drove out towards the country, and Kant had a pleasant excursion, listening to the notes of the birds, and smoking half a pipe. As winter came on, however, his old complaints began

to vex him again—the *Blähung auf dem Magenmunde* (flatulence on the stomach), as he termed it. He suffered from bad dreams—would often rise at night, and injured himself by his falls, so that it was found necessary to make the servant sleep in the same room with him, and to introduce a night-light. Still he would amuse himself by planning excursions abroad for the next summer—excursions never destined to be carried out.

On the 22d April 1803 his birthday was celebrated, but he had no enjoyment of the festival. And two days afterwards he wrote down these words: “According to the Bible our life lasts seventy years, and at the most eighty; and when it is at the best, it has been labour and sorrow.” Still about midsummer he was able to go with Wasianski a short drive to a cottage on the N.W. of Königsberg, situated on a rising ground amidst tall alders; but the short drive seemed to Kant too long. And with autumn it became impossible with safety to leave him by himself. Accordingly his youngest sister—an aged widow, only six years junior to her brother, but still hale and active—was introduced into the household from the almshouse where she had spent so many years. The brother and sister got on very well together. About the same time, however, he began to lose the sight of his right eye (the left had for about twenty years been useless); and as he could scarcely walk, and forgot the names of familiar things, he was unwilling to receive the visits of strangers, to see what he himself described as a “worn-out, decayed, feeble old man.”

A bad attack on the 8th October 1803 was a prelude to the end. He would now often retire to rest immedi-

ately after the mid-day meal; but his sleep was disturbed. On common topics conversation was no longer possible with him; and yet if the current of talk turned to philosophic and scientific subjects, he still showed occasional flashes of the old vigour of mind. Everything had to be written down for him in little notebooks, some of which are still preserved. The dishes to be served at table, his barber's name, the little jokes or conundrums for after-dinner use, points under discussion in science or politics, are noted on these papers.

Yet even during these years of slow decay and prolonged dissolution, Kant was the point to which many inquirers looked for light and comfort. He held strong views on Jenner's great discovery: he termed vaccination an "inoculation of bestiality." Twice in the year 1800—once by a Professor Juncker of Halle, and once by a Graf Dohna (whose bride desired to be vaccinated)—he was asked whether he considered this prophylactic against small-pox a morally justifiable one. The publication of his works on Ethics had procured for him a sort of moral directorship: cases of conscience were laid before him for his decision. The number of letters (not always prepaid) which reached him in these later years came to be one of his grievances. Popularity, he found, brought penalties from which he would gladly have been exempt. He had always been lax in answering his letters; but now, unless by the medium of some of his younger friends, they were not answered at all. Yet he would work at his proposed metaphysics of nature after his intellect refused. But it was a treadmill task: he went round and round, and never advanced. His manuscript, examined by Dr Reicke, shows a hundred

attempts to find a definition of transcendental philosophy. Yet he still took an interest in the efforts of Villers to bring the Critical Philosophy to the knowledge of the French; and no doubt still received Kiese-wetter's friendly letters from Berlin, along with the hamper of Teltow turnips (*Teltower Rüben*), which was despatched by carrier every November. His official life had wellnigh ceased. A final spark was struck in the protest he raised in 1798, when a proposal was made that his place and that of another superannuated professor in the *Senatus* should be filled by two adjunct members appointed for the purpose. Kant's protest—"I refuse my consent to this new proposed plan, as the old arrangement is at once wise and the most humane"—was backed by the authority of the East Prussian Government, and the veteran retained his honorary post with unabated dignity.

At length the end came. The beams of the glad blue eye were quenched; the cheeks which even in age had been fresh and ruddy became pallid; the keen senses grew dull; the bodily frame, which assiduous care had maintained as a worthy organ for his mind, sank into weakness. Up to the last, however, his thoughts were kindly and noble. "There must be no stinginess or miserliness anywhere," he told his companions. In January 1804 he grew more and more restless,—his necktie had to be tied and untied many times in a minute. He ceased to recognise his friends. On the 3d February the springs of life seemed wholly dried up, and he ate nothing more. On the 12th February, at eleven o'clock in the forenoon, he passed away. All that was left was a poor skeleton,—a worn-out frame

which age and infirmity had gradually exhausted. His last words on the night before he died, said in declining the offer of a refreshing draught, when he seemed to suffer from thirst, were "*Es ist gut.*"

The news of his death soon spread from mouth to mouth through Königsberg. "The day," says Reusch, "was clear and cloudless,—a day such as Königsberg seldom sees in the year, and a small bright cloudlet floated in the zenith in the azure-blue sky. A soldier, said the story, had called the attention of the bystanders on the Smith Bridge to the circumstance by the words: 'See, that is the soul of Kant flying heavenwards!'" During the sixteen days, whilst he lay stretched on a bier in his dining-room, crowds flocked to see the remains of one who had been so famous. Kant had frequently expressed a wish that he should be buried quietly in the early morning. For some reason this request was disregarded. His funeral on the 28th of February was attended by a procession of the students, by his intimate companions and table-guests, and by a large concourse from the town and neighbourhood. He was buried in the so-called Professors' Vault, on the north side of the choir of the *Dom* (the University Church). In this place five years later some changes were made under Scheffner's direction. The floor of the cloister was paved with tiles, as a covered walk for the professors residing in the rooms opposite. A railing divided the eastern part—in which the coffin containing Kant's bones was deposited—from the rest of the cloister. The whole arcade received the name of *Stoa Kantiana*; and in 1810 a bust of the philosopher, executed by Schadow in white marble, was placed above the stone

which Scheffner had set to mark the place of interment. But the Stoa Kantiana soon fell into a condition of filthy decay, and the bust was removed to the New University, where it still remains. For many years this discreditable state of affairs continued, till about ten years ago a committee was formed to make the place worthy of its illustrious dead. In 1880 the eastern end of this arcade was transformed into a simple Gothic chapel; and in June 1881 a bust of Kant was again placed in the Stoa, and the well-known words of "Der bestirnte Himmel über mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir" inscribed on the wall. In the previous year an excavation had been made under the inspection of several Königsbergers interested in Kant, to determine exactly, if possible, the place where his bones were laid.

More than a month after the funeral a solemn convocation of the university assembled on the 23d April (the 22d, Kant's birthday, happening to fall on a Sunday), to hear a memorial address on the deceased from Dr Wald, the professor of eloquence. Shortly afterwards it occurred to William Motherby—one of the guests who sat so often at Kant's table—that it would be well to perpetuate the memory of the old fellowship by an anniversary festival. Every year, from 1805 onwards, the Kant Club which was thus called into existence met on the 22d April, under its *Bohnenkönig* or Captain of the feast, to celebrate the memory of the Master. The first meeting of these disciples, numbering between twenty and thirty from all ranks of society, took place in Kant's house. That house unfortunately is now the depot of ready-made garments and other

drapery, and unless the piety of modern disciples prevent, will inevitably be pulled down and replaced by a large modern shop.

The rigid economy of his mode of life, and judicious investments on the advice of his friend Green, the merchant, enabled Kant to leave behind him what was for his circumstances the considerable sum of 21,539 thalers. Yet Kant had been liberal during his lifetime. He indeed gave nothing to the casual beggar who importuned him on the street; yet every year for some time before his death he paid out about 200 thalers, partly to support his poor relatives, partly in general charity, not to mention smaller donations. Since 1800, when his brother died in Courland, he paid a yearly pension of 200 thalers to the widow and children. In his will he first of all distributed several legacies,—about 3000 thalers to his faithful administrator and executor Wasianski, his library (which consisted of 500 volumes) and 500 thalers to Professor Gensichen, 666 thalers 29 silbergroschen to his old cook, a smaller sum to his servant Johann, and something to Lampe over 40 thalers yearly. His childless sister who had nursed him received a life-pension of 100 thalers. The remaining 12,000 thalers of his property were to be divided equally—one moiety to the children of his deceased brother, and another moiety to the surviving children of his sisters.

There are several likenesses of Kant in existence. One of the best known was done in 1791 by a Berlin painter named Döbler, after which an engraving by Karl Barth was made for Schubert's biography in the collected edition of Kant's works by Rosenkranz and

Schubert. The original picture may be seen at Königsberg in the Freemasons' Lodge *Zum Todtenkopf und Phoenix*. A medallion likeness in clay by a friend of Kant's, named Paul Heinrich Collin (1748-89), the director of a porcelain-work established in Königsberg, after the model of Wedgwood, was considered successful at the time. It is the basis of a well-known print by Bause, after Schnorr, published at Leipsic in 1791. A Berlin painter named Vernet also painted Kant about the same time as Döbler. This portrait, which is not thought good, was photographed some years ago. A portrait of Kant in his 44th year was painted for the publisher Kanter, in 1768, by an artist named Becker. A good photographic copy of this last was issued in 1881 by Gräfe und Unzer, the present representatives of the Kanter firm. Another portrait by Becker exists in the possession of a German in London, and is probably of the same date. In 1864 a statue (a copy of that in the Friedrich monument in Berlin, by Rauch), representing Kant out walking, and stopping to speak (to Lessing), was erected on the slope between Kant's house and the castle.

CHAPTER VIII.

SPECULATIVE PHYSICS AND BIOLOGY.

EVEN before Kant had passed away, the currents of thought which he had tried to turn into the fields of experience were sweeping past him into new and dangerous latitudes. In 1802 Schelling and Hegel established a *Critical Journal of Philosophy*; and in the third number of their magazine they had the opportunity, in reviewing Villers, of stating the estimate the new school had formed of the philosophy of Kant. In their opinion the first question for one who aims at presenting Kantism to a cosmopolitan public, is to ask whether the system is really adapted for universality, and not merely aimed at a local and temporary frame of mind. And they have no doubts that the latter alternative is the true one.

"It is evident," says Schelling, "that in this case the language is inseparable from the thing; that if we are to philosophise on Kant's lines, we must use his language; and that any attempt to abandon the letter at once carries us across the narrow line that bounds what may be called his philosophy. Kant, as every one knows, referred all his followers to the clear letter of his writings; and Kantians of the strictest sect have always been on their guard against depart-

ing from the master even in the words and outward form. . . . It can be proved by history that Kant had never studied philosophy in its grand and comprehensive type,—that Plato, Spinoza, Leibnitz even, were known to him only through the medium of a metaphysical doctrine, which about fifty years ago was dominant in the German universities—a scholastic metaphysic which, through several intervening stages, derived its origin from Wolf. . . . And thus although, within the circle in which his mode of approaching philosophy has placed him, the persistent tendency of his mind to reach totality in its science may influence our opinion of his personality, and of the high respect he deserves, it cannot alter our estimate of his philosophy. That remains what it was—a secondary derivative, not a native and original growth. His philosophy is a building which at the best rests upon the empirical earth, but in part also on the rubbish-heaps of forgotten systems—no universal system, self-originated and self-subsisting.”

There is truth in these remarks by the young lions of Jena. Kant was no student of the history of philosophy, except where he found in other thinkers ideas and problems congenial to those which exercised himself. His reading, generally scrappy, was especially weak in the old metaphysicians. Yet one may doubt whether the faults which they find in Kant may not claim sometimes to rank among his merits. There is a good deal to be said for a system which “rests on the empirical earth,” or the facts of real experience.

An ancient philosopher laying down a course of education for the would-be metaphysician has insisted upon the advantages for this end possessed by mathematics, pure and applied. In geometry, in theoretical astronomy, and in the application of mechanics to the several branches of physical science, he found the stepping-stones by

which the mind could most easily rise to discern that all existence was in unity, bound together by permanent relationships or laws. It was according to this plan that Kant became a philosopher and a metaphysician. No doubt, like other students, he was fed on the husks of logic, and gained such furtherance from a formal training in the habit of distinguishing and defining, of proving and disproving, as it is able to give. Like them, too, he listened to the arguments of natural theology, to the discussions of free-will and immortality, which formed the culminating efforts of reasoning to reach ultimate and fundamental truth. But he found no satisfaction in the technicalities of the one, or the show of demonstration in the other. It was in mathematical and physical science that he felt himself on real and secure ground. But on that ground again his interest converged even from the first on a special question,—the question of method and evidence. Naturally, therefore, his first approaches towards the field of strict philosophy are hesitating, and proceed from different, and almost casual, points. There is no preconceived goal towards which he is hurrying. We may almost say, he is a metaphysician in spite of himself. He has no definite system ready in his head, and is in no haste to concoct one. Certain leading ideas soon begin to command the tenor of his thought. And after about twenty years these outlines begin to group themselves together in a theory, which on the one hand attempts to show the nature and constitution of human knowledge, and on the other, to exhibit the reality of a region from which science is inevitably barred.

In his earliest work, the ‘*Estimate of Living Forces*,’

mostly written when he was twenty-two, we see indications of the coming man. The doctrinal results established in the essay are of little direct value at the present day. It deals with one of those questions which may often be set aside as a mere war of words, because they raise disputes over an imperfect and ill-defined term, and fail to set clearly forth the real difficulty concealed under the verbal puzzle. The quarrel lay between Descartes with his followers on one hand, and Leibnitz with his on the other. The Cartesian theory had asserted that the sum of movements in the world was always constant. With this thesis, Descartes had combined the formula that the force is proportional to the velocity. Leibnitz had pointed out that the two positions were somewhat inconsistent, and had introduced the new formula by which a force was declared to be in proportion to the square of the velocity. The battle was waged by numerous combatants, many of whom, including the learned Marquise de Châtelet, Kant mentions and criticises. But he seems unaware that in 1741, the friend of the Marquise, the great Voltaire himself, had presented to the French Academy "*Doutes sur la mesure des forces motrices et sur leur nature*," and that in 1743 (*i. e.*, three years before Kant wrote) D'Alembert had set the question aside as a theoretical quibble, to which mechanics was indifferent. So remote was Königsberg from the main stream of European letters!

In his examination of the question, Kant is only moderately successful. He admits that the Cartesian formula is, for the purposes of mathematics, correct and satisfactory. Mathematics, as he remarks, assumes that the bodies of which it treats are always set in motion by

an external cause, and that the force they may exercise is always due to external impulse. But in the real bodies of nature there is more than this mere communication of motion. There is in physical bodies an original "intension," a germ of movement which only needs to be excited in order to gather vigour, and in free or unimpeded movement develop increasing energy. It is to the real bodies of concrete nature—*i.e.*, to those movements which, he says, have the property of maintaining themselves in the body to which they have been communicated, and of continuing for ever if unchecked—that the Leibnitian formula applies. Descartes, he holds, states the truth for the abstract mathematical theory; Leibnitz for the concrete facts of experience. The antithesis thus suggested is no doubt an important point; but Kant fails to prosecute it far enough, and to give a satisfactory definition of *vis viva*, or living force itself. Indeed, apart from the modern discoveries of the transformation of energy, and its conservation in its various modes, the question was doubly difficult.

Perhaps the most noteworthy feature in the doctrine of the book is the acceptance given to the Leibnitian dictum, *Est aliquid præter extensionem, imo extensione prius*: there is something more than extension, ay, something prior to extension, in what we call a body. Kant begins by adopting the dynamical theory of matter, which he afterwards expounded in detail in the *Metaphysical Elements of Physics*. The primary elements out of which matter is constructed are points of force, and the space which they occupy is a result of the antagonism between their forces. In short, the world is not a mere dead mass, of which the movements are

maintained by any extra-mundane God. In all its parts it is instinct with an active force, of which movement is a manifestation.

But even more notice is deserved by the general spirit and tone of the writer. It is marked throughout by a generous confidence in honest thought, and something of the feeling is ever breaking through, which says, *Ed io sono pensatore*. Even the motto quoted from Seneca is significant, being much to this effect—

“Be not like dumb, driven cattle!
Be a hero in the strife!”

“I am inclined to believe,” says the author of twenty-two, as he enters upon a field strewn with the bones of controversy, “that it is sometimes not without its uses for a man to place a certain noble reliance on his own powers. Such a confidence gives new life to all his efforts, and instils into them a certain stimulus which much conduces to the discovery of truth. When a man is in the way of believing that some dependence may be put on his studies, and that it is possible to catch even a Leibnitz in mistake, he will leave no stone unturned in order to corroborate his conjecture. Again and again he may go astray in his undertaking: yet, after all, the profit which thus accrues to the service of truth is much more considerable than if he had always kept to the main road. It is on this consideration that I take my stand. I have already fixed upon the line which I am resolved to keep. I will enter on my course, and nothing shall prevent me from pursuing it.”

Here is how this courageous, and withal sententious, youth speaks, from his speculative look-out, of the atti-

tude of the combatants. "Both the partisans of Descartes and those of Leibnitz have felt for their opinion all the conviction which in human knowledge it is for the most part possible to feel. On both sides sighs have been drawn for the sheer prejudices of opponents; and either party has believed that its own opinion could not possibly admit of doubt, if the other side would but take the trouble to look at it in the proper equilibrium of mind and temper. A certain notable difference, however, may be detected between the way in which the party of living forces (*vires vivæ*) tries to keep its ground, and that in which the evaluation of Descartes is defended. The latter appeals to simple cases only, in which the decision between truth and error is easy and certain: the former, on the contrary, makes its proofs as dark and intricate as possible, and saves itself, so to speak, under cover of night from a contest, in which, with a proper distinctness of light, it would always lose. Still the Leibnitians have almost all the experiences on their side: this is perhaps the sole point in which they have the advantage of the Cartesians."

This judicial attitude, not without a secret predilection for the Leibnitian doctrine (which, as we have seen, he supports with qualifications), appears in a severer form in his estimate of metaphysical knowledge. "It is apparent," he admits in one place, "that the first and primary sources of the operations of nature must undoubtedly fall under the scope of metaphysics." But alas for its performances!

"Our metaphysics is really like many other sciences—only on the threshold of genuine knowledge: God knows if it will ever get farther. It is not hard to see its weakness in

much that it undertakes. Prejudice is often found to be the mainstay of its proofs. For this nothing is to blame but the ruling passion of those who would fain extend human knowledge. They are anxious to have a grand philosophy ; but the desirable thing is, that it should also be a sound one."

We need not devote more than a brief notice to two tracts on physical geography published in 1754. In the first, Kant engages to demonstrate that there is a real external cause modifying the rotation of the earth on its axis, and that this cause, which gradually diminishes that rotation, tends in an immeasurably long period to destroy it altogether. The cause suggested is the continual friction of the ocean against its solid bottom, due to the attraction of the moon.

The other paper dealt with the physical grounds for holding that the earth was growing old. "It is one of man's greatest mistakes," says Kant, "when he applies as a standard on the grand scale of the Divine works the lapse of human generations. . . . When we consider the durability shown by cosmic arrangements in the grander members of the system,—a durability little short of infinity,—we are inclined to believe that in respect of the duration destined for the earth, a lapse of five thousand or six thousand years is probably less than one year in the life of a human being." Kant contents himself with showing that physics does not give sufficient data to answer the question, especially if the sort of changes supposed to indicate age in the earth is not clearly specified.

The ill-fated essay (p. 22), which came out in 1755 as a 'General Physiogony and Theory of the Heavens,' consists of three parts, with prologue and final doxology.

The first part, heralded by a summary of the Newtonian theory of the planetary system, propounds the hypothesis that there is also a system of the stars. Here Kant owns his debt to a self-taught English astronomer,—Thomas Wright of Durham,—with whose ‘New Hypothesis of the Universe’ he was indirectly acquainted by means of an abstract from it in the Hamburg ‘Freie Urtheile’ of 1751. Both speculators agree in thinking that the fixed stars may be treated as suns, and held subject to the same general conditions as prevail in our system; that these stars (our sun included) form some sort of system, which is aggregated in the line of the milky-way. The milky-way, in the vicinity of which the vast majority of the stars is found, holds in the stellar system the same place as the prolongation of the solar equator holds amongst the planets. Kant, however, goes beyond Wright in insisting upon the infinitude of the systems of stars; treats the nebulae as indications of other stellar systems lying on a different plane from that of the milky-way; and uses Bradley’s observations on the proper movements of the stars to corroborate his suggestions. In the seventh chapter of the second part, not content with a central star (perhaps Sirius) for our system of the milky-way, he suggests the probability of a central body regulating the revolutions of all the star-groups (nebulae and milky-way) which exist amid immeasurable space. It is needless to add that observation confirms neither the hypothesis of the lesser nor of the greater central sun, and that modern theory does not regard a central body even as indispensable for the existence of a systematic interdependence of all the astral movements.

The second part, or Cosmogony proper, treats "of the first state of nature, the formation of the celestial bodies, the causes of their movement and systematic connection, not merely in the planetary sphere, but in the creation as a whole." Here Kant rivals Epicurus, and in some ways anticipates Laplace. Taking one instance to exemplify a process continually repeating itself in the extended spaces of the Cosmos, he assumes as provisional starting-point a time when all the matter, now condensed in sun, planets, and comets, was with all its generic differences dissipated in a gaseous state over the whole space in which these bodies now revolve. Even then "the eternal idea of the Divine mind" was the fundamental cause of certain active forces in these molecules, by which they are a source of life to themselves, and which keep them ever tending to enter into new orders and create complex unities. Especially two forces have to be attributed to the elementary corpuscles—attraction and repulsion. Somewhere or other there will be a preponderance of particles, of a denser species than elsewhere; and thither, in consequence of the properties of matter, there will be a tendency in the other particles to fall. A central body thus arises from the agglomeration in this point of the various sorts of particles, especially the denser. As we recede from this body, we come to a region where the repulsion between the particles is free to originate lateral movements. These, by composition with the central attraction, issue in a mazy dance of molecules, hither and thither, but all in a general way in circles round the central mass. Gradually these bands of circling molecules, with intersecting orbits, settle into the position which involves

least mutual interference, and form extended ranges or strata of revolving matter, decreasing in density as the distance from the centre increases. In each such stratum a local nucleus may be formed, and repeat on a small scale for that range what happened with the whole mass. The central nucleus became the sun, the other local nuclei became the planets, some of which again have satellites, the product of other separate revolving masses, partially dependent upon the subordinate local centre.

Such an origin has several consequences. Being originally parts of a common mass of revolution, the planets should all lie nearly in the plane of the sun's equator: their density, seeing that the heavier particles are most attracted sunwards, ought to diminish in proportion to their distance from the sun; those furthest from the sun, having the largest circles and being freest from solar interference, ought to be generally of greatest bulk; and their excentricity should on the whole increase with the distance. Unfortunately there is in this too great demand for symmetry. To take the last consequence—excentricity. There is no such regularity as Kant expects; and when he goes a step further, and seeks to apply his law to the comets,—when he says that the last of the planets is also the first of the comets, he abolishes a difference which modern astronomy still retains. There is an approximation to the truth in his inferences; and perhaps that is all we have a right to ask. And while in one point, by declaring the great probability of planets beyond the orbit of Saturn, he seems to anticipate the discovery of Uranus and Neptune, in another point, from his opinion that the large

gap between Mars and Jupiter might fairly be attributed to the mass of the latter, he entertained no suspicion of the existence of the asteroids. After all, prophetic power is but a vulgar recommendation of science; and defects in the available data should be remembered, when we lay blame on the imperfect correspondence in detail between his hypothetical consequences and the subsequently observed facts.

In the close of his '*Exposition du système du monde*,' Laplace, unacquainted with Kant's efforts (which indeed could only be known to a select few), gave a physical explanation of the origin of our solar system which has sometimes been paralleled with that of Kant. But the differences are considerable. Kant had made the ring of Saturn a special case, and explained it with much ingenuity and detail. It is this special case which is the type and foundation of Laplace's theory. Laplace, too, puts the comets in a class of their own. Beginning with the sun, he supposes it surrounded (like Saturn in Kant's theory) with a gaseous atmosphere, which spread far beyond the present limits occupied by the solar system. From this atmosphere, endowed with a primary rotation of enormous rapidity, first one ring of vapour and then another broke loose. In course of time these vapour-rings parted into fragments tending towards globular form: these in most cases were annexed by the largest of their number, but sometimes (and this would be the case of the planetoids) the several globes retained a separate existence. Clearly this is a narrower hypothesis than that of Kant: it is also worked out with greater precision.

There are throughout the essay glimpses of an imagi-

nation which is checked in the birth by sane reasoning, and of a keen perception of the frailties in pseudo-science. Thus, speaking of the time when the earth may, like Saturn, have rejoiced in a ring, and showing how it may be employed to explain the "waters of the firmament" and Noah's rainbow, by those "who believe that, instead of desecrating, they rather heighten the honour of revelation, by making it confer respectability on the extravagances of their fancy," he adds,—“Yet I hold it wise to sacrifice the passing applause excited by such correspondences [between miraculous events and the results of natural law] to the true pleasure derived from observing the regular consilience by which physical analogies combine to indicate physical truths.” Or again, when he remarks how the perfection of reasoning beings is bound up with the superior flexibility of their organism, and recalls the gradually more refined matter of which the planets consist as they lie farther from the sun, he lets his imagination “place the lowest species, the very beginning of spirit-kind, on what may be called the earliest and rudest spot of the whole universe, so that by regular progression therefrom it may extend to fill the whole infinitude of time and space with infinitely increasing grades of perfection of intellectual faculty, and so step by step approach, without ever actually reaching, Deity, the goal of supreme excellence.” “May it not be written,” he asks, “that the immortal soul shall one day become closer acquainted with those distant orbs of the universe, and behold the excellence of that plan which so arouses curiosity even here? May there not be globes in the planetary region even now forming, destined, after the time appointed for our sojourn

here has ended, to prepare for us new mansions in other skies? Who knows whether the moons of Jupiter are not one day meant to yield light for us? It is harmless and fitting" (he replies to these questions of selfish curiosity) "to please ourselves with such ideas; but no one will rest his hopes of the future on these unstable pictures of fancy. After mortality has claimed her dues, the immortal spirit will soar away in swift career over everything finite, and continue its existence in a new connection with the whole nature which arises from a more intimate union with the Supreme Being. . . . When the heart is filled by thoughts like these, the sight of the starry sky in a clear night gives a pleasure only felt by noble souls. Amid the universal silence of nature, and the repose of the senses, the hidden faculty of the immortal spirit speaks a language which has no name, and throws out vague ideas which may be felt rather than described."

In contrast to the almost mystical tone of these reflections, there stands out equally prominent the view that a mechanical theory of the origin of the world is at once scientifically correct and in harmony with religion. "How is it possible to make a mechanical theory harmonise with the theory of design, if the plans of supreme wisdom are intrusted to raw matter, and the rule of providence put in the hands of unassisted nature? Is not the allusion to design an admission that the order of the universe has not been produced by the general laws of matter? To dissipate these scruples, let us recur to what has been already adduced. Must not the machinery of every natural movement have a fundamental tendency towards only those results which thoroughly

accord with the plan of divine wisdom in all its ramifications? How can this machinery have in its first stage chaotic tendencies to dissipation, when all the properties of matter from which these results proceed received their vocation from the eternal idea of the divine mind, in which everything must be in reciprocal interdependence and adaptation? . . . The more we learn of nature, the better shall we perceive that the general constitutions of things are not separate or alien one from another. We shall be fully persuaded that they have intrinsic affinities, by which they are inherently fitted to combine in the construction of a perfect organisation; that the action and reaction of the elements tend to produce the beauty of the material and the advantage of the spiritual world; and that in general the several natures constitute, in the realm of eternal truths, so to speak, a harmonious system, in which each is connected with the other. We shall learn also that they derive this affinity from the common origin, whence spring the whole of their essential characteristics."

These considerations touch upon a feature of the essay afterwards developed with greater detail. "There is a God," says Kant, "because nature, even in chaos, could not proceed otherwise than with regularity and order." Nature and its laws are no distinct and independent principles apart from God. It is only an "idle philosophy seeking to hide sluggardly ignorance under a mien of devoutness" that needs to call in the interference of an extra-mundane God. "On the contrary, it is more becoming and correct to argue thus: Nature, left to its own general qualities, is rich in fruits which are always fair and perfect. Not merely are they harmonious and

excellent themselves, but they are adapted to every order of being, to the use of man, and to the glory of God. It is thus evident that the essential properties of matter must spring from one mind, the source and ground of all beings: a mind, in which they belong to a solidarity of plan. All that is in reciprocal relations of harmony must be brought into unity in a single Being, from which it all depends. There is therefore a Being of all beings, an infinite mind and self-subsisting wisdom, from which nature in the full range of all its forms and features derives its origin, even as regards its very possibility."

It remains to be added that Kant, in assigning to the mechanical laws of nature the production of the existing order of things, stops short at the enigma presented by the beginnings of life and organisation. "I think," he says, "we may in a sense say without temerity: Give me matter, and I will build a world out of it; I will show how a world comes to be evolved. . . . But can we truly claim such a vantage-ground in speaking of the least plant or insect? Are we in a position to say: Give me matter, and I will show you how a caterpillar can be generated? Must we not here stop at the first step, from our ignorance of the real inner constitution of the object, and the intricate complexity which it includes?" Nor is this an isolated statement. "The structure of plants and animals exhibits an adaptation, for which the universal and necessary laws of nature are insufficient." And the origin of animals and plants is classed with the secrets of Providence, and the number 666, as one of the topics on which ingenuity and thought are occasionally wasted.

Kant's papers in 1756 on the causes of earthquakes,

and especially on the phenomena of the Lisbon earthquake, contain little of importance. An earthquake Kant regards as the effect of fire in the subterraneous caverns, where there are stores of explosive materials ready to burst and shake the solid arches above. We probably know little more about these processes than Kant—who, at any rate, has given a careful and apparently a faithful *résumé* of the antecedents, accompaniments, effects, &c., of the disastrous event.

Two Latin essays ('*De igne*' and '*Monadologia Physica*'), written in the years 1755-56, can only be named.

After this time, Kant became more and more drawn into the vortex of metaphysics. But it may be convenient to add a short notice of his chief remaining contributions to physical inquiry. In 1764 there visited Königsberg a wild man of the woods, who, dressed in nomadic costume, and accompanied by a lad of eight years old, as also by a herd of cows, sheep, and goats, drew the notice of the philosophers no less than the unlearned. Reading the decrees of Providence from his open Bible, he gained from the people the name of the goat-prophet. Kant (who, like Hamann, was interested in the phenomenon) wrote a short paper for Kanter's journal. He is most attracted by "the little savage, who, reared in the woods, has learned to brave cheerfully all the hardships of the weather, shows no common frankness in his face, and has none of the bashful awkwardness caused by bondage or compulsory lessons of attention,—who, in short, seems to be a normal child after the heart of an experimental moralist who might refuse from equity to treat the views of Rousseau as chimeras until he had actually tested them." Evidently

the echoes of the 'Emile' (published two years before) still rung in Kant's head; and they had not quite died away in 1771, as is shown by a still more curious paper in the same journal. From this, a short notice of a lecture by Moscati, an Italian professor, we quote the beginning and end:—

"Once more we have the natural man, and on all-fours. . . . Dr Moscati proves that the upright walk of man is forced and unnatural: that, although he is so constructed as to be able to support and move himself in that posture; yet if he makes it a necessity and constant habit, he must look forward to discomforts and diseases, which show beyond dispute that he has been misled by reason and imitation to diverge from the original animal arrangement. . . . However paradoxical this proposition of the Italian doctor may seem, still, in the hands of an anatomist so acute and philosophical, it gains almost complete certainty. We thus see that nature's first care was to preserve man as an animal for himself and his species, and to that end the posture most agreeable to his internal structure, to the situation of the embryo, and its preservation in danger, was the four-footed. We see also that a germ of reason was implanted in him, by developing which he adapts himself for society: and by means of reason he assumes for his constant attitude the biped posture, as best suited to that end. But while thus gaining infinitely in advance of the animals, he must resign himself to inconveniences, which spring from having lifted his head so proudly above his old comrades."

In three essays published between 1775 and 1788, Kant deals with the question of races or hereditary varieties in the human species. According to him, a race is one of several offshoots derived from a single species, by the special development under favouring conditions of certain germs latent in the parent stock,

which, once called into actual being, become a permanent part of the nature of the specially circumstanced individuals, and pass by regular descent to their progeny. In the human stock he admits the existence of four different races or permanent types of the one species of man—viz., a white race, a black race, a yellow or olive-coloured race, and a Hunnish or Kalmuck race. The last mentioned is found in the Tartars and in the aborigines of America; the third in Hindustan; the white race in Europe and adjoining parts of Asia and Africa. The several races, thus marked by their colour, have at first a definite locality appropriated to them. Should members of different races intermarry, the offspring is a hybrid or half-breed, partaking equally of the characters of both parents. When members of the same race (*e.g.*, Arab, Englishman, Finn, or other white) intermarry, the offspring takes exclusively after one of the parents.

More important than the distinction between the races, is the account Kant renders of their existence as persistent types within the unity of the species. Here he insists on the contrast between Physiography, or the mere classificatory description of natural phenomena, and Physiogony, or the genealogical account of the process by which the present order of things was produced. While logical division, he reminds us, founds its classes on similarities, natural division aims at constituting families and kinds. “A natural *history* (in the literal sense)—what we are at present almost wholly without—would teach the changes of the earth’s form, and the alterations terrestrial creatures (plants and animals) have undergone through natural migrations, and trace the divergences thus arising in the original type or funda-

mental species. Probably it would reduce numbers of what appear different species to races of one species, and transform the present prolix system of descriptive classification into an intelligible natural system."

While admitting variation, Kant insists upon its limits. He lays down the biological maxim, that "throughout the organic world, amid all alterations in individual creatures, their species remains fixed." It is a vulgar and shallow conception, in his eyes, to look upon all distinctions in our species as due to one cause—to chance or external circumstances. "Once accept a single case (tending to show that human ingenuity can by external agency modify the character of species, and make that modification hereditary in the generative power), and we are as effectually lost as when we believe a single ghost-story or work of magic." Speaking of a hypothesis of spontaneous generation (*abiogenesis*) of plants and animals from inorganic matter, and the consanguinity thus asserted between mosses and men, he exclaims: "I know a not altogether unmanly fear,—the fear which shrinks from whatever unsettles reason from her first principles, and opens the gate for her to rove through boundless fancies." The absolute variability of species through endless gradations under the influence of circumstances seems to him to unhinge the very portals of natural science. To him a race is one thing and a species another: the Darwinians maintain that no such rigid line of division can be drawn, and that with time and chance all things are possible.

"The conception of an organism," says Kant, "implies by the mere word a material object in which all the parts are reciprocally related as means and ends, and this can only be thought as a system of final causes. The feasibility of such

a thing can, at least for human understanding, only be explained on teleological grounds, not on grounds of physical mechanism. The question of the prime source of all organisation does not fall within the scope of physical science. If it can be answered at all, it must be by metaphysics. For my part, I derive all organisation from organic beings ; and the later forms of such natural objects I derive by laws of gradual development from original capacities (one comes across them often in transplanting plants) to be found in the organisation of the parent stock. How this parent stock itself came into existence, is a question totally beyond any natural philosophy possible for man."

A footnote in one of the last pages of his 'Anthropology' shows that Kant had faced the idea of the evolution of man from a lower animal stage. Speaking of the unfortunate results that might attend the newborn infant's cry, in the rude state when man was largely at the mercy of wild beasts, he adds: "We must assume, therefore, that in this primitive period the loud crying of the infant was unknown, and that subsequently there came a second period, when both parents had reached the civilisation required for domestic life. How nature brought about such a development, and by what causes it was aided, we know not. This remark carries us a long way. It suggests the thought whether this second period, on occasion of some great physical revolution, may not be followed by a third, when an orang-outang or chimpanzee would develop the organs which serve for walking, touching, speaking, into the articulated structure of a human being, with a central organ for the use of understanding, and gradually advance under the training of society."

Has Kant cautiously put the future instead of the past, and hinted at what probably has been rather than what may one day be ?

CHAPTER IX.

ESSAYS IN METAPHYSICS.

KANT'S work as a philosopher in the stricter sense may be said to begin about his thirty-eighth year. Seven years before that time, no doubt, his essay on the Principles of Metaphysic, issued as a specimen of his capacity to teach, had indicated the future philosopher. In a technical discussion he had weighed the claims of the principles of Contradiction and of Sufficient Reason to be criteria of truth and error, and contributed his quota to the dispute between Crusius and the Wolfians. He had himself added two principles of secondary nature: a "principle of succession," affirming that change in substances is only possible so far as they are connected with others in reciprocal dependence; and a "principle of coexistence," affirming that the affinity or reciprocity between substances necessarily presupposes a common source or cause of this interconnection. These are two ideas which remain landmarks in his speculation. Only as years go on they cease to be presented as laws operative in things, and appear only as the logical consequences of the laws which regulate the understanding. Yet

they serve to indicate a Platonist mode of thought which Kant never quite abandoned.

Apart from this early dissertation, however, the first period of Kant's philosophic fruitfulness begins with the close of the Seven Years' War, and extends to 1766. The four essays published in the beginning of this period are so closely connected in subject, that it seems doubtful whether the order of publication entirely corresponds with the order of composition. Most of them must have been written in 1762. We know from Herder, who, whilst teaching in a Königsberg school, contrived to attend Kant's lectures from August 1762 to the close of 1764, that Kant was then keenly interested in Hume¹ and Rousseau. The first lecture to which Herder listened discussed the question whether there are other spirits than our souls. It criticised with easy irony, and many amusing anecdotes, the superstitions of cobolds and sprites, ghosts, magic, and haunted houses; showed how a natural explanation of such phenomena was always to be preferred; and did not hesitate to suggest that certain miracles might be accounted for on these grounds. In the course of their familiarity during these years, Herder was initiated by Kant into the "Rousseauiana and Humiana," and learned to correct the one by the other, and both by his teacher. The nature of the influence exerted by Rousseau has been already alluded to; that of Hume will become evident as we go on. We shall see that in both cases the process was simply the ferment caused by a seminal word thrown into

¹ Sulzer's translation of Hume's 'Enquiry concerning Human Understanding' appeared in 1755, and Kant next year is found recommending it to his class. Apparently he did not read English.

a mind well prepared to produce the pure wine of science.

If the current metaphysics of Germany had ever seriously affected Kant, the time was now past. Looking back upon his philosophical lessons from the vantage-ground of some scientific experience, he was profoundly impressed by their unreality and instability. For him, as for his king, Frederick II., Wolf was only a transition stage, and was succeeded by the influence of Newton, Locke, and Voltaire. Yet both retained the love of their youth; the veteran king in 1780 warmly recommended Wolf's logic to German schools and universities, long after the time when he had as enthusiastically asked the teachers to study "*Loc.*" It was in a spirit akin to Locke and his followers that Kant spoke of metaphysics as "a bottomless abyss, a gloomy ocean with neither shore nor lighthouse," and of philosophical discoveries as "meteors whose brilliancy gives no promise of durability." But he is aware how futile are the hopes to mend these defects by imitating the procedure of the mathematicians. "It is the business of philosophy," he says in the essay he sent in competition to the Berlin Academy, "to break up the confused ideas which we find to hand, and to render them precise and definite. It is the business of mathematics to put together and compare given conceptions of magnitude—conceptions which are clear and certain,—and then to see what can be inferred from them." While mathematics starts from precise definitions of its elements, and constructs its objects, philosophy in its present stage can only hope to discover its elements by observation, abstraction, and reflection. If mathematical method is synthetic or con-

structive, philosophic method is analytic and tentative. "The genuine method of metaphysics is at bottom identical with that which Newton introduced into physical science."

It is the old warning of Bacon and Descartes and the philosophic reformers:—we have no sound material for building in philosophy, and our first efforts should be directed to securing some, however little. "When the philosophers strike upon the natural method of sound reason; when they look first of all for what they surely and unquestionably know of the abstract conception, without as yet making any claim to give a full explanation; when they only draw inferences from these certain data, and when, on any change in the application of an idea, they note whether the idea, though its symbol remains the same, may not have undergone a change also,—then, though they may not bring so many discoveries to market, those which they offer will be warranted sound."

After noting the dangers peculiar to metaphysics from the want of any immediate connection between word and meaning, and from the tendency to treat the non-perception of an attribute as proof of its non-existence, Kant proceeds to examine the principles of morals and theology. In morals he finds the fundamental idea of obligation involved in an obscurity which affects the whole system of ethics. The "I ought" means either a problematical necessity (I ought to do A, if I wish to obtain B), or I ought absolutely and without regard for consequences. In the second case we have the true imperative of moral obligation. Positively this imperative may be expressed as, "Do the most perfect thing possible

by thy means ;” and negatively, “Omit whatever hinders the greatest possible perfection attainable by thy means.” But these formal rules are no sufficient guides to action. They result in specific obligations only when certain indemonstrable material principles are recognised as exemplifying them. But how, the question rises, are we to recognise the material principles of obligation? By feeling or by reasoning? All that can be said is, that though the material maxim or specific obligation may be treated formally as a case of the general principle, still no analysis can ever show the ground on which it is so subsumed: we cannot, in short, tell why or how the maxim leads to perfection.

In these remarks Kant is treating of the problems which had exercised Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, and Hume; but at the same time, the position given to the idea of obligation shows another current, which in time came to be dominant in his mind. Passing to the philosophy of religion, he distinguishes two departments of theology of unequal evidence. The certainty which we can hope to attain of God as a moral governor and providence is at best only approximate. But if by God we understand the absolutely necessary Being, we have, he thinks, knowledge which seems to promise more certainty than most other philosophical truths. On this topic he enlarges in a special essay, the “Only *possible* ground for demonstrating God’s existence.” Of the cogency of his argument he speaks with modesty. “It is unquestionably necessary,” are his closing words, “to be convinced of God’s existence; but it is not quite so necessary to demonstrate it.” All that he contends for is, that if there be such a demonstration, it must follow the lines

he lays down. There are four ways in which it may be conceived that we can demonstrate the being of God: two which may be styled *a priori*, and two *a posteriori*. In the former, starting from the conception of possibility, we may either from the ground of possibilities argue to the existence of God as consequent (the ontological proof of Anselm and Descartes); or from the possibilities of things as consequents, argue to the existence of God as their ground.

The latter form of the *a priori* argument is that recommended by Kant as alone holding out hopes of a cogent proof. He begins by noticing the peculiarity of the predication of existence. What is meant by saying that something is or exists? "Existence," he remarks, "is no predicate or determination of anything whatever, but rather a predicate of the thought which we have about it." But this inaccurate distinction does not carry us far: it only indicates that existence is a predication *sui generis*, and that as "absolute position" it is to be distinguished from the "relative position" or mere logical relation expressed by the copula in a proposition. It scarcely throws more light upon the vexed question of the relation of thought to reality, to say that it is the special source of certain knowledge in experience, mediate or immediate, that entitles us to affirm existence,—unless some attempt is made to probe the conditions of experience. But this Kant does not attempt. Any solution he suggests would be to the effect that existence is given, and that thought only describes or classifies it. Instead of trying to find how the actually existent differs from the merely possible, he contends that, if there are possibilities in human thought, then, unless all

possibility is to be made impossible (which would be impossible), there must be an absolutely necessary Existence which renders these possibilities possible. Further logical considerations show that this necessary Being must be one, simple, unchangeable, and eternal: possessed of intellect and will: in one word, God. Thus, after cutting the strings of his proof by the initial statement, that thought is one matter and existence another, he treats the exhibition of the necessary correlation of possible and actual, and of the inherent centralisation which dominates thought, as equivalent to a proof of the real existence of a Deity. This is truly a "dogmatic slumber."

The *a posteriori* form of the same argument presents it under a more interesting aspect. Examining the properties of things known to us by experience, and observing that, in order to be so constituted as they must be to perform their combined functions, there is needed a unity in diversity and a harmony in separation, we are led to conclude the existence of a single principle on which the feasibility of everything depends. Alike in geometry and in physics, Kant shows how a single property of space or a single law of nature is fertile in innumerable results; which could not be, unless many apparently independent agencies were really co-operating in general consilience to a common aim. Such interdependence between what seem isolated forces is only possible, he thinks, on the assumption of a fundamental unity of principle. But it would be a mistake to attribute this consilience, as found in the geometrical and mechanical laws of nature, to the act of divine volition. All that it tends to show is, that ultimate unity of sub-

stance is the necessary presupposition of that adaptation to complex harmony by simple means which is found on examination to characterise the objects of geometry and mechanical science.

The case is altered when we pass from inorganic to organic nature. In the former, the harmony was due to the necessary consilience of primary elements in virtue of general laws. In the latter, the adaptation of the various parts in an organism, each of which has no necessary suitability to the rest, is due to an artificial coalition. The plant and animal are contingent and arbitrary units, and imply for their existence the exercise of intelligence and will,—in one word, design. Kant's "improved method of natural theology" is thus a double-barrelled argument. It infers not merely a wise designer from the display of art in the adaptations of organic objects, but also a primal united source of the very attributes of nature itself.

"The contingent order in the parts of the world, so far as it indicates as its source an act of will, can be of no use towards proving that God created the matter of the universe. Such is the art shown in the combination of the sentient organs of animals with those for voluntary motion and vital function, that the man must be wilfully blind who, when his attention is directed to the point, fails to perceive the wise Author of Nature who arranged so admirably the constituent matter of the animal body. But he can go no further. Whether this matter is eternal and self-subsisting, or has been produced by the same Author, remains doubtful. We come to a different conclusion when we remark that the perfection of nature is not always artificial, but that rules of great utility are sometimes linked together in necessary unity, and that such an interconnection lies in the very possibilities of things. What shall we conclude from such an

observation? Is this unity, this fruitful harmoniousness, possible apart from dependence upon a wise Author? The prevalence of a regularity so wise and far-reaching forbids this. But as the unity in question has its foundations in the very possibilities of things, there must be a wise Being, apart from which all these natural objects are not possible, and in which, as an all-embracing basis, the constituent natures of endless natural objects enter into regular relations of union."

The "False Subtlety of Four Figures of Syllogism" is somewhat inept as a criticism of Aristotle, although it may be valid as against the formal logic of Kant's own time. This logic, which Kant inherited from the Wolfians and Aristotelians, may have deserved the charge that it "treated the second, third, and fourth figures of syllogism as inferences not requiring the interpolation of other judgments;" but Aristotle was not open to the same accusation. Unfortunately Kant knew little of Aristotle, except in the conventional form legitimated by tradition. And he went on teaching the old doctrines to his pupils, occasionally modifying them in detail, but never fully confronting them with the new logic which came to light in his 'Criticism of *a priori* Reasoning.'

The chief interest of the essay lies in its remarks on judgment as the cognitive faculty of first order. An act of judgment is not merely a distinguishing between two things: such *physical* distinguishing may be inferred whenever a creature is seen to be impelled by different impressions to different courses of action. But when we have in addition a recognition of the distinction, this is logical judgment. It is a faculty fundamental and peculiar to human beings, and implies a power of making our impressions and feelings an object

of our thoughts—implies, in short, consciousness or the faculty of inner sense. Such self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge.¹ As expressed, this faculty of logical judgment has two forms—Understanding (*Verstand*) and Reasoning (*Vernunft*). These are both acts or processes of judgment—the former being immediate, the latter mediate. Understanding, or the faculty of apprehension, helps to make our ideas distinct; Reasoning or Ratiocination, to make them complete. Understanding is the power of seeing single connections, of discovering the several features distinguishing an object; Reasoning is the power which combines these features together so as to form a total. Psychologically, judgment is alike in the single step of apprehension and in the combination of these single steps; but epistemologically, in their relation to the method of science, Understanding and Reasoning can be distinguished.

The ‘Attempt to Introduce the Conception of Negative Quantities into Philosophy’ exhibits a decided approach to Hume. There are, says Kant, two species of opposition—logical and real. Logical opposition is found between two propositions which severally affirm and deny a given attribute of a given subject; and in such a case the two propositions cannot both be true, unless they are both imperfect statements taken on an inadequate ground. In real opposition, the two statements are equally positive, and only distinguished as positive and negative when brought into relation with each other. Thus, we have the two propositions:—A has to receive

¹ That relations of thought (judgments) are the instruments which turn sensations into objective things—the doctrine of the Criticism of Pure Reason—is thus hinted in 1762.

£100 from B: A owes £100 to C. Taken separately, we have no reason to speak of one of these as negative more than the other. But when taken together, they present a real opposition, and may be conceived as + and - quantities which cancel each other. Thus, while in logical opposition, the one member of the antithesis is a mere negation or absence: in real repugnance, two positive grounds respectively cancel the result which would follow from the other. This idea Kant illustrates by various cases. Thus, impenetrability may be treated as negative attraction—that is, as genuine repulsion; and the occupation of space may be explained as the resultant from the opposition of these two forces. Pleasure and pain are really repugnant, whilst pleasure has its logical opposite in indifference. Pain, *i.e.*, is negative pleasure, or a positive agency cancelling the pleasure accruing from other sources. So vice is called negative virtue, in the sense that it is a spring of action contending against the moral law.

In the further course of the essay, Kant offers some considerations on the application of this idea of real repugnance to the phenomena of change. "Something which exists ceases to exist;" but this is only part of the truth. In the phrase of the essay, "Every vanishing is a negative arising." Thus abstraction may be termed negative attention—*i.e.*, attention fixed on something else which expels the former object of consciousness.

"It is a delusion to suppose we have explained the cessation of the positive results of our mental activity, because we give them the name of omissions. The more we examine our commonest and most confident judgments, the more we are struck by discovering how often we deceive ourselves by

mere words, without understanding the thing. When I have not a certain idea before me, and have not had it at all previously, it is no doubt intelligible enough to say I omit to think it—this word only meaning that as the antecedent is absent, the consequent is absent also. But when we ask how an idea that was in our minds a minute ago is there no longer, the same answer has no sense. The not-being is now privation—the omission now means the undoing of an activity which was in existence just before.”

It is often difficult to say if a given negation is a mere defect due to some absence of force, or a privation due to the collision of two positive springs of action. In the mental world, inactivity of mind may be the resultant of an equilibrium of forces; and the forces may be greater taken separately than in many cases of active thought—only they neutralise each other. And the same caution is necessary in our moral judgments, where, in the words of Burns,—

“What’s done we partly may compute;
But know not what’s resisted.”

The conclusion of the essay is as follows:—

“I very well understand how a logical consequent flows from its antecedent by the law of identity: an analysis of the antecedent shows it to contain the consequent. Thus composition is the antecedent of which divisibility is the consequent. . . . But how something follows from something else, and not in virtue of the law of identity, is what I should like to see explained. . . . The former species of ground I term the logical, the latter the real, antecedent. . . . Now as to the real antecedent, and its bearing on the consequent, my question presents itself in this simple shape: How am I to understand that because something is, something else is? A logical consequent results, because it is part and parcel of the

antecedent. Man is fallible : his fallibility is a consequence of his finite nature ; for if I analyse the conception of a finite mind, I see that it implies fallibility. But the will of God is the real reason for the existence of the world. Now here, the divine will is one thing ; the existing world is something else. Yet given the one, the other follows. . . . Here analyse the conception of divine will as much as you please, you will never find an existing world implicit in it and following from it by the law of identity. I decline to be put off with the words Cause and Effect, Force and Action ; for if I begin by treating one thing as the cause of something else, or invest it with the character of an effect, my thought of it virtually includes the relation of real antecedent to consequent. And that once done, it is easy to see how the consequent follows by the law of identity. . . . Of opposition I have a clear idea founded on the law of contradiction. I can see how, by asserting that God is infinite, I cancel the predicate mortal, as contradictory to infinitude. But how the motion of one body is cancelled by the motion of another, when the two are not contradictory, is a very different question. If I presuppose impenetrability standing in real opposition to each and every force that seeks to penetrate into the space occupied by a body, I can understand how the movements are cancelled ; but in that case I have confronted one real opposition with another. But suppose we attempt to explain real opposition in general, and to give a clear conception how, because something exists, something else is annihilated. Can we say more than I have already said—that it does not take place in virtue of the law of contradiction ? I have reflected on the nature of our knowledge, particularly as to our judgments about antecedents and consequents : I will one day present in full the results of my researches. My conclusion is : that the connection between a real antecedent and something which is thereby created or annihilated can never be expressed by a judgment, but only by a conception. No doubt this conception may by analysis be reduced to simpler conceptions of real antecedents : still, after all, our knowledge of this connection always culminates in simple and irre-

ducible conceptions of real antecedents, of which the relation to their consequents can never be made perfectly clear."

It may be well to set beside this passage some sentences from Hume's Essays (for Kant apparently was acquainted only with the 'Enquiry,' and not with the 'Treatise on Human Nature') :—

"All relations concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. . . . I venture to affirm as a general proposition which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not in any instance attained by reasoning *a priori*, but arises entirely from experience. . . . The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause by the most accurate scrutiny and examination ; for the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. . . . It is confessed that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles productive of natural phenomena to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery ; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves by any particular explication of them. . . . Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse : these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature."

The resemblance between the two writers is at this point so close, that it compels us to consider Kant as influenced by Hume—though it would be a mistake to treat him as a careful student of his predecessor. In Hume's mind the question is clear. Convinced as he is "that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences," and "that the mind never perceives any real connection between distinct existences," Hume is asking how the

fact that we believe in such real and necessary connection can be explained or accounted for. Kant has not yet reached any such clear formulation of the issue. But gradually he is brought face to face with the contrast between the real and the phenomenal world,—between the world of true being, as the idealists call it, and the world of change and becoming ;—the contrast between the world assumed by formal logic, and the world which the real sciences have to analyse. On the one hand, we have a world of forms, orders, classes ; on the other, a world of forces, evolution, and natural kinds. The ordinary logic has no means for explaining, or indeed taking account of, the nexus between real existences.

Two ideas are struggling for the mastery in his mind. He still retains a hold of the idealist position—that all the distinct existences we perceive are in the last resort dependent on a fundamental unity theistically conceived. But he is equally animated by the spirit of the experimental sciences, which seem at least to proceed from the parts to the whole—or rather from a given particular fact to its connections and generalisations, to its antecedents, consequents, and uniformities. Perhaps the best index of his position at this period, between English empiricism and German rationalism, is seen in the remarks accompanying his notice of lectures for 1765 :—

“Philosophy being,” he says, “by its very nature the business of manhood, no wonder difficulties are felt in adapting it to the untrained faculties of the young. The youth, let loose from school-instruction, had been in the habit of learning ; and so, he thinks, he will now learn philosophy. But that cannot be ; he must now learn to philosophise. . . . The true method of philosophic teaching is zetetic—*i.e.*, inquiring ; only with the fuller growth of reasoning does it in

some instances become dogmatic—*i.e.*, positive or decided. The philosophical text-book, therefore, is not to be treated as a standard for our judgments, but only as an occasion for forming judgments about the author's ideas—it may be, against them. The method of reflecting and drawing conclusions for himself is the craft in which the pupil wants to gain a mastery. . . . And hence it will be apparent how unnatural it is for philosophy to be a professional study (*Brotkunst*): its inmost character is violated when it has to adapt itself to the caprices of demand and the law of fashion.”

After thus affirming philosophy to be nothing if not free and critical, Kant proceeded to sketch the order he proposed to adopt in his several courses for that session. In the course on Metaphysics, the early lectures would deal with experiential psychology, where, avoiding all mention of soul, a reasoned account would be given of the facts or phenomena of the mental life. Going on next to the theory of living bodies (the biology of the period), and thirdly to cosmology, or the theory of the material world, he would come in the fourth place to ontology, which expounds the general properties of things, and includes rational psychology (where the idea of soul or spirit is brought in), and would terminate with rational theology. This arrangement—a compromise between Lockian tendencies and the traditional philosophy—has, according to Kant, the advantage of reserving the hardest points to the last, and allowing the hearers, who drop off before then, to carry away some definite results from their attendance. In logic, postponing to a later period the higher logic, which is a criticism and a regulative of all philosophy, he would treat mostly of common logic, which is a criticism and a regulative of the healthy intellect, as it comes into

contact with crudeness and ignorance on the one hand, and with science and learning on the other. The Logic course included also a brief digression into a criticism of the Taste, or *Æsthetics*. In ethics, alone, does Kant make distinct reference to English thinkers.

Some time about 1760 Kant had, like the rest of the world, been smitten with curiosity about the alleged spiritualistic performances in which Swedenborg figured. Though generally disposed to scepticism in the matter of supernatural apparitions, he was somewhat staggered by the show of circumstantiality in the Swedenborgian visions. Not content with getting friends to make inquiries for him on the spot, he even wrote to the seer himself, who, however, returned no reply. For some time he either had not complete disbelief in the stories, or at least he declined to express it. In a letter to Frl. v. Knobloch, which, from internal and other evidence, must have been written about 1763 (and not in 1758 as Borowski puts it or in 1768 as a Swedenborgian wishes to date it), he expresses no decided opinion on the spiritualistic experiences. His interest, indeed, was strong enough to make him spend seven pounds on a copy of Swedenborg's great work (published years before, though Kant thought it was yet to come), and to study the alleged visions as well as the theories of the author. His investigations were talked about, and the importunity of friends drew from him a book,—‘*Dreams of a Visionary explained by Dreams of Metaphysics*,’—in its mixture of sympathy and scorn, spiritualism and materialism, the strangest of his works.

It begins by noting the absence of any real answer to such questions as, What is a spirit? How is spiritual

presence detected? How is spirit related to matter? Why a spirit and a body constitute a unity, and what the forces are which, on the occurrence of certain dilapidations, destroy this unity, are questions transcending our intelligence. And yet that there is a class of immaterial natures to which the soul belongs seems highly probable. The inconceivability of the relation between body and spirit is, after all, due to the fact that our ideas of external action are derived from experiences of bodily pressure or impact. But there can be no pressure between body and spirit. May we not suppose that in every substance, even in the simple elements of matter, there is an internal agency, and that it is with this internal agency, and not the outward, that the spirit was directly in contact? In these internal modifications the soul would thus come to perceive the condition of the external universe which corresponds to them.

Setting aside, therefore, the outward dead matter, subject to mechanical laws, we may suppose, on the other hand, an immaterial world consisting of beings subject to what we may call pneumatic laws. It will include all created minds, whether conjoined with matter or not, the sensitive subjects in all kinds of animals, and all other vital principles in nature. Between this immaterial world and the material any intercommunication must be held accidental or due to divine interference,—the former being a self-subsistent, self-contained system. In the present life, accordingly, the human soul has relations with two worlds. As united with a body in one person, it is percipient of the inward agency, and indirectly of the external phenomena, of material nature. As a member of the spirit-world, it receives and trans-

mits purely immaterial influences. "This," says Kant, with a jeer, "is as good as proved, or might easily be proved, if we were to go into detail, or, better still, will yet be proved one day, I know not where or when." It is also probable that the spirits which are separately existent have no direct consciousness of the sense-world, and though they are in communication with human spirits, the two kinds of spirit cannot convey clearly to each other their peculiar ideas.

Such a hypothesis may perhaps receive a slight corroboration by inferences or conjectures from observed facts. How often does the focus towards which our efforts converge seem to lie outside us! Does not the sense of dependence on others' judgment betray the tacit feeling of a universal intellect, in which all thinking beings are at one? When we consider how a secret force makes us work for others' welfare, and how the moral instincts force us out of our selfish isolation, are we not led to believe in a moral unity, and to see all particular wills dependent on a universal will? Dwelling on these considerations, we can perhaps neglect the strange divergencies seen in the moral and physical conditions of man. For, the corporeal world, we may say, prevents these spiritual affinities appearing in their full distinctness. Yet even here, the soul of man is a member of the immaterial world: present and future, life and death, make one continuous whole in the order of spiritual nature.

But it may be asked, Why, if such a community exists, is its appearance so rare? To answer this objection, let us remember the radical unlikeness between the ideas of the same person considered as man and as spirit. The possibility of any communication between

the pure spirit and its matter-clad kinsman depends on establishing a connection between abstract spiritual ideas, and cognate images which awake analogous or symbolical conceptions of a sensuous kind. Such associations are formed in persons of peculiar temperament. At certain times such seers are assailed by apparitions, which, however, are not, as they suppose, spiritual natures, but only an illusion of the imagination, which substitutes its pictures for the real spiritual influences, imperceptible to the gross human soul. Thus "departed souls and pure spirits, though they can never produce an impression upon our outward senses, or stand in community with matter, can still act upon the soul of man, which, like them, belongs to a great spirit-commonwealth. For the ideas they excite in the soul clothe themselves according to the law of fantasy in allied imagery, and create outside the seer the apparition of the objects to which they are appropriate."

In this "fragment of esoteric philosophy" we have a "dream of a metaphysician"—a "fairy-tale from the fool's paradise of metaphysic." If we consult a "vulgar philosophy" for a theory of ghosts, we get a different style of explanation. It founds upon the power by which the senses seem to localise their objects, at the points where the lines marking the direction of the impression intersect. If we allow with Descartes that imaginative ideas are attended by movements in the brain, we may perhaps assume that in normal people the lines of such movements meet within the brain, whilst in people whose brains are by birth or accident perturbed, the imaginary focus of the lines falls outside the brain, and the creations of a disordered imagination are thus local-

ised in outward space. Such an explanation reduces the spirit-seer from a half-dweller in another world to the level of a candidate for the lunatic asylum; and instead of sending the claimants of supernatural vision to the stake, recommends them a dose of medicine.

Yet Kant does not authoritatively decide in either way. He thus concludes this part of his essay:—

“I do not pledge myself to deny truth to the hosts of ghost-stories altogether; and yet, what though curious is common, reserve my scepticism about each separately, while allowing them some credibility as a whole. The reader may decide as he pleases; for my part, the preponderance of arguments for the first theory is great enough to keep me a serious and undecided listener of all such marvellous tales. It is no doubt true that we can never claim to have either by reasoning or observation exhausted any object of the senses, were it even a drop of water, a grain of sand, or anything simpler still, so boundless is the complexity even in the smallest things which nature offers for investigation to a limited intellect like that of man. But this does not apply to the philosophic theory of spiritual beings. That may be completed, if only negatively: we can discover, that is, limits to our intelligence, and gain the conviction that the phenomena and laws of physical life are all we are permitted to know. But as for the principle of life or spiritual nature (which we do not know, but merely conjecture), it can never be positively thought; there are no data for such a conception in the whole range of our perceptions. We may make shift with negatives, so as to think something so utterly different from any object of sense: but the very possibility of these negatives rests neither on experience nor inferences, but on a fiction to which reason, when deprived of other refuge, flies for aid. Pneumatology, therefore, may be termed a theory of the necessary ignorance of mankind about a supposed kind of beings; and as such it may easily be up to the level of its task. And so, one copious chapter of

metaphysics, the whole question of spirits, I lay aside as done with and settled. Henceforth it concerns me not."

The conclusion thus reached, that the sphere of knowledge is limited by experience, remains fixed for Kant. The existence of spirits is a metaphysical hypothesis. But whilst a scientific hypothesis takes only the fundamental forces already known, and combines them in some mode (which must at least be possible) to produce the given phenomenon, a metaphysical hypothesis assumes some new and fundamental relation between causes and effects. Such chimerical fictions are no explanation, but merely devices to save labour.

As a commentary on the essay, we may add a few words from a letter (April 8, 1766) to Mendelssohn, whom the *persiflage* of metaphysics grieved: "I can neither divest myself of a slight attachment to this kind of stories, nor can I help cherishing a conjecture that the arguments for them are sound, though the absurdity of the stories takes away all their value, and though chimeras and inconceivabilities mar the arguments. . . . As regards the stores of this kind of metaphysical knowledge at present in the market, it is neither fickleness nor frivolity, but the lessons of prolonged study, which make me hold it the wisest course to strip metaphysics of its dogmatic garb, and to meet its pretended science with scepticism. The use of this is no doubt negative merely, but it leads the way to positive gain; for if the guilelessness of healthy ignorance needs only an organon in order to reach truth, the perverted intellect, with its sham science, must first have a cathartic."

CHAPTER X.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ENVIRONMENT OF KANT.

THE record tracing Kant's mental history up to the year 1770, has in the main a merely biographical interest. With the publication of the 'Criticism of Pure Reason' the sage of Königsberg emerges from his retirement, and before the close of the eighteenth century comes to hold the foremost place in European philosophy. A brief glance at the problems which chiefly exercised his contemporaries will help to set Kant's own labours in a clearer light.

Modern Europe has inherited its philosophy from Greece and Judæa. Medieval speculation in its main stream carried along a turbid mass of dogmas, some derived, through many and worthless intermediaries, from the lessons of Plato and Aristotle; others due to the hopes and aspirations, sometimes morbid, of oriental seekers after God. Its pride had been to forge links of argument binding earth to heaven, science to faith, facts of sense to ideas of reason. The modern world, as soon as it grew conscious, began to groan under this burden of theory which dictated to human thought the objects of belief and the limits of knowledge. Especi-

ally loud grew the complaint when the severance grew more and more palpable between what the ecclesiastical philosophy taught as logically compacted truth, and what experience on every hand, from Columbus to Copernicus and Galileo, showed to be natural fact. First came Bacon and the 'Novum Organum,' with the rejection of scholastic logic,—the rejection of the claim of human thought to control nature. Bacon's fundamental lesson is to condemn the tendency of the human mind to regard its habits of thought as laws of the universe, and to insist upon the duty of seeking without prepossession to learn the conditions on which the phenomena of the physical world repose. As against the *ideas* of the divine mind, by which he means the forms or objective laws regulating the constitution of a thing and the series of its phases, he subjects to criticism the so-called *idola* of the human mind, its inherent or acquired, universal or individual, scholarly or vulgar, tendencies to see in the teachings of experience only an exemplification of certain anticipations of its own. And this protest against the importation of subjective ideas, of principles of human convenience, such as adaptation and simplicity—and this assertion of the "form" (the aim of knowledge being thus defined as the discovery of that law or principle in an object which governs the order of its phenomena)—these, and some hints on the methods of elimination available in scientific inquiry, constitute Bacon's main contribution to philosophy. They had the effect of bringing *things* to the front, and putting *thought* out of view. The only use left for thought was to direct experiment, to collect and compare instances of a phenomenon with

a view to eliciting its fundamental, generic, objective characteristics.

The suggestions offered by the example of Bacon were followed out by Hobbes and by English philosophy in its most characteristic and illustrious examples. The first consequences of that example in Hobbes were the adoption of what we may call an atomistic theory of nature and morality. But the teaching of Hobbes was not duly appreciated by the popular mind. It was Locke who really laid the foundation of the way of looking at the problems of life and mind which dominated English philosophy for at least half a century, and has not ceased to be an important factor in it at the present day. During the whole of the eighteenth century Locke and Newton are the "great twin brethren" of the European philosophical firmament: and in their name prophesy the prophets from the Rhone to the Neva.

But Locke can only be understood by a reference to Cartesianism. Descartes, like Bacon, made a protest against scholasticism. But whereas Bacon set on foot a movement outside the boundaries of the school, which grew and increased independently till it came back strong enough to reconstitute philosophy, Descartes was rather an internal reformer who sought to reconstruct the irregular edifice of medievalism on a new principle. That principle was the centrality and priority of thought. A clear and distinct conception was made the certain evidence of reality and truth: *cogito, ergo sum*. Thus the negative criterion, that confusion and indistinctness indicate some error in our ideas, was at one turn translated into the positive canon that whatever we clearly

and distinctly think is true. What Descartes no doubt sought was to get rid of the eternal see-saw of argumentation, and to found the ultimate objects of belief on immediate or intuitive perception. We have, he says, certain ideas,—notably the idea of God,—which are unmistakable, and force themselves upon our thoughts whether we will or not: ideas which we do not voluntarily make, and which are the inevitable issue of our mental constitution: hence, argues Descartes, the objects of these ideas exist independently of our thoughts, of which they so obviously are the masters. It would not be easy to determine how far these metaphysical presumptions are essential to Descartes: they certainly came to be the very essence of Cartesianism. Innate ideas—thoughts which, just because they were universally or generically thought, were treated as evidence of a reality beyond the mind—came to be the recognised creed of the Cartesian school.

Against that doctrine Locke contends negatively and positively: negatively, by showing that such generic ideas are not verified as existing in all men when we appeal to experience; positively, by showing that all our ideas can be traced either to sensations, or to reflection upon what takes place in the operation of our minds. Locke was the first who distinctly set in the front of philosophy the necessity “to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with.” Bacon and Descartes had raised the question of the method suitable for gaining knowledge. Locke proposed the question as to the limits of knowledge. And his answer in plain words had been, that “all our knowledge consists in the view

the mind has of its own ideas." The charm which he exercised upon his age, however, resided in the ease and simplicity with which the psychological history of our ideas was written from the elementary constituents up to the highest and most complicated conjunctions. The normal individual, instead of receiving certain ideas from a mysterious original constitution, found himself gradually coming into possession of the whole of his conceptions by a careful and intelligent attention to the lessons which nature gave through his senses, and by the combination of these data according to his own free choice, giving unity or instituting relationship between the data supplied to it. Metaphysics was transformed into psychology. Instead of the old distinction between Mind and Matter, Thought and Extension, which had been cardinal for the Cartesians, Locke set up a new distinction within the sphere of consciousness, a psychological parallelism between an inner and an outer sense (sensation and reflection) with their respective ideas. Grant a susceptibility to the impressions of external sense (which does not seem to be asking much), and it is apparently possible to show how all the distinctions of mind and matter, substance and relations, cause and effect, morality and theology, can be psychologically explained as natural products in the development of reflection.

With Berkeley, who turns round to examine that parallelism between inner and outer sense which Locke had adopted with Cartesian confidence, a further step in the direction of idealism is taken. The Lockian theory had been something of a compromise, with its elements in unstable equilibrium. It was possible for

his disciples to throw the main weight on external sense, and treat abstract ideas and general conceptions as faint and dim traces of the full-bodied and vivid sensation. It was possible, on the other hand, to emphasise the operation of inner sense. Locke had shown that the secondary qualities of body (colour, smell, &c.) were conditioned by the human organism; but he had held that the primary (mathematical) qualities were in bodies as they were in the mind, and had still accepted the view of substance as the unknown and obscure something on which the qualities of body are supported. Berkeley cut away these supports to realism. He showed that distance and extension were functions of the organism with its environment, not less than colour; that they are not less relative, though differently relative, to the subject, than the secondary qualities. As for the substances which Locke still acknowledged, he maintained that these abstract general ideas were metaphysical delusions. A thing, he taught, is a sum of perceptions,—a collection of ideas which have no existence save in a mind perceiving them. Of these two orders of being, therefore, minds or spirits and the ideas or perceptions which exist in the mind, the universe is made up. Spirit, or that which perceives, is the only substance, or only thing truly self-existent. Ideas are thus passive and inert: they can do nothing, or, in strict language, be the cause of anything; and hence to explain the origin and succession of ideas in our own consciousness we must call in something which is itself no idea but a spirit, or “incorporeal active substance,” who is thus for us the Author of Nature, the cause of our ideas. It is God who has arranged our ideas in

certain order : in themselves they throw no light upon each other : their causality and other connections are only rules for their behaviour to be learnt by observation. "There is nothing necessary or essential in the case, but it depends entirely on the will of the governing Spirit."

This attack on the causal principle—this assertion that there is no real causal connection between things, but only a juxtaposition imposed by Superior Will, and left open to our inspection—was resumed with more vigour and on different ground by Hume. More thoroughgoing than Locke, Hume distinguishes between the *impressions*, or more forcible and violent perceptions (sensations, passions, and emotions), as they make their first appearance in the soul ; and the *ideas*, or faint images of these impressions, which we use in thinking and reasoning. He distinguishes, in short (and the distinction is cardinal in Kant also), between "feeling" and "thinking." It is with ideas founded upon impressions, and with such ideas alone and their relations, that knowledge is concerned. When he comes to the ideas of Substance and Causality, and is obliged to answer the question as to what feeling or impression they are founded on, he raises specially important issues. Locke had allowed that there was something substantial in Substance, though he pronounced it unknowable. Hume declared it to be only a "collection of simple ideas united by the imagination." So far as material substances were concerned, Berkeley but said the same. But the Bishop of Cloyne was tenderer towards spiritual substance. Here Hume goes unhesitatingly to work. "They are the successive perceptions

only that constitute the mind:" the notion of our own identity is due simply to the smooth and uninterrupted progress by which our thought on reflection is led along from one past impression to another.

Very slightly different is the treatment of the idea of Causation by Hume. It was this part of his philosophy which formed the special point of contact between him and Kant; and did so, because in the 'Essays' it occupies a prominent position, whilst Substance is only discussed in the earlier 'Treatise on Human Nature.' He points out that we have no impression of Causality on which our idea of it can be legitimately based; we can no more perceive that one thing exerts power or acts upon another, than we can perceive a substance as the support of its attributes. "We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy; we therefore never have any idea of power." "The simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of power or of a connection betwixt them; this idea arises from the repetition of their union: the repetition neither discovers nor causes anything in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind by that customary transition it produces; this customary transition is therefore the same with the power and necessity, which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, and not perceived externally in bodies." "Thus," says Kant, by way of commentary, "the conception of a cause is fallacious and misleading, and, in the mildest way of speaking, an illusion which may be so far excused, since the custom (a subjective necessity) of perceiving certain things or qualities of things associated with the existence

of others either simultaneously or in succession, was unawares taken for an objective necessity of assigning such a connection to the things themselves."

Kant had been originally trained under different philosophical auspices. Germany had not broken with the scholastic philosophy in the same decisive way as France or England. The Lutheran Reformation had not dethroned Aristotle from his philosophic sway; and in the universities of Germany there still flourished a scholasticism slightly accommodated to modern needs, and tintured here and there by Cartesian ideas imported from the schools of Holland. The old alliance between philosophy and theology remained to appearance intact; and this theological tone had received fresh life from the example and doctrine of Leibnitz. The innovating ideas of Descartes, passing through the alembics of Christian theology and pagan pantheism, finally disappeared in a new and imposing system of abstract reasoning composed by Wolf and the Leibnitians. Scholastic theology sprang up with renewed vigour. With unabated confidence these thinkers sought to exhibit the order of nature as a reasoned order of ideas, following in a logical chain. They sought to reach—and imagined they had reached—a keynote by which all the harmonious music of the universe should be written down; the all-embracing password which would open every gate and barrier in nature; the mainspring of the machinery of the world, on which the whole series of its movements depended. The power of mathematics had taught them to hope for similar miracles in metaphysics. With ingenuous faith in the power of reason to accomplish whatever it felt necessary for its economy, they tried to

show that everything has a good ground for being what it is and nothing else. At first, indeed, the absolute necessity by which one thing devolves from another was confined to the range of abstract and ideal truth. But even in the occurrence of facts there was discovered a guiding principle—the principle of Sufficient Reason, or Principle of the Best. Thus, although an event is contingent in the sense that it depends upon a combination of forces, which, so far as we know, have nothing in common, yet it is subject to a wider principle of adaptation to an end and of progress to the best, and is accordingly to some extent governed by preconceived laws. There are thus two keys by which philosophy unlocks all mysteries. The Principle of Identity and Contradiction governs the consecutive trains of necessary truth—such truths, for example, as those of geometry. The Principle of Sufficient Reason explains the order of contingent events: they all converge towards the fulfilment of a divine plan, and accord with the counsels of absolute wisdom.

No philosophy perhaps has held a stronger faith than the Wolfian in the supremacy of reasoning, and none has a better right to the name of Rationalism. Nor should it ever be forgotten that in this assertion of reasoning as against fact of authority, tradition, and observation, the Wolfians had got hold of a sound principle only requiring limitation. And that principle is, that even facts of observation, no less than facts imposed by authority, must be brought into a reasonable interconnection before they can be anything more than objects of amazement, doubt, or antipathy. Their error lay in a failure to estimate exactly how far these powers of

reasoning could go—a vagueness of thought, which appears in the admission that side by side with the reasoned or abstract branch of the science, in which the whole of its propositions appear as evolved by regular deduction from a fertile first principle, there was also an empirical science of the same name (*e.g.*, an *empirical* beside a *rational* psychology). And in this empirical science all that reasoning had to do was to impose an external arrangement upon the several data given by observation. It was only natural in such a state of things to conjecture that the show of geometrical demonstration was more specious than efficacious, and that the real force of argument lay in the processes of observation.

The suspicion that reasoning was trading on mere credit, whilst observation and experiment really furnished the capital and labour required, was probably intensified by growing acquaintance with English philosophy. Through the ‘*Acta Eruditorum*’ of Leipsic, German scholars became familiar with the experimental method of inquiry which had its home in England, and the *savants* of the two countries co-operated in advancing the growth of natural knowledge. Of all the English philosophers, Locke had the greatest influence. Even Wolf recognised his merits, and Wolf’s opponents were still more indebted to his suggestions. In Göttingen, Feder, Meiners, and Tittel (all of them amongst the opponents of Kant) were ardent popularisers of Locke’s theories. And even where the discipleship was less obtrusively presented, the same influence betrayed itself in the keener prosecution of empirical, and especially moral, psychology—the so-called “inductive study of the human mind.” A psychological

epidemic visited Germany. Pope's dictum, that "the proper study of mankind is man," might have served as motto to numerous books and bulky magazines. Analysis and classification of the human mind—accompanied, sometimes, by morbid introspection of consciousness—culminated in the threefold division of mental faculties into thought, feeling, and will, which was handed on from J. N. Tetens (1736-1805) to Kant, and became the occasion of the subdivision of his 'Criticism of Reasoning' into three separate works. It is impossible to estimate the amount of mischief which this doctrine of mental faculties wrought in Kant's system. His belief in their reality is almost touching. Three superior faculties of knowledge (understanding, judgment, and reasoning) match the threefold range of mental activity in general, and get complicated with the triple stages of perception (in sense, imagination, and apperception). Each of these faculties comes forward in his pages as an independent agent with a sway of its own: they deal with each other like sovereigns, conduct peace and war, and form treaties by means of intermediate powers. The Reasoning usurps the place of the Understanding; the Judgment allies the Senses with the Intellect; the Imagination plays into the hands of the Understanding. Nor is this metaphorical and dramatic effect the worst. There is also engendered a feeling that the whole question before Kant is a psychological inquiry. And it takes some trouble to get over these personifications of mental action as psychological entities, and see that the real question, only encumbered by this baggage of faculties, is the more precise ascertainment of that objectivity or truth of knowledge which is attainable by human beings.

Kant discards the problem of psychology as secondary, and brings forward the problem of *epistemology*—not the nature of the soul, but the constitutive and regulative elements of human knowledge.

Another battle, besides that between rationalistic or *a priori* methods and empirical or psychological inquiry, divided the thinkers who wrote for the people. By them abstract questions about the supreme conditions of knowledge were replaced by arguments on the ultimate powers which influence human life. Here we have the antagonism between theists and materialists. On the one hand stood the disciples of natural theology, who fancied they saw a clear ladder of argument leading up from nature to the God of nature, and from this world to the world beyond the grave. Moses Mendelssohn, the Jewish philosopher, may serve as a type of these thinkers. The fundamental theses of theism are two: that there is possible, for natural reasoning, a discovery of a personal God, and a conviction of the personal immortality of the soul. Mendelssohn argues for the former in his ‘*Morgenstunden*,’ for the latter in his ‘*Phædo*.’ A noble heart, nourished on Jewish or on Christian faith, coming in course of time to dis sever its ties with sectarian dogma, is anxious to give the sanction of natural logic to the hallowed ideas borrowed, at least indirectly, from revelation. In pantheism it sees a gulf of darkness scarcely less black than utter atheism or materialism; and one can understand the horror with which the prototype of “Nathan the Wise” heard the suggestion,—only too well founded,—that his friend, the great Lessing, had been drawn to sympathise in his secret soul with the heresy of Spinoza.

As yet, however, Spinozism lay in the background as a misunderstood and neglected force. The true enemy against which deism had to contend on the battle-fields of philosophy was materialism. In its extremer form, as presented by La Mettrie, materialism was an exaggerated revival of the doctrines of Epicurus. It saw in the universe and in man nothing but the action of mechanical laws: it found no God in the world, and held the human soul to be a mere result of organisation. But there were probably many unable to adopt the creed in its integrity. Voltaire was an earnest and candid theist; and Friedrich II., like his friend, accepted the argument from design. "The whole world," says Friedrich, "demonstrates the existence of a supreme, conscious, final cause: we have only to open our eyes to be convinced of it." But the "Great King," as Kant calls him, had abandoned the belief in immortality; and to those who appealed to everlasting rewards and penalties as the sanctions of morality, he asserted virtue to be its own reward.

There is a general similarity, indeed, between the religious views of Friedrich and of Kant, as there is between both and Voltaire in his calmer moods. To ecclesiastical Christianity, and the special doctrines of revelation, their attitude is indifference—which only becomes active hostility when they suspect an attempt to impose belief by the force of the civil and social arm. "The history of the Church," says the king, in words which might have been used by Kant, "is the arena of priestly ambition, intrigue, and selfishness: we find in it—not God, but—profane misuse of the divine name, by which the priests, objects as they are of popular reverence,

cloak their own criminal desires." The rescript of June 1740, by which Friedrich heralded a reign of toleration in religion—"Hier mus [*muss*] ein jeder nach seiner Fasson Selich [*Façon selig*] werden" (Everybody in my kingdom must seek felicity after his own fashion)"—was the fruit of indifference to sectarian dogma in one who loved to call himself "the first servant of the State." But if they reject supernatural religion, Kant, Friedrich, and Voltaire with one voice affirm the moral grandeur of Christianity. "Did the whole Gospel," said the aged king, "contain only this precept—'What ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise'—it must be owned that these few words contain the summary of all morality."

Amid these contending schools of thought—between the rationalising dogmatism of the theistic metaphysicians and the sceptical doubts to which Hume had reduced Locke's account of the origin of our ideas—Kant takes up a position which he styles the "critical" standpoint. As against the dogmatic school, he lays bare the fallacies, the contradictions, the unreality of its methods and principles. The soul of man, the *origines* of the Cosmos, and the existence of God, are shown to be all three inaccessible to the investigations of science. To this extent, therefore, he may seem to be agreed with Hume: so far, at least, he had been shaken out of his dogmatic slumbers by the Scotch thinker. But on the other hand, his deep sense of the moral ideas and of the law of duty seemed to him to witness to the existence of a power superior to necessity and chance—a rational principle controlling and administering the variety of human desires, and

acting as if, though it appeared by its presence to be felt in man, it were something belonging to another sphere than the phenomenal or sense world that visible man lived in. In short, it seemed as if, though we could *know* nothing about it, a supersensible reality was at least discernible by moral *faith*; or that moral action reposed for its very existence on the conviction that man was a citizen of an ideal world, and was bound to conform his life according to that world's requirements. Further, that the task so imposed on man of living an ideal life was impracticable for a sensuous being, unless he could look forward to eternity as the time allotted for approximating to an unattainable ideal of holiness, and could also trust to a Power able to make the realities of physical life conform to and subserve the development of the ideal or intelligible nature. And yet that all these things could never be matters of knowledge, but only the reaction of faith in the soul, which compared the forces of sensuous appetite with the exceeding breadth and height and depth of the moral law.

So much against the dogmatists and their pretended science of metaphysics. As against Hume, Kant seeks a *rationale* of the principles of science and of mathematics. The result of Hume's examination had made their objective validity a problem. As for mathematics, Hume (though Kant, ignorant of the 'Treatise,' was unaware of the fact) had maintained that our only real idea of space or extension was an idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order: all the exactitude of immaterial points and lines without breadth was mental fiction. He had reduced mathematics to

an experimental science, founded on approximations and corroborated by exact measurement with improved instruments. We have already seen how he stopped short at the subjective origin of the connection of cause and effect. In both of these points, and in many others therewith connected, Kant sought to complete and correct him. Far from admitting that space, cause, substance, &c., first came into existence when reflection supervened upon an original apprehension of single or isolated objects,—that they resulted by measurement, observation, and abstraction,—Kant maintained that the very perception of single objects—that objectivity, as we understand it,—is only possible on the assumption that the mere sensation is arrested, related, and organised by these and other primary conceptions. No doubt if we knew things in themselves, independent of consciousness, it would be beyond us ever to affirm connection between them, except in our thoughts about them. But as the only things we know are in the mind (not in the brain), then correlation between them is the normal condition of things; it is, in fact, by that reciprocal correlation that they are members in the same objective universe. Instead of unity between the individual members of the universe being the last stage, it is the very first—from the beginning—*a priori*. Experience only exemplifies it in this and that instance. And the thinker, reflecting upon his experience, comes to discover that what he calls his mind is a native faculty of forms, by which he is in a special manner constituted or organised, and that all his knowledge presupposes the existence and operation of these forms. Whatever variety may be introduced by sensation, how-

ever complex and peculiar the elementary constituents which awake to consciousness, there are laws, forms, relations, which are always essential to make these elements parts of our world of experience. And the systematic analysis of this structural framework is what Kant sought to accomplish. Locke had been the physiologist of the human mind: he had expounded the history of the normal processes in the mental life. Hume had been one of those geographers of human reason who were content to discover certain regions which unquestionably lay beyond its boundaries. Kant, as against Locke, claimed to be the anatomist who traced the nature and interdependence of the organs by which the acquisition of ideas was made feasible; and, as against Hume, he claimed to lay down on principle the radius of the circle of human knowledge.

Two centuries and a half before his time, Copernicus (whose cell at Frauenburg on the Frisches Haff makes him a neighbour of Kant) had restored to the sun that central rank in our system from which traditional astronomy had long ousted it. Kant looked upon himself as a Copernicus of mind. Whereas the things we know had erewhile been supposed to rest in independent subsistence with minds here and there surveying them in the revolutions of thought, he suggested that the generic (or transcendental) consciousness of man was the central sun of knowledge, by whose light and attractions the elements of feeling were raised into form and system. He made human knowledge anthropocentric, with normal humanity at the centre.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.

THE philosophy of Kant is, in all essentials, but with disproportion of parts, contained in the one work—‘The Criticism of Pure Reason.’ The two subsequent ‘Criticisms’—that of the ‘Practical Reason’ and that of the ‘Judgment’—are modelled, perhaps too closely, on its lines, but introduce some modifications which throw a reflected light upon the original work. The ‘Criticism of Pure Reason’ itself divides into a constructive and a critical portion ; and it is especially with the topics of the latter that the two subsequent criticisms are concerned. For many purposes it is possible to restrict the study of Kantian philosophy to the first portion, dealing with the analysis of knowledge or the theory of experience. For some purposes it is convenient to read the philosophy of Kant by the light of the first criticism alone. But the true perspective of the system can scarcely be gained unless we combine the insights derivable from the points of view successively given by the three criticisms.

Preliminary to the ‘Criticism’ itself is the sketch contained in the Dissertation of 1770. The groundwork of the whole subsequent system is to be found

here—the doctrine, namely, that space and time are qualities or conditions of our sensuous apprehension, and have no meaning for the objects of pure intellect. But the chief corollary drawn from this doctrine is a warning against assuming that a statement in which conditions of time and space are introduced can ever be held to be a truth about things in themselves. Almost nothing is said of the action of intellect in the formation of experience. The ‘Criticism’ itself appeared in two editions, and there are considerable differences between the two. But the claims (by Schopenhauer and others) of superiority for the earliest are exaggerated. Substantially the two editions vary but little. Readers familiar with the first were naturally disappointed when they found one long passage—the “Deduction of the Categories”—completely rearranged and rewritten; a great excision made in the discussion of the “Soul;” and several modifications made in the doctrine of substance and reality. In some cases the alterations are improvements; in others they only accentuate weak points of the system. On the whole, it might be wished that Kant had left the work to stand in its original form. But there is no foundation in such changes for the charge that he sought to dissimulate or to retract his views.

Unfortunately there are other and graver difficulties in the way of an attempt to put Kant together. As he has himself said in the chapter on the “Architectonics of Pure Reason:” “It is unfortunate that it is only after we have for a long time, under the direction of an idea lying concealed in us, collected our materials unsystematically in the shape of pertinent pieces of knowledge,

—ay, only after we have again and again contrived combinations of these pieces,—that it becomes possible for us to discern the idea in clearer light, and to sketch out a whole architectonically by aims of reason.” In a work so grand, multifarious, and suggestive, including in one sweep all the branches of philosophy, it needs an eagle eye to follow his flight. Kant is often so engrossed with the details of his argument that he has eyes for nothing beyond; his arguments have regard to that point alone which he is immediately discussing. It is easy, therefore, to represent him as inconsistent with himself. There are some statements, for example, which are hard to reconcile when the ‘*Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic*’ is compared with the ‘*Criticism of Pure Reason*.’ When we remember that his great work was written in his fifty-seventh year, we can see that with increasing old age it became more and more difficult to keep in view all the complex issues of his theme.

The same considerations may serve to condone the style, both logical and literary, of the three works. A correspondent of Goethe tells of a visit which Wlömer, Kant’s college friend, paid to the old man in Königsberg. Asked by the professor whether he found time to look into his books, Wlömer replied that he did so with much pleasure, were it not for the want of fingers; and when questioned as to the meaning of this excuse, explained that there were so many clauses of stipulation and qualification in a Kantian sentence, that it was impossible to find one’s way through the labyrinth, unless by keeping a finger on each clause—which their number rendered impracticable. But the complica-

tion of literary style, thus somewhat apocryphally chronicled, is not the worst fault in these works. The logical arrangement of the ethical treatises ('Foundation of the Metaphysic of Ethic' and 'Criticism of Practical Reason') is defective in the extreme. It seems often as if several attempts to express the same thought had been put down one after the other without any effort to fuse the several redactions into continuity. And in the 'Criticism of Judgment' the reiteration becomes especially marked. A further difficulty is the technical nomenclature with which the works bristle. Distinction after distinction is made and invested with a name. Words receive new significations. The terms transcendental, *a priori*, schematism, idea, categorical imperative, typic of practical judgment, exercise a deterrent effect upon the reader. There is a great parade of logical subdivision, and yet a great abruptness often to be felt in the succession of paragraphs. It is only gradually and with labour that one can shake off the feeling of drowsiness induced by the multiplicity of currents which murmur here and there over the rocky ground: only after several attempts that one is able to grasp the general drift and direction of the stream.

Kant's philosophy describes itself as *transcendentalism*. The word causes a shudder, and suggests things unutterable. Not less terrible is the term *a priori*. But in either case a little courage carries the student safely past these lions in the way. He must first of all dismiss the popular associations that cling to the words. A transcendental inquiry, then, is an inquiry not into things in general, or any particular sort of things, but into the conditions in the mental constitution which make us

know or estimate things in the way we do. It seeks to present the fundamental features of mental action which are operative in generating the product known as the world of knowledge. These fundamental features, discovered by an analysis of mind regarded simply as the organ of knowledge, are what Kant terms *a priori*. Evidently they are no innate ideas. But they are pre-suppositions without which knowledge is impossible. Further, they have always a bearing towards experience, and concrete knowledge of facts: they are always on the outlook, as it were, for an *a posteriori*; in which alone they are actually and, so to speak, tangibly embodied. To sift out these conditions, to discover the element logically antecedent to experience, and which renders experience itself possible,—to find out the fundamental spirit of unification which is the progenitor of all the several unifications of sense-impressions which make up our experience,—this is the work of Kant's criticism. But as *criticism* it accomplishes the task in a partial way. The aim of the work, as a criticism, is to point out how these conditions, inherent in the very act of knowing, impose a limit upon its application. Only so far, therefore, as is needed in order to show the necessary restrictions of science does Kant enter upon the analysis of its elementary laws. Yet he himself believed that he had so far demarcated the main outlines of the *a priori*, that only a little more labour, with the help of a metaphysical text-book, was needed to expand the criticism into a complete transcendental philosophy.

The process of knowledge is assigned by Kant, in the first instance, to the action of two factors—the senses and the understanding. By the former, it is said, ob-

jects are *given* us; by the latter they are *thought*. In other words, the starting-point of knowledge is sensation: sensations are the *data*, and the indispensable data. In sensations we have knowledge, and the object of knowledge, in their utterly rudimentary or embryonic stage. Such an entity exists in consciousness alone: sensations presuppose a sentient being. Whether, when they are described as "impressions," they do not involve a reference to a cause outside us, is a further question. For the present we need only consider that the thing with which we start, if *thing* it can yet be called, is a sensation. In sense all knowledge begins: without such a starting-point there can be, at least for human beings, no such product as knowledge. We are so constituted, it may be said, that certain waves, as it were, pass over the surface of our representative faculty: and these modifications of mental state are the furthest reality to which we can carry our knowledge back.

The theory which expounds the character of the sense-process, so far as it is a factor in experience, is styled by Kant *transcendental æsthetics* (æsthetics being used in its literal acceptance, and not, as was and is common, to denote the doctrine of taste). It lays down that Space and Time are the very essence and primary condition of sense-perception. They are not so much forms *of* sense; rather sense-perception, in its generic subjective aspect, means these forms. Whatever be the special material, so to speak, of the affection of our consciousness, the fact of sensuous consciousness generically implies "timeing" and "spacing;" or, in another (and looser) phraseology, the process of translating an organic impression into consciousness has always as per-

manent features the correlation of its contents in space and time. Thus time and space are the formal characters of sense-perception; and as sensation is the beginning and indispensable basis of knowledge, all our *knowledge* is bound up with conditions of space and time. And Kant's contention is that space and time have no existence save as inseparable characteristics of human consciousness, as a sentient consciousness—a consciousness, *i.e.*, which finds itself modified in various ways, and does not have knowledge except as modified; which does not make its own objects, but receives them as raw material to be fashioned—"to receive a local habitation and a name."

The indispensable function of these forms in producing a knowledge of objects serves to Kant to explain how pure mathematics can have an objective application in experience. It is by the elaboration of this formal element that mathematics is produced. And as the formal element serves to constitute the very rudiments of our conception of things, so whatever can be found out by bringing this element into active development will have an objective value. According to Kant, every mathematical truth is a synthetical judgment—a judgment, *i.e.*, where the predicate adds something new to the subject. Thus, he says, $7 + 5 = 12$, is a synthetical judgment. Of course Kant was not unaware that to a person who fully understood what 7, 5, and 12 severally are, the judgment is either analytical or more properly the expression of an identity (its form being an equation). What he meant was, that as seven expresses a synthesis of elements, so the addition of seven to five implies a further stretch of the same act of conjunction,

issuing in the production of the number twelve. The conditions of numbering are given in the homogeneous forms (space and time), but the numbers have to be *made* by fixing and conjoining the elements.

Synthesis or unification, however, in any shape, cannot strictly be said to belong to sense. Space and time afford the possibility of unity; they form the warp of experience, as it were, across which the shuttle of thought continually throws its woof and constructs the web of objective knowledge. They have a potential infinitude, coextensive with all the exercises of intellect in us. And thus, though at each perception we have only a limited space and time, still the forms homogeneously accompany our every act, and serve as the basis of conjunction between sensation and sensation. They are continuous wholes: where one part ends another begins: there is no gap. Thus these forms, as the sensuous aspect of consciousness, are all-embracing; nothing can possibly escape their meshes or lie beyond their grasp, so far as our knowledge is concerned. A world of three-dimensioned space and one-dimensioned time,—such is the one world of human experience. There may be, of course, worlds of four-dimensioned space, but their existence is an everlasting may-be: we can never, as now constituted, come to know them.

On this theory there is much to say; perhaps two remarks may suffice. The first is, that to set the ideality of time and space in the front of the doctrine is a great stumbling-block. It may be said that, as is evident from the Dissertation of 1770, it was the point which first struck Kant on examining the conditions of

knowledge. But it has the defect of presenting as a theory of sense what can hardly be understood without treating sense as a partner of intellect. It is only by the application of intellect that mathematical science comes into existence. Space and time only afford the possibility for a comprehensive co-ordination of sense-elements: they are, as it were, the chemically prepared plate of the photographer, on which the concentrated rays of intellect, or rather the sunlight of experience itself, draw out the implicit relations into distinct outlines of quantity, at once continuous and discrete. This Kant himself shows; and it is almost beyond the power of abstraction to look at the action of sense alone. What he is anxious to insist on is, that there is in the mind something which forms the homogeneous and universal factor of all perception; and secondly, that the truths of the science which deals with that factor of experience must have application to reality.

The second point is the contrast between this idealism and others more familiar to Englishmen. J. S. Mill, for example, agrees with Kant in regarding sensations as the basis of scientific reality. "Sensations or other feelings being given," he says, "succession and simultaneousness are the two conditions, to the alternative of which they are subjected by the nature of our faculties; and no one has been able or needs expect to analyse the matter any further." He treats, in short, succession and simultaneousness as *a priori* forms of sense-perception. But with Kant space holds from the first a position of parallel rank with time: the one is the form of outer, the other of inner sense. To psychological idealists like Mill, space (or externality) is a later and

derivative development, due to special acts of sense or organic motion. To the transcendental idealism of Kant, on the contrary, space is a characteristic of sentient consciousness no less original and primary than time. Every state of feeling is only part of consciousness because it is either localised or timed. Hence Kant's indignation at being confused with the common herd of idealists. To him an external, or at least a spatial, world, is as much a primitive datum as the world of sequent sensations and feelings—both, of course, existing in human consciousness.

The action of intellect or understanding comes in to supplement that of sense. And that action is synthesis or correlation. A mere sensation would be a mere isolated reaction or occurrence in consciousness. It would be a mere instant of feeling; and though we may suppose a hundred such instants, each is alone and blindly self-centred. Sentient life, if we keep the unifying vehicle of consciousness out of view, would be a mere series of pulses, each pulse being unaware of the others. In Kant's words, perceptions without conceptions are blind. The spark of fire which runs along the line of sensations and sets them in a blaze; the string which gathers the single beads into a necklace; the glass which collects the beams of sentient life into one focus,—is what we call intellect. Synthetic unity is the one function of thought—the one architectonic idea which lays sense-brick to sense-brick, and builds the house of knowledge.

It is the business of the *Transcendental Analytic* (or metaphysics of inductive logic) to exhibit the special forms in which this general intellectual act of synthesis

or correlation is exercised, and to show how the work of unification is accomplished, as it must be, under the conditions of sense. Transcendental logic (as distinguished from formal or general logic, which expounds the laws of thought applicable to all classes of objects whatsoever) expounds the nature of human thought (ideal or mental organisation) so far as it is applied to constitute a knowledge of things, and has accordingly to show how mere or pure thought can ever enter into the formation of objective fact. It thus falls into two parts: the first—called the *Analytic of Conceptions*—is a classificatory statement of the ultimate forms to which the correlating force may be reduced; and the second—called the *Analytic of Principles*—exhibits these elements of unification in their sensuous and concrete forms, as syntheses in the element of sense itself.

With the discovery of the several species or aspects of the synthetic act, Kant does not give himself much trouble. His special aim lies in showing that to give knowledge they must be incorporated with the sense-forms. Impressed as he was with the general perfection of logical science (not less than with the current psychological distinctions), and regarding judgment, as we have seen (p. 124), as the cardinal operation of intellect, he believed that the various modes which the logicians had assigned to the unity of predicate with subject in a proposition would be found to supply a classification of the modes in which understanding unifies the unconnected elements of sense. Thus, at any rate, the trouble of a laborious analysis was saved. Logicians have established a conventional classification of judgments into judgments of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and

Modality. That is to say, in the first class of judgments the point emphasised is the numerical extent to which the predicate is applicable to the subject; in the second, whether it belongs to it in any way or not at all; in the third, whether the assertion is made off-hand or with a condition and an option; in the fourth, whether the proposition is asserted, merely suggested, or authoritatively imposed. The distinctions in themselves are of dubious value,—often untenable. But Kant accepts them gratefully, and even goes on, by introducing modifications into the current theory, to get an array of twelve forms of judgment—each primary form being strained to supply three sub-species.

Precisely in the same forms as judgment combines its terms, does thought combine the elements of sense into a conception of an object. Thus the abstract forms under which this synthesis takes place, the twelve species of intellectual relation or unification, are the twelve Categories (as Kant calls them, by a misuse of an Aristotelian term) of the following list:—

Quantity.	Quality.	Relation.	Modality.
1. Unity.	4. Reality.	7. Substance and	10. Possibility—
2. Plurality.	5. Negation.	Accident.	Impossibility.
3. Totality.	6. Limitation.	8. Cause and Effect.	11. Existence—
		9. Action and Reaction.	Non-existence.
			12. Necessity—
			Contingency.

But what right have these forms, so plainly mental, to become a part of the objective world? How can mere modes of mental action transmute the flux of sensation into permanent and objective conceptions? The *quasi*-legal exhibition of the grounds for the claims made on behalf of these forms to be treated as formative

elements in real knowledge, is known in the Kantian terminology as the *Deduction of the Categories*. It is one of the hardest parts of the book, differing considerably in the two editions of the 'Critique:' yet elsewhere it is described as comparatively unimportant. We may simplify the consideration of the Deduction if we remember that it is no proof in the logical sense of the term. Like every so-called "transcendental" argument, it simply aims at showing that these categories are presupposed in the very existence of experience: that our ordinary knowledge involves elements which, upon an exhaustive analysis, would be found to be identical with the categories. We have here, as with the forms of sense, only to show that this branch of the *a priori* (i.e., the radical types of intellectual synthesis) is another condition without which experience would be impossible.

If we turn to experience and consider what happens when we perceive an object, we find that it presupposes acts of synthesis at several stages. First of all, we must run over the several points in the object, and combine them in the one act by which we apprehend it. Next, if we are to form a real unity out of these various points, we must be able to retain and reproduce the preceding, and combine them in imagination with those which follow. Thirdly, we must have a name, expressing a conception, at hand, by which we recognise in the aggregation correspondence with a given type or rule. It is clearly the conception as embodied in a word which governs our imagination in the reduction of the various data of sense to a unity. The name serves as a rule or law to guide the synthesis of imagination, and thus

ultimately tells us what our observation is to embrace. To these three aspects of unification, Kant gives the names respectively of *synthesis of apprehension in sense*, of *reproduction in imagination*, and of *recognition in the concept*.

Something like this takes place in the process, not of perceiving (*i.e.*, knowing) some particular object, but of perceiving an object at all. In order to rise from a mere sensation to a perception of objective existence, there must also be a synthesis—and, indeed, a triple synthesis. Here, however, we look not at mental faculties as they work in experience, but in their underlying generic or transcendental conditions. Those generic conditions which create unity in *sense*—the forms of space and time—have been already discussed. But the second faculty, the *imagination*, has also a transcendental aspect. This “blind but indispensable function of the soul,” regarded as a generic and fundamental feature of mind, produces totals out of the elementary forms of sense: builds up geometrical figures, creates number out of units, and establishes links between the various points of time. Such an operation is the very secret art of mind: always weaving its web, producing new conjunctions, and not merely reproducing conjunctions already made. But this dynamical unification carries us back to a statical unity, the “standing and abiding *ego*”—in other words, to the third and primary synthesis, the “original synthetic unity of apperception,” or “transcendental unity of apperception.” Under these alarming names lies concealed the vulgar fact that intelligence means to have or to exert a consciousness which is one and the same basis for all conscious states. Appercep-

tion is a word used to signify that when a new perception or new fact is acquired, it is not merely added to, but is fused into harmony with, the already existing furniture of mind. And the original or *transcendental apperception* is simply mind or consciousness generically regarded as such a process of grouping and unifying the group. Thus the final ground which serves to unify the elements occurring in sense-perception is the unity of consciousness,—and that not a passive receptacle, but an active reference of one element to another, and the further unification of the particulars by a synthetic act. The “I think” which silently accompanies and animates each state of conscious life, confronts every fresh item of experience which we gather with the accumulated store of past knowledge.

The “Deduction of the categories” thus consists in showing that experience presupposes a formal unity of consciousness, and that the categories express the special rules under which this generic unity presents itself to guide transcendental imagination. Thus when we ask, What gives objectivity to our sensations? what translates sensations into objects? the answer is, Correlation in one or other of those aspects known as categories. “Thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience.” On these regular lines, known as the categories, the various and unconnected modifications of consciousness form into permanent groups. But the categories are essentially forms or functions of human thought; and thus the lines on which sensations settle down into unities, orders, sequences, identities, are imposed from the intellect. The natural world,

which we know—and as we know it—is founded on sensations, and regulated by general laws or principles derived from human intellect. Thus Kant supplements the doctrine of Mill—that “a body is a set of sensations, or rather of possibilities of sensation, joined together according to a fixed law,” by adding that the fundamental law is a mental fact no less than the sensation,—that connection is but another word for mind.

Kant began his investigation by assuming a thorough separation between the senses and the intellect. Gradually, however, he has been driven to relax the rigour of his antithesis, and seek some common ground for faculties so heterogeneous. How can pure thought and pure sense be brought into contact? The problem is solved by the introduction of the *transcendental schema*. The sense and the intellect meet in the faculty of judgment. Such, at least, is Kant's way of putting the metamorphosis. In reality he simply reverts from the pure understanding to the imagination or pictorial intellect. Our real thinking in science and experience is always pictorial—it is tinged with imagination: not abstract thought, but thought coloured by the laws of sense. As cognitive beings, our essential character is to be a sensuous intellect, or an intellectual sense. Our intellect is partly passive and partly active; and it is only in the ground where both aspects meet, that knowledge, strictly so called, is feasible.

The pure or abstract categories have their home in logic—in the field of judgment. There the power of synthesis is seen in its abstract and disembodied purity, and the *copula* or synthetic tie can be disentangled by abstraction, guided to some extent by the indications

of language. But in real thought, applied to objects of sense, the abstract relation is always presented semi-sensuously. Instead of the categories, we get the *schemata*—the figurations in which the categories actually play their part in constructing experience, or the shapes in which sensations issue from the subjectivity of feeling, and appear in nature as articulate structures.

Thus, as the generic activity of cognitive thought is that of relating the data of sensation, it must further be noted that all relations in human consciousness (as organ of knowledge) are coloured by a peculiar vehicle: this vehicle is time. In knowledge, therefore, the abstract relations of human thought are always invested with a garment of time. We can only correlate sensations so far as we have space and time available to give the mental act a substantial and discernible reality. "A secret art in the depths of the human soul" translates the intangible conception into a schema—a sort of generalised image, a universal which is withal sensuous: not so much a picture itself, as a general formula or recipe for drawing pictures. Thought, in short, works under conditions of time. The schemata are the working principles to which the categories, and the supreme category, "I think," supply the secret power. Thus, if we apply quantity to phenomena, we use the schema of number, and number is the active generation in time of unit after unit. Similarly the category of reality is replaced by the degree (also measured by number) in which sensation intensively fills time. Substance is replaced by the schema of the persistent in time; and cause and effect are respectively equivalent to regular antecedent and regular consequent.

The schemata, then, are the true scientific categories. They are, in Kant's words, "the true and only conditions for securing to the categories a bearing upon objects—of giving them, in short, import and meaning." Leave out the sensuous condition, which is the phenomenal envelope of the category, and it shrivels into a mere logical form without objective reality—a mere function by which thought correlates two conceptions in a proposition. Substance, unless when sensually presented as what persists in change, can only mean a possible subject for a logical judgment. Reality, if it is to have phenomenal or scientific value, must denote the degree of intensity with which any sensation occupies consciousness. Universality and necessity, for our human experience, resolve themselves into what is at all times and all places found—*quod semper, quod ubique*. Thus the significance of the categories for scientific knowledge comes from the senses, which, while they tie down the intellect to a sensuous form, at the same time clothe it in reality.

But it is not merely in the form of time that the categories are realised: even the forms of time and space themselves are but fictions of the mind, ghostly schemata, unless as they look forward to an embodiment in actual experience with actual sensations. It is because they are destined to be the laws of a natural world that our *a priori* elements of sense and thought possess objectivity. Their objectivity lies in their consensus as constituents of the whole of experience.

Following the clue given by the categories, Kant expounds the metaphysical principles of science under four heads; but the order thus obtained is somewhat

strained and formal, while the names by which they are designated are open to a charge of pedantry. First come under two groups the principles by which mathematics holds a governing place in the body of science. The *axioms of perception* unite in the general principle that an object of perception can only be apprehended by the conjunction of parts to parts; that it is always recognisable as an aggregate or extensive magnitude. The *anticipations of sensation*, in the second place, are based upon the view that every sensation, or conscious state considered as an amount of feeling, though it has no parts out of parts, has nevertheless intensive magnitude or degree. In other words, the quantity and quality which we find in science are alike based upon mathematical elements,—in the one case, elements which can be placed side by side as mere juxtapositions; in the other, elements which appear as degrees of quality. But every object of perception and sensation, physical or psychical, has a numerable constitution. Heat, *e.g.*, conforms to the anticipation of sensation—the sun to the axiom of perception.

The third class of scientific principles, the *analogies of experience*, carries us from mathematical to physical or dynamical science,—from the consideration of the internal structure of objects as either sums or multiples of simple elements, to the consideration of their order and relations in the complexity of actual existence. These principles are termed analogies by reference to the relations of thought (*e.g.*, that of antecedent and consequent in the hypothetical judgment). As the logical antecedent to the logical consequent, so analogically in our experience does the physical cause stand

to the physical effect. But it is only an analogy and not an identity; they are like, but by no means the same. The general description of the function of these analogies is, that "all phenomena, in the matter of their existence, stand, and cannot but stand, under rules which govern their relations to one another in a unity of time." These rules of order in time, considered as a unity, which govern experience of the actual world, are discussed under the three relationships of substance and attribute, cause and effect, action and reaction.

And first of Substance. When we speak of substance, we mean only what persists or abides in time, and we contrast the permanent with the changes of its phases. But the substance is not a separate thing over and above its modes or manifestations. It is simply that change or alteration cannot be understood except in reference to something permanent. It is easy, then, to say that substance is a fiction of thought: Kant's reply to that charge is, that to treat successive sensations as having one source common to them (what we must constantly do in our experience), implies as a ground of its possibility an identity or persistency in the consciousness which serves as the common vehicle of the successive feelings. Unless thought supplied this persistent, permanent background, it would be impossible for us to realise the relations in time known as succession and simultaneity.

In Causality, which is the second of these analogies, we advance from the point of view that all alteration is relative to a permanent, to the further rule that every event, every change which has come into being, is connected with, or follows after, another event. The

sequence of sensations may of course be a mere accident in our way of perception. But if the succession of the two phenomena in consciousness is treated not as a mere chance in my way of apprehending them, but as a succession of the phenomena themselves,—if the succession in short is objective, not subjective merely, there must be something in the antecedent which regulates the succession of the consequent. To regard any event as an objective occurrence, we must always presume that it is preceded by something on which it regularly follows. Such, then, is the principle of causality: every event has its cause, something on which it follows by rule and law. And its justification is, that without it objective reality is inconceivable: that experience (which is an accepted fact) depends on a fixity in the order of time. Thus temporal sequence and antecedence as fixed by rules is the aspect under which the logical relation of ground and consequent appears in science.

What the second analogy does for succession in time, the third does for simultaneity. Objective simultaneity or coexistence of things is only conceivable on the assumption that these things (the permanent substrata, which we must employ to construct our experiential image of the world) are in thoroughgoing community—act and react upon each other. Our only ground for treating any two phenomena as really simultaneous is, that the one is connected with and dependent upon the other; that A is the cause of B's manifestations, and B the cause of A's. Thus the world of experience, with its things possessing different powers and qualities, its regular sequences and coexistences, requires us to admit an intellectual law by which the serial sensations are

grouped and unified by reference to permanent causes, each phase of phenomena treated as unconditionally dependent on something in the anterior phase, and all the elements coexisting in one phase or aspect as in reciprocal interdependence.

The *postulates of experiential thought*, which are the fourth and last class of synthetical principles, explain the use of the terms possible, actual, and necessary, in the scientific and realistic field. In that sense nothing is possible except what conforms to the formal conditions of experience as expressed in the combination of perceptive and intellectual constituents. Only that is actual which is either directly or mediately in connection with the material element of experience—that is, with sensation. And lastly, an existence is said to be necessary in the sense that everything which occurs is regarded as determined by a cause which preceded it, and on which it must follow. Such is the restricted application of the three modal terms in the field of real knowledge.

Under these four heads Kant marks off the boundaries of human experience. He has first laid down the pure or abstract *a priori* of the senses and the understanding: the formal elements of union contributed from either source—viz., the time and space forms of perception and the categories or forms of conception. He has, secondly, shown the mixed or concrete *a priori* in the four classes of scientific principles. It is thus apparent that, as space and time are only realised as forms of experience by the action of thought, so the categories cannot be *defined* without condescending to conditions of sense. The two factors in knowledge respectively restrict and modify each other. Within the range of

experience the senses impose their limitation upon the wide but vacant forms of pure thought, and any employment of thought apart from its modification by sense is declared to be illegitimate. We only know quantity in the sensible shape of number, and causality in the sensible shape of sequence. But though thus restricted within the province of knowledge, the categories remain claiming to extend their influence beyond the range of the senses. It is true that the perceptive powers by which we come into contact with reality are limited to the senses ; we have no higher or intellectual intuition, and therefore there can be strictly for us no *noûmena*—no objects of spiritual vision. Yet *noûmena*, in a negative sense, we may still admit. We may still allow, that is, that though our knowledge is confined to phenomena (sensations), there are conceptions free to us of purely intellectual forms, and that there may be indications in other parts of our nature of something transcending the sense-world, and, though causal, not subject to conditions of time.

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CHAPTER XII.

THE UNKNOWNABLE.

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POSITIVE science—the classified record of the measurements and correlations of the phenomena of sense—does not satisfy the aspirations of human nature. As we have traced the constituent conditions of knowledge, we have seen its limits. At the outset, there is something given, not made—a material. On one side of our nature we are receptive: we are so organised that certain waves, as it were, pass over our representative faculty; we awake to certain modifications of consciousness. These sensations are for Kant the primitive datum for reality and objectivity of experience. To the popular view, they are due to the action of real things which we know to be outside us, and which by means of our bodily organism produce in us certain feelings: our consciousness only mirrors an external reality. Kant, on the contrary, believed himself to have shown that the so-called external world was a product of sensations as, for the human mind, shaped and grasped by generic capacities of sense-perception and organising links of thought. Still, therefore, the question remained as to this world suspended in the mid-air of consciousness, How are these “appear-

ances" to be accounted for? What is the cause of our sensations? For Kant, clearly, the question was not within scientific competence. "Things in themselves," existing independently of consciousness, were for consciousness nothing. A material world which "causes" impressions on the thinking subject, and a thinking subject itself which exerts or "causes" acts of thought, were both put out of court. To get at them would require us to step out of consciousness at both ends, and to rise by some new power of knowledge above the very conditions on which our knowledge depends.

And yet Kant's successors tried to get behind the curtain which, as he had said, was the picture. With Herbart, they explained the appearances within consciousness as due to realities outside of consciousness—permanent objective points which were decipherable from the somewhat distorted or displaced images of their relations in consciousness. With Fichte and Schelling, on the other hand, they said that the modifications of consciousness which we invest with externality are really produced by mental agency—an agency which, before we awake to mundane and divided consciousness, has externalised the products formed by imagination before the rise of conscious life. Kant himself hardly discusses the question from these points of view.

But another road leads to the same *transcendent* questions—transcendent because they treat the forms of human thought not merely as logically antecedent to the products of experience, but because they apply these forms to problems where experience wants data. The power of thought in creating knowledge is limited to the conjunction of sense-material under the conditions of

sense-perception. But in itself thought is not so narrowed; it is conjunction and unification in the most universal and unlimited extent. Besides its real, it has an ideal function: in Kant's phraseology, besides Understanding there is Reasoning; besides conceptions (*Begriffe*) there are ideas (*Ideen*). All the forms of thought (the categories) are functions or aspects of one fundamental unity of consciousness; all the details of experience stand in mutual interconnection on the field of the "transcendental apperception." But this totality which is thus the implicit basis of all experience is never actually present; what we actually have at any given moment is some one special synthesis, or large group of such syntheses, beyond which we feel that we can still go in thought. It is this power of thought which always tends beyond any given synthesis of phenomena, and, however far it may go, knows no rest short of absolute completeness, which is termed *Reasoning*. Here is an ideal side of thought which is always unsatisfied by the largest synthesis of materials, which can never acquiesce in any amount or extension of so-called realities of knowledge. It is the inability to rest in finite, conditioned data; the craving for a reason which gives a reason without requiring one—for a starting-point which is not itself a consequence upon something that has gone before—for absolute spontaneity, necessity, originality, and finality.

Such a tendency is reasoning when left to its own prompting, unchecked by the bridle of verification in experience. Now reasoning, according to the logicians, falls into three syllogistic forms—categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive: according as the process traces

phenomenal attributes back to their ultimate substance, subsequent states to their antecedent conditions, and the separate members of a class up to their fundamental source. Kant, in like manner, asserts that intellect, when thus carrying the fragmentary and detailed results of human experience to their rational issues in a postulated totality, gives rise to three distinct *Ideas*. These three ideas are the Soul, as the supersensible substance from which the phenomena of consciousness are derivative manifestations; the World, as ultimate totality of external phenomena; and God, as unity and final spring of all the diversities of existence.

The ideas, strictly as ideal, have a legitimate and a necessary place in human thought. They express the unlimited obligation which thought feels laid upon itself to unify the details of observation; they indicate an anticipated and postulated convergence between the various lines indicated by observation, even though observation may show that the convergence will never visibly be reached; or they are standards and model types towards which experience may, and indeed must, if she is true to the cause of truth, conceive herself bound to approximate. Such is the function of ideas, as regulative; they govern and direct the action of intellect in the effort to systematise and centralise knowledge. Our thought is thus guided by its own threefold maxims of homogeneity, specification, and continuity; the first of which enjoins the unlimited reduction of special laws and forms to more general, the second demands indefinite liberty to mark out distinctions, and the third insists upon gradual and unbroken passage from species to species. Even the more concrete forms of the ideas have their use. The

idea of a supreme intelligence, as regulative of the universe, serves as a clue to suggest the discovery of new relationships in the objects of nature. The idea of a soul serves to supply a principle of unity for our study of the mental phenomena; and the idea of the world serves to keep before us the way in which natural phenomena are always indicating an increasing unity and interdependence.

But the ideas naturally sink into another place in human knowledge. Instead of stimulating research, they become, as Kant once puts it, a cushion for the lazy intellect. Instead of being the ever-unattainable goals of investigation, they play a part in founding the edifice of science. Ceasing to be *regulative* of research, they come to be *constitutive* of a pretended knowledge. Instead, for example, of using the conception of a divine intelligence as a hint to look for adaptation in nature, we seek explanation of facts from the inscrutable decrees of divine wisdom. But "the appeal to supernatural influences is the refuge of a sluggardly philosophy."

Kant has spent what may seem to the modern reader a disproportionate amount of energy in examining the processes by which the intellect has come to persuade itself that in these ideas it has found objects of a higher order than sense-experience can show. He has traced with unsparing rigour the various forms of self-deception by which *a priori* reasoning plumes itself on having gained a fulcrum outside the sphere of experience, and discovered the true dependence of all phenomena in their vicissitudes from their uncaused source. As usual with him, the procedure is designated by names borrowed from the nomenclature of the logicians. In general, it

goes under the title *Dialectic*—a to-and-fro of arguments, like the battle of Sheriff-muir, where

“ There’s some say that we wan,
Some say that they wan,
Some say that nane wan at a’, man.”

A few words must briefly indicate the nature of this (in the strictest sense) ‘Criticism of Pure Reasoning.’

Rational Psychology, with which he begins his trial of the pretenders to scientific sovereignty, the pseudo-kings of metaphysics, is an exposition of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* (consciousness evinces a personal Ego). Its argument for the soul, Kant styles a *paralogism*. Founding on the fact that every exercise of consciousness rests upon a fundamental “I think,” or logical unity, it translates this into the phrase that I am the permanent subject of all my conscious states, and therefore, it is inferred, the substance of which mental phenomena are phases. The virtual or logical unity of consciousness is translated into a real substratum of mental life. But the unity of mental life is not identical with a unit (a simple substance), which is the source of that life: consciousness as unification is not the same as one simple, persistent monad, numerically identical at the various periods of its existence, and known by introspection with an intuitive certainty far superior to the inferential character of our knowledge of the world outside. It is a false idealism; according to Kant, which assumes us to have direct contact with the basis of mental reality, whilst for external reality we are restricted to dubious inference. Transcendental idealism shows, on the contrary, that matter and mind

are alike real as phenomena exhibited on the field of sensuous consciousness: alike beyond our knowledge, when beyond that field. The very category of substance suggests materiality: it means persistency in time; and mental phenomena are rather known as successive and transient. The only link which holds them together is the thread of consciousness; and the continuance of that thread we dare not assert scientifically to be possible in conditions (of a future life) unknown to us.

The reasoning which seeks to fix the cosmological conception of the world as a whole, in order to get a basis for general physical science, leads to what Kant calls the *antinomies*, where every thesis by which intellect speaks as if it knew whereupon the foundations of the universe are fashioned, and who laid the measures thereof, is met by an antithesis. This "antithetic," inherent in any attempt to define the elements and beginnings of the whole of experience, is expounded under four heads. There are the two antinomies of speculative mathematics; between the assertion that the world has a beginning in space and limits in time, and the doctrine that it has none; between the statement that there are real uncompounded elements in nature, and the statement that absolute simplicity of monads is a fiction. As for such disputes about infinite or finite divisibility and extension, both sides are equally in the wrong,—as their antagonists make clear. The third antinomy is in a different position; and with it we come upon the true crisis, the very watershed in Kantian thought, from which the streams descend towards opposite valleys. This antinomy lies between freedom and necessity. While

the thesis maintains that everything occurs in conformity to the rule of physical causality (which lays down that every event has its antecedent), the antithesis asserts that there is such a thing as absolute spontaneity, a power of making an entirely fresh and original commencement. Kant meets the dispute by referring to his doctrine that the things of which we speak in physical science (in nature) are phenomena, and not things in themselves. To such by the very constitution of consciousness the law of causation inevitably and without any exception (such as human actions) applies. But if there be, as there may perhaps turn out to be some reason for holding, realities not included in the phenomenal order, then to these supersensibles there is nothing to prevent us applying the view of freedom—that here, at any rate, there is uncaused and original power of commencement. As to the fourth antinomy, it turns upon the question whether we can think in the world anything absolutely necessary, or must regard everything as contingent upon something else. Evidently, it is only a slightly altered form of the third: and the remarks by which Kant solves the antithesis of the one are applicable to the other. In other words, the idea of a self-existent and necessary being cannot find a place in the realm of experience and of science; but at the same time there is nothing to prevent it coming in with the establishment, by other means, of a supersensible world.

The third idea of pure reasoning is God. Founding on the conception of an absolutely necessary being, it invests this conception with elements gathered from the whole universe, whence all that is imperfect or contradictory has been eliminated, and thus creates the idea

of a Being of absolute perfection and highest reality. Uniting into one harmonious image what has been collected from the various phenomena, where it exists distributively and in part, we form what Kant calls the "Ideal of Pure Reasoning," a mere imagined unity of all that is good and great; and then, having attributed to our ideal a substantial existence, we take the further step of personifying it, and call it God. The arguments by which it is attempted to prove the real existence of this ideal are of two species. There are, first, the arguments of the deist, who takes the abstract and strictly rational ground of arguing that a Being who is endowed with all realities must, by the very force of terms, exist, else he would want the reality of existence; and that as there must somewhere be an absolutely necessary being, that being must be a fountain of all reality. But "a man," says Kant, "is no more likely to increase his knowledge by mere notions, than a merchant to increase his property, who tries to better his condition by affixing a few noughts to the balance of his account." As for the arguments of the theist, who takes the ground of experience and refers to the evidence of intelligent adaptation in nature, though they must always be spoken of respectfully as the oldest and most natural attitude of the honest mind, they neither prove an absolutely infinite and omnipotent governor, nor a creator, as distinct from an architect of the world. Kant, in short, as he did in 1763, holds that the ontological or abstract metaphysical proof is the only rigorous one, and even it he rejects.

Thus closing his review of the dogmas of the metaphysicians, Kant may seem to say in substance, like

Smollett's "Sufficient Examiner," "A fig for reason; I laugh at reason: give me ocular demonstration." And one thinks of the parallel which Heine drew between the philosopher and Robespierre. "First we find in both," says Heine, "the same inexorable, cutting, prosaic, sober integrity. Next we find in both the same talent of mistrust, only that the one exercises it against thoughts, and calls it criticism, while the other applies it against men, and entitles it republican virtue. In both, however, there shows itself in the highest degree the type of petty tradesman: nature had intended them to weigh out tea and sugar, but destiny decreed that they should weigh other things; and for the one it placed a king, for the other a God, on the scale. . . . In truth, had the citizens of Königsberg divined the full meaning of this subversive, world-bruising thought, they would have felt before that man a far more gruesome awe than before an executioner,—an executioner who puts only men to death; but the good people saw in him nothing but a professor of philosophy, and when he strolled past at the appointed hour, they gave him a courteous salute, and, it may be, set their watches by him."

But this impression of Kant's work is misleading. Here, as before (p. 120), his point is, that though it is unquestionably necessary to be convinced of God's existence, it is not so necessary to demonstrate it. Going even further than he did then, he shows that all such demonstrations are scientifically impossible and worthless. On the great questions of metaphysics,—Immortality, Freedom, God,—scientific knowledge is hopeless. But this position cuts two ways. If we cannot prove

that the soul is immaterial and immortal, that there is a power of absolute commencement in the real world, that there is a God, no more can we disprove these theses. The canons of scientific evidence justify us neither in accepting nor denying the ideas on which morality and religion repose. "Both parties to the dispute beat the air; they worry their own shadow; for they pass beyond nature to a region where their dogmatic grips find nothing to lay hold of. They fight at their ease; the shadows which they hew in pieces grow together again in a moment, like the heroes in Walhalla, to rejoice anew in bloodless battles." Metaphysics, if this be so, can no longer claim to be the foundation-stone of religion and morality. But if she cannot be the Atlas who bears the moral heaven, she can furnish a magic defence. Around the ideas of religion she throws the bulwark of invisibility; and the sword of the sceptic and the battering-ram of the materialist fall harmless on vacuity.

CHAPTER XIII.

ÆSTHETIC IDEAS.

THE analytic method of inquiry has its losses as well as its gains. Kant had begun by isolating theory from action: he had treated man as an exclusively cognitive being. Even in examining the scientific side of human nature, he had drawn sharp lines between sense and intellect, and between understanding and reasoning. Without ignoring the common origin of the various faculties, he had left their radical unity to appear as an undesigned and remarkable coincidence. The faculties of the human mind, according to his phraseology, were three in number: a faculty of cognition; one of appetite; and a feeling of pleasure and pain—which, somewhat unsymmetrically, he placed under the dominion of principles supplied by understanding, reasoning, and judgment. Amid the crowd of faculties with separate principles, issuing, again somewhat unsymmetrically, in the three domains of nature, morality, and art, the unity of human nature is apt to disappear.

The gulf between theoretical and practical reasoning in Kant's philosophy — (the contrast between which, stamped on the 'Criticism of Pure Reason' with a pro-

minence which should keep it from being missed, is carried out into greater detail in the subsequent Criticisms)—is a palpable anomaly which has led to opposing estimates of his work. And yet it should be remembered that every philosophical system must bear in some measure the imprint of its author's individuality. Now, in Kant's character, two features stand out especially luminous. The first and most radical is his strong faith in moral order, his conviction of the royal law of duty. Perhaps it first took root in his mind under the influences of his early Christian training; but it grew and strengthened, even when all enhancement from religious sanction had ceased to affect him. The second feature in his character was his scientific interest, his love of knowledge, his devotion to verified truth. In this latter capacity he had written the '*Criticism of Pure Reasoning*,' and liberated his soul from the incubus of a pretended science of the supernatural. Yet the supernatural was not eradicated from his thoughts; and his two remaining Criticisms are devoted to an examination of the evidence which moral law and artistic ideas furnish of its presence and operation in human life.

The '*Criticism of the Power of Judgment*' is a work full of many tautologies, reverting again and again to the same difficulties, stopping short in its analysis at the very point when truth seems in sight, and yet full of deep suggestions on its own peculiar topic, and throwing many luminous rays on the dark places of his general course of thought. It deals with two topics, somewhat casually bound together,—(a) a Theory of Taste; and (b) an Examination of the value of Teleology in Physical Science and in Moral Theology. In the first part, we

have an analysis of the conditions involved in the attribution to natural objects of Beauty or Sublimity. Suggested, to some extent by Burke's 'Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful' (1756), and by Baumgarten's 'Æsthetica' (1750-58), and influenced by Lessing and Mendelssohn, this analysis may be said to have laid the foundation for Germany of the philosophical study of Æsthetics, and the Philosophy of Art. Kant indeed goes but a little way: he barely touches the complicated questions of Art criticism; but by his distinction between the Beautiful and the Pleasant, and by his exposition of artistic genius, he raised the æsthetic problem to its proper level. The second part of the Criticism, dealing with the idea of Design, serves to connect his theoretical and moral philosophy. It acquires special significance as suggesting the idea of an intellect, for which universal conceptions would not be mere abstractions connected but externally with the particulars, but would be a governing principle for the relations and constitution of the parts.

Nominally the work is a Criticism of the Judgment: more strictly, of the *Reflective* Judgment. By that qualification, Kant meant to exclude from discussions the judgments (such as are examined in the Logic books) which describe or analyse what a thing is, or state what class it belongs to. The reflective judgment, instead of stating what a thing is, or what qualities it has as an objective thing, rather looks at the relation between the mental reproduction of the object and the general constitution of the human mind, particularly of the human powers of apprehension and comprehension. The predicate of such a judgment does not indicate a quality in

the thing, but primarily a relation between the act of apprehending it and the general conditions of human thought; though secondarily the epithet is transferred to the object which gives rise to the subjective conditions. Generally speaking, it may be said that on any occasion when the phenomena of the external world, either as they merely are apprehended by the senses, or as they are comprehended by the intellect, show themselves in harmony with our subjective mental organisation, the feeling of the unsought harmony is accompanied with a thrill of pleasure, whilst a felt disproportion causes pain. The theory of the "judgment" may therefore be said to deal with the causes of the pleasure and pain occasionally associated with the exercise of the powers which are ordinarily engaged in the service of knowledge. Such pleasures as are found in the heightened consciousness of mental life and harmony to which certain objects by their very presence awake the faculties of sensuous imagination and intellect, must be considered to depend on a different law from the pleasures connected with the gratification of appetite, as well as from those accompanying a willing conformity to the moral law.

Such a consciousness of spontaneous co-operation and natural adaptation of our mental powers is what justifies us in applying to the objects which occasion it the epithets beautiful or sublime. We pronounce an object to be *beautiful*, in the strictest sense of that term, when, as imagination freely groups its forms and outlines, the combinations, thus evoked as it were in play, exhibit an unsought symmetry, as if some intelligence had guided the moulding hand of fantasy. Thus, beauty in its

purest phase excludes all influence from the sensuous or symbolic charms of colour,—all that excites emotion or desire,—all even that suggests a use, function, or meaning in the object which can claim the epithet. The mere form of the object, in the unexpected and unaccountable sympathy by which, as imagination combines its elements, it almost leaps forward to harmonise with the requirements of understanding, is what primarily constitutes beauty.

An object, again, is styled *sublime*, when the perception of it stimulates the imagination to grasp in one single picture the mass of details, and imagination falls short of the task ; or when the feeling of its overwhelming power, as compared with our physical weakness, suggests immediately, by way of counterpoise, the thought that there is in us somewhat which all the efforts of physical force are powerless to subdue. In both cases (Kant distinguishes them as the mathematical and the dynamical sublime) the strange pleasure which we take in what is too great for imagination to apprehend as a unity, or too powerful for the unchecked buoyancy of flesh and blood to feel at ease in its presence, is due to the revelation that we have a higher vocation and a nobler humanity, which commands the imagination by a vague idea, and keeps us tranquil amid the grandeurs of nature. Thus, by the very check given to imagination (which is the supreme grade of our sensuous faculty), we are opportunely reminded that we have a power of thought, or an ideal (rational) nature, which sensuous knowledge can never come up to, and which physical constraints or sensuous terrors can never overpower. It must be added, however, that

for that reason the sense of sublimity presupposes, even more than the sense of beauty, a susceptibility to ideas, and implies a culture of the moral sentiments. It can only be felt by noble minds.

Alike with the beautiful and the sublime, the judgment claims universal assent, not as a right which it can enforce by argument and objective data, but as an expectation of adherence from all whose judgment is not perverted by fashion or dulled by passion. The ground of that expectation must be found,—if we refer to our analysis of beauty as an unsought proportion between imagination and understanding, and of sublimity as the suggestiveness by which a baffled sensibility pointed us to an invincible reason,—found in the assumption that the conditions of mind, which by their relation produce the said feelings, are identical in all human beings. It is, in short, the postulate of a common sense, or normal average taste, on which our claim for the universal and necessary acceptance of our æsthetic dicta is based. And this normal taste is not a fact, but an idea. The old objections of *Chacun à son goût*, and *De gustibus non disputandum est*, make it clear enough that æsthetic disputes cannot be settled like a scientific discussion.

“Nature was found beautiful,” says Kant, “when it looked at the same time as if it were Art; and Art can only be called beautiful, if we are conscious that it is Art, and it yet appears to us as if it were Nature.” The words hint, but scarcely express, the relation between the beauty of Nature and the beauty of Art. Kant, while contending that an interest in the beauties of Art is no evidence of an attachment to moral goodness, declares that it is always a sign of inward loveliness

(*schöne Seele*) to take an habitual and immediate interest in the beautiful forms of Nature. But the reason of the distinction is not germane to the matter; for the superiority of the taste for natural beauty is merely founded on the circumstance that, by showing itself where there is no admixture of social and other extraneous interests, it displays more unequivocally the susceptibility to beauty for its own sake. And we may therefore, as Kant seems to imply, consult the analysis of the conditions of art-production to throw some light on the beauty of Nature. Whereas Taste, or the faculty of æsthetic criticism, only contains part of the secret; Genius, or the faculty of æsthetic production, gives the true key. Art realises the beauty of Nature.

What produces beauty in Nature may perhaps be a mystery. In Genius, which is a human analogue to the secret power of Nature, the conditions of the process are brought into somewhat clearer light. The characteristics of genius are originality, so that it is no mere result of the application of rules,—exemplarity, so that its products serve to indicate a rule for others to carry out,—unconsciousness in its methods, so that it seems like inspiration, and suggests more than natural gifts. In other words, genius, though a personal and purely individual power, yet exhibits a universal law, not as a mere rule of understanding which others can copy, but as a living type out of which kindred spirits severally read the appropriate guidance for themselves, and yet understanding cannot explain the *rationale* of the process. Thus, though genius produces what taste can only estimate and criticise, they both ultimately

throw us back to something inexplicable or inexpressible by the understanding.

What genius does is to exhibit *æsthetic ideas*. We have seen that beauty issues when an object so stimulates the imagination that the sportive grouping of the sensuous elements is felt to be in agreement with the rules which an intellectual synthesis would have imposed. But for ordinary people it is only on especial occasions and with certain objects that they are able to observe this unprompted and unforced action whereby the sense elements spontaneously assume the order prescribed by intellect. There are many things which to the ordinary taste are not beautiful; and yet in many cases the artist representing them can make them beautiful,—can elicit from them a beauty which did not seem to be in them. Everything, says Kant, short of what is nauseous, may be made beautiful by artistic rendering. The genius of Art frees the object from the hampering and distracting circumstances which hang around in what is called real life,—that is to say, frees it from association with opinions, wishes, laws, and other conventionalities, and lets us see it as an object wrought by nature, expressing by the unsuborned consilience of its parts and features a truth typical and universal. It does, in short, perfectly and over a wide range, what ordinary perception does in a few instances.

Hitherto we have noted only the undesigned coincidence by which constructive imagination freely produces a result which judgment finds in harmony with the laws of understanding—those very laws which prescribe the modes of reducing the diversity of sense into unity. But the power of genius to exhibit æsthetic ideas carries

us a step further. In depicting its object, the genius of art has an important function in translating the conceptions of intellect into sensuous pictures, which, without effort, and as if it were naturally, meet with and recognise themselves in the intellectual conceptions. But a work of art must always do more than this. The peculiar touch of genius is seen in the residual features, which refuse to be reduced to a hard and dry concept,—in the additional material to which one cannot attach a finite, single meaning, and which the formal intellect by its prosaic renderings can never adequately exhaust. Even a simple song, much more a sonata of Beethoven, a line of poetry, a picture—all have their power and beauty in the illimitable expansion which they give to the imagination, in the suggestion of a meaning deeper than the thought which can be formulated in words. Such collateral or residual images, which, after the definite conception has been æsthetically or sensuously rendered, still prolong their echoes endlessly through the sounding corridors of the mind, are what Kant calls the exhibition of *æsthetic ideas*. Ideas, because they tend to infinitude; æsthetic, because they find their peculiar expression in a sensuous image.

It is this (from the point of view of the hard intellect) superfluity in description which gives evidence of "*Geist*," and shows that the reproduction of reality in portraiture is more than a mere pedant could effect. It is *Geist* in the artist which reproduces life in the object, which presents the something over and above the mere conformity of elements to a rule superimposed; that something being the life and freedom which spontaneously accomplishes all that rules require, yet at the

same time bears the promise of an ampler realisation,—ampler, because it springs from a source to which limit is unknown. Genius, therefore, by the aid of art, steps in to pick up what the understanding throws away as unimportant for science. It shows that there is more in nature than nature as phenomenally construed adequately represents; more also in the human faculties than is quite accounted for by the distinction between sense, understanding, and reason. It shows, on the one hand, that the sense and the understanding are in fundamental harmony; that the latter, abstractly considered, is only the grim skeleton of that articulate and living system which imagination in her sensuous materials is spontaneously weaving; and that both rest on a reason which manifests itself to the æsthetic eye in the products of sense, and gives the scientific understanding a problem of expounding the connotation of these products,—a problem to which it is for ever unequal. On the other hand, we are equally thrown back upon the supersensible nature. Nature, in short, to the æsthetic eye, is not a collection of points of sensation bound together by laws of order given by the agency of thought; rather the object speaks of a life behind it, of a “supersensible substratum” in the thing which is at no great distance from the “supersensible substratum of humanity.”

Thus in the beautiful no less than in the sublime, in the beauty of art as well as the beauty of nature, the act of judgment forces us to have recourse to the “undefined idea of the supersensible,” in order to explain the mysterious sympathy between our powers of knowledge and the nature of their objects. But there is one point still to be noticed. To feel the influences of beauty and

sublimity, to enjoy fully the beauties alike of nature and of art, there are some preparations requisite. The effort and excitement of passion, and the restlessness of knowledge, must alike be laid to rest. In either case we should have a problem to accomplish,—something to resist and to overcome. But to create or to appreciate beauty, all must be peace and harmony. In other words, what art gives, and what it teaches us to find in the objects of nature, is the spontaneous lawgiving by which, without sense of restraint, and without feeling of obligation, the sensuously imaginative being blossoms out into endless symmetries, and builds up the fairy realm of fantasy, in which all works together for good, and yet no lawgiver is to be seen.

But, to Kant, this freedom from appetite or passion, and from the divorce between sense and intellect, tended to present itself under one special form: and that was the consciousness that we are subject to a law imposed by our own higher nature, in virtue of identifying ourselves with which we are raised above the sensible drags of appetite and ignorance. Hence his view that the right training for the purification of Taste is to develop ethical ideas and cultivate the moral feelings. Taste is at bottom a power of judgment which detects the embodiment of moral ideas in sensuous shapes. The Beautiful is the symbol of the morally good.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PROBLEMS OF ETHICS.

THE terms Art and Practical have each a stricter and a looser application. In the use of the word Art, which we have just been considering, it is employed to denote a mode of production which contains a certain personal residuum not amenable to rule or reducible to formulæ. In the looser sense, it is applied to any application of knowledge to practical purposes, and simply denotes the production of an object according to rules or precepts. Similarly, the term Practical, in its wider sense, denotes the mode of laying down a theory, in which the theoretical principles are translated into precepts declaring that, if a certain result is desired, a certain means must be adopted. In the narrower sense of the term Practical, it denotes something *sui generis*—viz., a law or direction which is not a mere corollary from some theoretical proposition, but is an entirely original and unconditioned command which appeals to no external considerations or ulterior consequences to justify or explain it, but claims unqualified, and, what is more, willing obedience. The command in question is that of the Moral Law.

Man is, in one aspect, a member of creation, a link in

the great chain of nature. As such he presents himself with peculiar characters—some unique, others shared by several objects in nature. Under the latter head comes the fact that he is an organised being. Amongst the objects of nature, there are some exhibiting features which compel us to regard them as in a strict and peculiar way totals, with members in mutual interdependence, and all contributing to constitute the whole. In the case of these bodies, which we term organisms, instead of looking at the whole as a mere aggregation of the parts, we have to look upon the idea of the whole as prior to the parts, and determinative of their form and their relations to each other. In this way only, and from such an assumed standpoint, can we understand that solidarity which pervades the several elements of the structure. At first, indeed, it is a view suggested only by one and another of the products of nature, and even in these only by certain of their features, whilst others might apparently be due to accident rather than to designed harmony with the idea. But logic constrains us to universalise our hypothesis: we extend it—first, so as to subordinate every part in the organised being to the government of the idea which is supposed to underlie it; and, secondly, to include the whole range of natural phenomena. Thus grows up a teleological, as distinct from a mechanical conception of nature. We cannot, however, be too careful in restricting the teleological conception to our human point of view, the necessities of our human intellect. We can safely say no more than that for our intellect, constituted as it is, the conception of an organised body is impossible unless by the help of an idea of design. The concep-

tion, in short, is an auxiliary hypothesis where the laws of physical mechanism fail; it is a device of the judgment by which it seeks to explain the peculiar aggregation of parts known as an organism. But though "it is perfectly certain that we can never gain sufficient acquaintance with, much less explain, the inner possibility of organised beings by merely mechanical laws of nature,—so certain that we may boldly say it is absurd for human beings even to entertain such a project, or to hope that some day there may perhaps arise a Newton capable of making plain to us even the generation of a mere blade of grass by laws of nature which design has not planned" (cf. p. 110),—still it must be remembered that the necessitation of the conception by the conditions of our intelligence gives us no warrant to affirm that there is a double causality (mechanical as well as teleological) in nature.

The peculiar circumstance in our mental constitution which forces us to adopt the teleological point of view may be said to be the contingency of the relation between a universal and its particulars. The union between them is neither intimate nor apparently necessary. The particulars which are supplied by what we may call sense are submitted to the grasp of a conception which gives them unity. There must, no doubt, be something in the particular elements which predisposes them, if we may so put it, to the form of synthesis in which they are unified. But when we look at the universal, it is clearly impossible, from any inspection of it, to say how many particulars it will contain. Given the generic conception of a rose, for example, it is beyond the human powers to predict under how many varieties

of individual form that genus may be exemplified. The abstract universal affords no key to the diversity in the particular and concrete perceptions said to be contained under it. It is for that reason that, in order to explain *to ourselves* the constitution and arrangement of any number of particulars, we can only do so by representing the idea of the whole as governing the process. Such an idea of the whole governing the form and order of the parts is what is termed a Final Cause.

But the very device which we adopt suggests the thought of an intellect other than ours, in which that accidentality in the correspondence of the particular features in nature to our faculty of universals would be no longer found. It might, so far as the abstract understanding is concerned, be possible that there should have been in experience no opportunity for the exercise of our faculty of universals ; it might have been that every single thing should have been absolutely unique, and that no sequence should ever occur twice in the same way. But, if the universal of human thought has met a response in the individuals of nature, it seems as if the universal had been there already. In this way, the idea of an *intellectus archetypus* is brought forward,—an intellect, that is, which sees the universal in the particular. The world which we perceive—the phenomenal world, as we construct it out of given sensations thought under different rules or relations—would be represented as resting upon a supersensible substratum, in which the separation between concept (rule) and percept (instance) is replaced by a concrete or synthetic universal which specialises itself in a variety of forms.

Adopting the standpoint afforded by such an idea of

a reason in nature, we look upon the existing variety of organised beings as based upon an original organic idea, which employs the mechanism of nature to produce new forms and vary the original type (cf. p. 114). We may from the same point of view regard man as the last link in the course of such organic evolution, and treat him as the closing purpose of the organic process of nature. But in doing so we must not imagine that experience will bear us out, and show how all the order and production in nature have reference to the aims of man. All that can safely be held is that, constituted as we are, it is inevitable for us to look upon everything in the world as subordinated to that end: we must, however we may resist the tendency, take up the anthropocentric position. Man contains the key of the whole situation, "illustrates all the inferior grades, explains each back step in the circle." But, What can man make out of a nature which is thus put at his disposal? What is the ulterior aim, the final purpose of man himself in the order of nature? It cannot be happiness: for not merely is the idea of a condition of being in which man's instincts receive their full satisfaction a vague and changeable one, but it could never be realised, for his nature is not of a kind ever likely to acquiesce in possession and enjoyment. As a *natural* being, indeed, man is bound to pursue happiness; such is the law of his sensuous nature, and to that end all his energies must be subordinate. Yet all the while happiness is beyond the power of nature to give. The most that nature can do for man is to give him a preparation for performing higher work. Civilisation is, in one word, what man can get through the agencies of nature; and civilisation, which detaches

a man from the limitations of kind, and confers on him, as a rational being, the supreme gift of versatility or the capacity for any aims he pleases, has two aspects.

The first aspect of civilisation is the acquisition of capacities, accomplishments and aptitudes to perform whatever work choice or circumstance may render desirable. What purpose he ought to carry out remains yet to be seen. Such development of accomplishments can only be secured by means of the inequality of classes; by a division of the world into, on one hand, the classes that labour—on the other, the classes that have leisure and room for intellectual aims. Amid the great and increasing evils which thus arise for the leisured no less than for the labouring class, there is wrought out, at the cost of individuals though to the gain of the species, the complete development of all the capacities which are latent in the human being. The aim of nature (which, however, is often not the aim of the individual men) is accomplished by the antagonism between men in the social state,—their emulation and competition, their “unsociable sociability.” “Man wishes concord, but nature knows better what is good for his species; she wishes discord.” But progress by competitive rivalry is only feasible under one condition, and that is, that the barbarities of the struggle for existence have been curbed by the establishment of a civil order, where the collective power of the community checks any attempt to violate individual honest liberty. But a single state is inadequate to this task; the true condition for the full and free realisation in social competition of all that lies within the promise of human nature is the formation of a cosmopolitan union of states,—a federation of the world.

Nothing short of such a combination can be the guarantee of a many-sided civilisation.¹ But, in the absence of such a security for everlasting peace without, war still remains as one spring more for promoting the highest evolution of the latent capacities of humanity.

The second part of civilisation is the discipline of the passions, without which no accomplishments avail. It frees from the despotism of the passions, which, though well contrived in reference to the animal side of man, are like chains drawing us in certain narrow and fixed grooves, and embarrassing the free sway of reason. The aim of civilisation, negatively, is thus to free man from his sensual limitations,—to make him feel himself, as he ought to be, truly universal, superior to the sense-world of which on his animal side he forms a portion.

Thus there is a truth at the bottom of the popular conviction that, without man, the world would be purposeless. It is not, however, to afford scope for his intellectual powers, or to consult his pleasure, that the world exists. Unless there be something in man which has a substantive value of its own, something of intrinsic worth, there is nothing to make knowledge valuable, nothing to ennoble the quest for pleasure. That something lies, no doubt, in the human desire—but not in that desire

¹ These views, expounded in the 'Ideas for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,' and in the essay, "Zum Ewigen Frieden," were communicated to A. Comte in a French translation of the former by a young German friend, Gustav von Eichthal. Though they were the only works of Kant which Comte seems to have known, they qualified him, in a letter of December 10, 1824, to describe the German philosopher as "le metaphysicien le plus rapproché de la philosophie positive," and to claim for himself no more than the credit "d'avoir systémisé et arrêté la conception ébauchée par Kant."

- See Littré, 'Comte,' p. 153.

so far as it is tied to natural conditions, and governed by sensual instincts ; not in so far as desire receives its gratification, and thus borrows its motive-power, from without : there is a higher desire which is governed by an internal idea, by the idea of a universe of action possible by its own means, by the view of each exertion of desire as a case of an ideal will, and therefore subject to a universal law. The chief end of man (and thus of the universe) has for its subjective condition that form of desire in which there is a habitual controlling consciousness of membership in an ideal community of rational beings. "A good will is that by which alone man's existence can have an absolute value ; and in relation to it the existence of the world can have an ultimate purpose." "There is nothing in the whole world, ay, or even anything possible to be conceived out of the world, which could be without qualification held to be good, except a good will alone."

The place due to reasoning in morals is a vexed question of the ethical schools. According to the Hedonistic theory, its function is to construct, from time to time, a teleological system of the world, in which the living individual who reasons is always at the head, so that the value of everything is estimated by its contribution to the sentient welfare of the single self. In such a system there are as many chief ends as there are human beings to form such a conception ; and in each, however the aim may vary in its matter, it retains the same formal identity under the title happiness. Every human being, to himself the chief end, is to every other a means. To be reasonable in this theory is to be prudent ; and the aim of a moral theory (in the hedonistic sense)

is to lay down counsels of prudence, *hypothetical imperatives*, or rules, which are binding upon those (and they are all mankind) who find happiness desirable.

The so-called Utilitarian theory of morals, starting from this hedonistic basis, may be said to universalise it. The merit of action is by the utilitarian represented as its tendency (in the most unlimited sense) to promote the greatest happiness of the generality. The function of reasoning in such a theory is to keep alive the perception that the individual is only a member of a community of mankind, and to trace out how this condition affects every act and wish of the individual. For such a purpose it employs the machinery of rewards and punishments, and society is organised in such a way that there is stereotyped in the consciousness of the individual a habit of estimating every action by its results upon the whole community to which he belongs. A corporate or tribal conscience is thus, if not created, certainly made an unmistakable and even preponderant motive amid the other desires of every human being so situated. By the help of these steady influences from without there grows up an idea of a totality, or community, to which all his actions, whether they have or have not yet come under the regulation of specific laws, must be relative: of a system which gives the formative, shaping, controlling touch to his wishes and inclination. Identified at first with some visible organisation on earth, the conception presents itself as the idealised form of that institution; and gradually the conviction arises that the true universal of humanity cannot be envisaged under any particular limited form, but must always remain an idea—a citizenship which is in heaven.

Thus, as Mill says, "the ultimate sanction of all morality is a subjective feeling in our own mind." "Morality," he continues, "rests upon the social feelings of mankind, on that desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures, which is so natural and habitual to man, that except in some unusual circumstances, or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body." It thus appears that, according to the exponents of utilitarianism, the only source from which moral actions can flow, as effects from cause, is a sense of solidarity with humanity, a perception that we are not our own individual selves, but that we share in an ampler life, and belong to a world which only exists in thought,—a perception vivid "in proportion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character." When asked, therefore, why I should be moral, I can reply by assigning no external reason. The unity of humanity, past, present, and to come, may be a fact or a delusion: it certainly cannot be verified by any analysis; it is either perceived or not, and the clearness of the perception cannot be increased by logical arguments.

All *moral* obligation, therefore, is a *categorical imperative*. It is possible, no doubt, to render a reason for complying with any particular law of morality by referring to its consequences; but clearly the ultimate, *i.e.*, the moral sanction itself, refuses to be accounted for in like manner. To ask why we ought to obey the moral law is absurd, because any explanation would only destroy the morality of the law. "We cannot comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative; we can only comprehend its incomprehen-

sibility." But that unaccountability has important consequences. As imperative it seems to be a stranger and an outsider ; as moral, it must be within us. The recognition of the authority of moral law is known as the sense of *Duty*; and in duty there is set before us a necessitation,—we feel that we are obliged to act in such and such a manner. And this sense of subjection to law, of limitation—this presentation of the moral idea as an imperative, and of the realisation of that idea as duty—is the peculiarity, according to Kant, of morality as human.

In other words, the "ought" of morality,—the determination of human desires and actions by something which is and is not ourselves,—is only possible on the assumption of a radical rift in human nature ; an antithesis between a sensuous self and an intelligible self—a phenomenon and a noumenon. Man is undoubtedly a member of the natural world: even his intellectual capacities may up to a certain extent be said to have their province in nature. But man, if he is to be a moral being, must so far *look upon* himself as a member of an intelligible or spiritual world. He must "erect himself above himself." The moral law speaks to the soul. Man as a sensuous, appetitive being, hears the command, which he may disregard or may obey. But his obedience has two forms or degrees. It may be a mere conformity in external act to what the law requires—mere *legality*: and it even may happen that it is obeyed, so to say, by chance, because a certain natural impulse or liking has led us to do by its instigation what the law would have commanded. But the true form of obedience is not obedience, in the strict sense,

at all; rather the soul willingly adopts the dictate of the moral law as a maxim of its own.

It is only when the agent takes up this position as himself at one with the law,—as virtually a lawgiver,—that the will is moral. Morality then implies that the will of the agent itself gives the law: that the will is *autonomous*. And yet, man as a natural being has not this autonomy of will; he has, on the contrary, a will governed by sensuous objects of desire. His autonomous will is an *ideal* will: by it he conceives himself as on the platform of a world where reason rules supreme, whilst at the same time he cannot, as human, free himself from the consciousness that the ideal will is a law restricting and controlling the desires of the natural man. It is only the mystic who can fancy himself already a member of that invisible kingdom: the honest man must always remember that the intelligible world is at best the object of a reasonable faith.

So, too, with *Freedom*, which is only another name for autonomy of will. Freedom, like autonomy, is no quality of the natural will. It is only in the power of adopting the moral law as a maxim governing our will, and adopting it so intimately, that the maxim is thought as the very utterance of our own higher selves, that we are free,—in other words, have a real causative originality,—a power of absolutely commencing a series of events. Freedom, therefore, is revealed by the moral law. When a statement unconditionally commanding action is accepted by the will as its own utterance; when the “thou shalt” of the law becomes the “I will” of the agent,—then in this high region, where the subjective volition is identified with the objective law, we

have a "synthetical judgment *a priori*" which is practical, or governs conduct. But such a judgment cannot be proved by an appeal to experience. We can see if the action is conformable; we cannot see the heart. We can argue at best by the light of the maxim, "Every tree shall be known by its fruits."

The freedom and autonomy of the will, therefore, form the standpoint on which morality is made possible. They describe the qualities of that transcendent will whose voice is the moral law, and which the human soul by reason recognises as her own. They imply, therefore, behind the phenomenal human being a noumenal reality—a will which can will what it ought. In that "intelligible substratum" man is free; and this fact—the great "*factum* of pure reasoning"—this original and unconditioned imperative to act so and not otherwise—is something, as Kant insists, quite beyond all human intelligence; and the trouble employed in seeking for a solution of the question how this can be is wasted. Apart from such transcendental freedom, the theories which explain freedom of the will to a determination by inward and not outward motives, succeed in giving man only the "freedom of the roasting-jack, which for that matter, when once it has been wound up, performs its movements spontaneously."

The moral will and reasoning—for the term good or moral belongs to outward acts only in a secondary way, as presumably proceeding from such a will—is contrasted with the selfish will and reasoning of hedonism by the conception in which it seeks to realise itself. That conception is found in an idea of all rational beings as a spiritual commonwealth in which, in the very truth,

all the citizens are free and equal. Each individual (no longer a solitary autocrat, as hedonism teaches, subordinating all others as means to himself as end) is a member (in thought) of a federation of all rational beings; a federation where indeed his commands have legislative force, but only because his individual will is the very utterance of an indwelling law. Thus man, by this figure, represents himself as legislative,—not as supreme overlord, but as a free citizen in the spiritual world: if he legislates, he is at the same time subject to the legislation. And even if in such spiritual world there be a Sovereign, His will is only the central unity of universal law itself.

Descending from these high latitudes of metaphysic, and attempting to apply the metaphysic to human ethics, when we ask how we are to recognise this adoption of the universal will by ourselves we get but unsatisfactory replies. We can never present the idea of moral goodness—the absolutely good will—in a concrete instance in nature. Nor indeed do we properly require so much. Morality lies not in the particular things which we will, but in the way in which we will; not in the *material* but in the *form* of volition. At least the form is the essential consideration, and governs the matter, as a condition precedes what depends on it for its correctness. The moral law will be made evident in the form of volition. Coming in contact with the appetites or propensities which arise in the phenomenal life of man, the practical reason or moral idea as a law of conduct limits and restricts their operation. Its essential force is restrictiveness of the senses: in its purity the moral law only tells us that in every act we must remember that we are subjects of universal law.

Its representation can be partly made intelligible by finding a *type* for the moral law in the world of experience. By the light of such "typic of the practical judgment" we can see whether or not our will is good. The type is found in an aspect of natural phenomena,—the uniformity and regularity which characterise them. We have therefore to ask ourselves if the action we intend, supposing it were to occur by the laws of a nature of which we ourselves were part, could fairly be treated by us as a thing we could honestly will. Here we have a formal criterion by which to test our maxims of conduct. "Never act except you can also will your principle of action into the rank of universal law;" or, "Act as if the principle by which you act were by your will to be made a universal law of nature;" or, "The principle on which you act must be capable of adapting itself to a possible universal legislation." But it should be remembered that this quality of right action is only selected as a formal or extrinsic mark by which to recognise it. The typic assimilates the inexplicable operation of the moral law on the single will to the analogous features of a physical uniformity, but does not therefore explain the mystery. And it is only a negative test after all, in harmony with the precept, "Do as you would be done to," and with Clarke's principle that "Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do to me, that by the same I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I in the like case should do for him."

On this preliminary condition of adaptability for general legislation all morality is based. But from a merely formal principle it is impossible without the help of other considerations to descend to particular and ma-

terial maxims of conduct. The moral law, as Kant expounds it, declares only the *sine qua non* of morality; it presumes us to have elsewhere become acquainted with the conditions of human life, the nature of individual man, and the relations subsisting between man and man, or man and woman. Given these facts of natural science, it steps in with its high ideal of respect for the universal. But if we ask for explanation of particular right and wrong, and for guidance in particular duty, the Categorical Imperative is more likely to give heat than light; or if it be a light, it is rather the beacon on the hill-top than the lamp to illuminate the domestic chamber (cf. p. 119).

With this preliminary condition, however, the moral law combines a more positive precept, and obliges every responsible being to seek to the height of his power to promote the welfare of the world, including his own. Thus instead of Epicureanism, which treats virtue only as a means of happiness, and instead of Stoicism, which declares that the consciousness of virtue is enough for happiness, Kant, laying prime stress on conformity to moral law as the requisite ground without which happiness cannot be the final aim of a rational being, goes on practically to insist that the furtherance of the supreme good of humanity is the object of moral action. He is here in complete accord with humanitarian or universalistic Utilitarianism. But in stepping on this ground he is involved in difficulties—in the *dialectic of pure practical reasoning*. The command to pursue the supreme good of all human beings requires us to do what can never be certainly achieved in the conditions of the physical world. It bids us realise the

infinite in the finite. To make such realisation possible, it would seem as if we ourselves must be freed from the limitations by which our sensuous nature thwarts and misleads the will, and as if we must have some ground for believing that the course of the physical universe is governed by the principles of moral law.

If our action, then, is laid under a law obliging us to work always for the good of the world, we must assume the existence of a being who guides the world in the interest of morality. Not that Kant says for a moment that it is as necessary to accept the being of a God as to recognise the obligation of moral law. That law commands formally and without promises; it commands us, be the issue of our efforts what it may, to will sincerely and earnestly the promotion of Happiness—the chief good which nature has set before men—in accordance, however, with the rights of universality. But when we consider that we and the whole range of nature are powerless to secure the success of our aims, there rises up the need to assume, by an act of moral faith, the existence of a moral Author and Governor of the universe. Otherwise, with no prospect of victory in the struggle, and with the paralysing sense of a possible failure in the end, the human will would often be fain to surrender, and fold the feeble hands in despair.

Similar motives appeared to Kant to demand a moral faith in the immortality of the soul. The will which seeks to realise the chief good in the world must, if it is perfectly to achieve its end, be itself in complete harmony with the moral law. But as a human will, immersed in natural egoism and subject to the laws of sensuous individual life, man can never in this world

exhibit such conformity. If the individual, therefore, is to be identified with the universal, if the single self must be visibly made an adequate representative of the moral law, it can only be under the image of a never-ending approximation to an ideal perfection throughout eternity. The image, indeed, fails to convey the idea.

"Blessed are the pure in heart," said the Preacher on the Mount, "for they shall see God." But such is not the vision which Kant found revealed in the moral law. Like the lawgiver of ancient Israel, he came to proclaim the law in the wilderness, and his view of the land flowing with milk and honey was only from the lonely heights of Pisgah. The stern mandates of the scientific reason always rested upon him. "Theoretical reasoning," he says, "is right when, following only its own interests, it holds, like the Canonic of Epicurus, that everything must be thrown away as mere speculative dreams which cannot accredit its objective reality by palpable instances capable of being exhibited in experience." The understanding—the faculty of *rules*—is too powerful a presence in his mode of thought. Here and there, as in his æsthetic criticisms, there are glimpses vouchsafed to him of something within us and without us which proclaims the infinity in the finite and the universality in the individual. But the glimpses are distrusted under the prevailing sense that all is but an effect of the human position,—the inherent limitation of the human view. The great ideal realities of life were acknowledged only as ideas which human consciousness required in order to regulate, round off, and unify the theory of nature and the requirements of desire. Their clearest epiphany was seen in the precept

of the moral law. But, even in his view of duty and morality, Kant, as Schiller said, always retained, like Luther, something of the monk.

Kant left behind no *system*, but he threw out suggestions of matchless fertility, and marked out with the instinct of genius the true form of philosophic problems. His philosophy is not, indeed, disconnected or self-contradictory, but its foundations are not sufficiently deep. At every step he carries us beyond his own lines, and hints at a systematic unity which might carry us over the breaks in his thought. These hints were followed out with various success by the succeeding systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. They were his children, though he disowned them, and though they, like Schopenhauer, and with more reason and courtesy, spoke hardly of their father. The Neo-Kantians, who have rent their master's mantle, and find his scientific logic adequate to the requirements of physiological psychology, are less legitimate disciples. But in many ways Kant is honoured. Kant-philology even is better than the half-ignorant worship of a few Kantian phrases. For those who have learned Kant, many questions have ceased to trouble : many are bright with a light unknown before : and others are at least placed in a fair way for further solution.

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